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The Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) was born from a simple but 
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 |      1
AN INTRODUCTION
Nina G. Jablonski
In this volume, we are happy to present the third and final group of essays emerging 
from the discussions of the Effects of Race (EoR) Project at the Stellenbosch 
Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) that occurred in 2016 and 2017. The EoR 
Project is part of the “Being Human Today” initiative, one of the longer-term theme 
projects sponsored by STIAS since 2013. The primary goal of the EoR Project was 
the development of new scholarly research bearing on the disturbing continuation 
of race-thinking and racism, and of antagonism towards fellow human beings 
caused by racism. The EoR Project sought to address the roots of the “everydayness 
of race” in South Africa and elsewhere by exploring widespread misconceptions 
about visible and cultural human diversity, the linguistic infrastructure of racialism, 
and the complexity of multiple identities. The contributors to the EoR Project 
have, over the years, wrestled with the question of how race ideologies have become 
tradition and “common sense”, and are no longer recognised as self-conscious 
belief systems (Swidler, 1986). They have recognised that the “everydayness of 
race”, when viewed from a structuralist perspective, is best understood as a set of 
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assumptions about the nature of the world that has become so unselfconscious as 
to seem a natural, transparent, and undeniable (Geertz, 1975; Swidler, 1986). If 
the contributors to the EoR Project and this volume had any single goal, it could be 
best expressed as achieving further understanding of the complex and perfidious 
assumptions surrounding race and race-thinking so as to further dismantle the 
belief in race as common sense. 
Meetings of the EoR Project took place at STIAS from 2014 through 2017, 
and involved a diverse body of scholars, thinkers, and educators from different 
constituencies in South Africa along with several scholars from Europe and the 
United States. As described in the introduction to The Effects of Race ( Jablonski, 
2018), the “core group” comprised a group of well-established senior scholars who 
engaged in theme-oriented discussions, and the “projects group” of mostly younger 
South African scholars and educators involved in specific, goal-oriented projects. 
This volume represents contributions developed from the discussions at EoR 
core group meetings held at STIAS in July 2016 and July 2017. The members of 
the EoR core group present at STIAS in 2016 were, in alphabetical order: George 
Chaplin, Zimitri Erasmus, Nina Jablonski, Gerhard Maré, Njabulo Ndebele, Barney 
Pityana, Crain Soudien and Göran Therborn. Those present in 2017 were: Zimitri 
Erasmus, Nina Jablonski, Gerhard Maré, Njabulo Ndebele, Barney Pityana, Crain 
Soudien and Göran Therborn.
Prior to meeting each year, core group members decided together on a theme that 
would provide focus to their discussions. In 2016, the theme was “Turning points 
in the history of race and racism in South Africa” and, in 2017, the theme included 
three conjoined questions, “What do you wish to change with regard to race, 
racism and racialism?”, “Why?” and “How would you bring this about?” These 
were big themes, and core group members conceived of them and developed them 
according to their own intellectual backgrounds and personal experiences. In both 
years, preliminary discussions focused on clarifying the topic at hand. In 2016, for 
instance, discussions opened with a fruitful exchange about different members’ 
conceptions of what was meant by a “turning point”. These were not sterile or hair-
splitting discussions of semantic points; they were conversations that warmed up 
group members to engage with one another’s thought processes and reintroduced 
them to the nature and complexity of the topics at hand. 
The dynamics of the core group meetings held at STIAS bear importantly on 
this volume and on the totality of the EoR Project. During meetings, core group 
members trusted and respected one another, and recognised that each person 
brought a valued body of learning and experience to the group. This mutual trust 
and respect made it possible for group discussions to develop naturally and without 
rancour, and mostly without defensiveness of individual intellectual territories. 
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This made for an extraordinarily constructive and elevating atmosphere, even when 
the most sensitive and difficult topics were being considered. The spirit and nature 
of the discussions were aptly summed up by Njabulo Ndebele in conversation at 
the end of the 2016 session, “The elephant is in the room and we are petting it”. 
The 2016 and 2017 discussions revealed the deep thoughtfulness of core group 
members and their willingness to listen carefully to one another and explore bodies 
of knowledge with which they had little familiarity previously. The psychological 
flexibility and learning abilities revealed were impressive and heartening, and 
conduced to a higher level of sophistication and integration of thinking about 
race than we had previously achieved. The whole was much more than the sum 
of its parts.
This volume is divided into two sections, which roughly map the group’s 2016 
and 2017 discussions, respectively. In the first section, “How the Stage Was Set”, 
the authors explore some of the reasons why the concepts and practices of race, 
race-thinking, and racism continued to exist and be reinvented in South Africa and 
elsewhere in the face of legislation and scientific knowledge. Taking inspiration 
from the theme of turning points, the authors refer in their chapters to local or 
global events or movements which influenced these processes in South Africa. 
The contributions reflect clearly too the diverse intellectual backgrounds and 
professional training of the authors. Here we see phenomena examined through 
the lenses of many disciplines: sociology, history, geography, anthropology, 
and writing. 
Crain Soudien sets a courageous and sobering tone for the section and the volume 
in the first chapter, “Racism’s workshop: Explaining prejudice and hate”. He 
explores the cognitive dimensions of racism, prejudice and hate, examining how 
these attributes are acquired and become part of the consciousness of individuals 
and groups. The turning point which catalyses Soudien’s investigation is the 
conclusive amassing of scientific evidence demonstrating the non-existence of 
human races. Why should prejudice and hate persist when the reasons for their 
existence have been eliminated? What Soudien thus excavates in this chapter are 
the reasons and mechanisms for the development and persistence of prejudice and 
hate in the absence of “evidence”. His chapter not only explores the phenomenology 
of the transmission of negative emotions through seemingly trivial expressions 
and gestures, but also how social scientists over the last half-century have sought 
to interpret this troubling phenomenon. This chapter addresses and effectively 
dismisses the contention of many sociobiologists, including Van den Berghe, that 
race is best understood as a manifestation of preferential kin selection, advantageous 
in the evolutionary process (Van den Berghe, 1987).
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In the next chapter, “An unlikely turning point: Skin bleaching and the growth 
of colourism in South Africa”, Nina Jablonski considers how racism and negative 
attitudes towards dark skin colour, especially during the apartheid era, propelled 
the development and use of skin lighteners in South Africa from the mid-twentieth 
century onward. Jablonski shows that one of the ways in which some South 
Africans responded to crises of identity during apartheid was by attempting to 
change their personal appearance. Because skin colour was the most physically 
obvious manifestation of difference, and because preferences for light skin were 
blatant, skin lightening became extremely popular in South Africa when products 
were introduced and widely manufactured in the country beginning in the 1950s. 
Jablonski shows that skin lightening remains popular since the end of apartheid 
because preferences for lighter skin remain and the psychosocial pressures to 
lighten the skin are felt by many.
The next two chapters, by George Chaplin and Göran Therborn, respectively 
examine the social, racial and political landscapes of South Africa during its long 
period as a settler-colonial state. In his chapter, “Settler-colonialism, nationalism 
and geopolitical politics: An overview of the mobilisation of race in South Africa 
in the context of lost turning points”, Chaplin examines how attitudes and policies 
towards race in South Africa and official South African government positions on 
race during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were influenced by social 
and political movements outside of South Africa. Most historical and sociological 
treatments of South African race policies during this time emphasise that South 
Africa’s policies developed sui generis, and did not draw inspiration or direction 
explicitly from movements outside of South Africa. Chaplin disagrees, and in 
an expansive historical overview dissects the influences of global geopolitics on 
the development of nationalist movements in South Africa, from early Russian 
communism to Nazism to later Soviet communism. His detailed exegesis provides 
detailed evidence for the influence of these contrasting powerful ideologies on 
the political and governmental landscape of South Africa. Of greatest importance 
is his description of the rise of influence of Nazi ideology on the development of 
the philosophical underpinning and racialised mechanisms of the South African 
apartheid state. The eventual triumph of Nazi philosophy in South Africa in 
everything but the name was and remains a source of shame and denial even in 
academic circles in the country. Chaplin’s reference to a lost turning point in his 
title makes fascinating use of an engaging counterfactual scenario from mid- and 
late twentieth century history. He ponders if the course of apartheid might have 
been shortened if those opposing it had not embraced Soviet communism, and 
whether racial justice in South Africa may have been better served and apartheid 
reversed if American and European democracies had not feared the communists 
they saw lurking behind African nationalism.
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In the next chapter, “From settler to postcolonial: The turn of the South African 
nation-state in a comparative perspective”, Therborn looks at the twentieth-century 
history of South Africa in the context of other nation-states and grounds South 
Africa in the context of global colonialism. His focus is on how the establishment 
of a new democratic government in 1994 marked a turnaround in the ideological 
underpinnings of the country, if not entirely in its economic fortunes. Therborn’s 
chapter draws considerably on his highly regarded overviews of the diverse origins 
of nation-states. As a settler-state, South Africa was inherently racist by definition, 
but it developed a uniquely repressive manifestation of settler-statehood because 
of its unusual demography, with white Europeans accounting for only 20% of its 
population. Examining its “racial rehabilitation” in the context of other settler-
states, he notes that South Africa’s rejection of apartheid was part of a global 
movement of human equalisation, which included rejection of institutionalised 
racism and sexism. He shows how the abolition of apartheid in 1994 in South 
Africa meant the abolition of the settler-state itself and all the mechanisms of social 
repression that went with it. This did not, however, bring an immediate turnaround 
in the fortunes of the country or its once-repressed populations. Although much 
has been done to address the many severe manifestations of inequality in South 
Africa, the country remains markedly unequal because, Therborn argues, it was so 
from its earliest days as a settler-state before apartheid. 
The volume’s second section, “Assessment and Future Prospects”, is devoted to 
chapters expressing some of the deepest of the EoR core group’s discussions about 
the costs of a racialised world order to humans and humanity. These sprang 
from the group’s exploration of “the three questions” in 2017: “What do you 
wish to change with regard to race, racism and racialism?”, “Why?” and “How 
would you bring this about?” The topics which emerged from consideration of 
these questions were close to the hearts of core group members, and reflected 
individual interests and predilections as well as the influence of current events such 
as the #RhodesMustFall movement. The group’s discussions and members’ essays 
did not express clear solutions to profound problems, but rather developed into 
deeply thoughtful foundations for detailed explorations into South African racial 
politics and the long-term effects of race in South Africa and elsewhere. The 
discussions and essays were predictably diverse, and included investigation of the 
South African Constitution and specifically, how contemporary politics and social 
values failed to fulfil the promises of social equality enshrined in the document. 
They also considered the biological and social understandings of race, and how 
new information from both the biological and social sciences was changing our 
perspective on the nature of the human condition, including the association of 
biological and social phenomena with “race”. Finally, the discussions and essays 
explored how race-thinking framed the very nature of human beings and the human 
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condition, including the ways we express ourselves and relate to one another 
through language. The six chapters in this section comprise distinct forays into 
the realities of race-thinking and their pervasive and sinister effects on the human 
being and human societies.
In the first chapter of this section, Gerhard Maré revisits the most salient theme of 
his oeuvre in, “Ways of being: ‘Race’ as common sense; non-racialism as humanist 
necessity”. Maré’s chapter is a conversation with himself and the reader in which 
he poses questions about race and race-thinking at all phenomenological levels. 
This is an uncomfortable conversation about the nature of the verities of race-
thinking and how every manifestation of race-thinking and racialism – whether it 
touches on biology, language, human rights, or the greater social order – is about 
recognition of inherent difference. The scourge and the tyranny of race, he argues, 
is that it deforms the substrate of thinking about everything else. Maré is cautiously 
optimistic about the future and challenges current and future generations to 
determine their own moral compass and to not be directed by social constructions 
of the past.
In the next chapter, Nina Jablonski discusses “The effects of racism on the human 
body”, an exploration into the nature and kinds of biological damage done to the 
body by long-term racism. This chapter does not explore “racial differences” in 
biology, but differences in biology brought about by racism. The chapter peels 
away the layers of effects of racism and discrimination on human health. Effects 
on socioeconomic position mature during human lifetimes into adverse effects 
on well-being through health disparities at multiple levels. Jablonski’s rumination 
on the unrecognised toll of epigenetic modifications to the human body caused 
by the stresses of racism raises new sets of worries about the costs of racism, as 
we begin to recognise the many ways in which human bodies and human genes 
are being constantly remodelled by the physical and social environment and by 
life experience.
Crain Soudien, in the next chapter, “Knowing and being: Living our learning about 
‘race’”, develops one of his deepest discussions to date on the nature of what we 
might call “race knowledges” and how they affect our being and state of knowing. 
Like Maré’s chapter, Soudien’s is a personal reflection based on a life of observation 
and experience about and with race-thinking and recognition of the humanitarian 
consequences of a racialised world. This chapter is a search into the nature of the 
kinds of knowledge that exist about race and how we as individuals metabolise 
those knowledges. The discussion of how inequality changes the fabric of any 
relationship is insightful and, here, Soudien places the burden on the knower, the 
person aware of the effects of their status on life’s outcomes. His prescription for 
the future – that we should have consciousness of regard for all human beings and 
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know others as we know ourselves – is not new, but the path he takes to reach the 
conclusion is, and makes for, a highly salutary read. 
The following chapter, “Semantics in the philosophy of race” by George Chaplin 
and Nina Jablonski, examines another aspect of race knowledges by looking at 
the extent to which race-thinking has co-opted our consciousness and language. 
Chaplin and Jablonski contend the fossilised lexicon associated with race has made 
any attempt to deal with the effects of racism almost impossible. The solution 
they advance is the creation of a new, non-pejorative vocabulary for defeating race 
that is acceptable to all. The authors’ discussion is unique in that they incorporate 
into their discussion a philosophical repudiation of race as a biological concept 
applicable to humans. The fact that human races have no metaphysical reality, 
they argue, is the ultimate negation of race-thinking. That our current depauperate 
lexicon prevents us from describing this properly and abolishing racism is a tragedy, 
but hope arises, the authors contend, from a willingness to create a new way of 
thinking, conceiving, and verbalising about humanity. 
Zimitri Erasmus, in the next chapter, “‘Who was here first?’, or ‘Who lives here 
now?’: Indigeneity, a difference like no other”, looks at race knowledges from a 
related perspective, but arguing from different evidence. She explodes the overused 
simplification of race being just a social construct by looking closely at “race” as 
composed of interconnected and institutionalised practices of power in relation to 
class, gender and multiple other factors. These practices are specific to historical 
moments and together they shape the racialised realities of any place and time. 
Erasmus’ discussion focuses specifically on the status of people who self-identify 
as “Khoi-San”, and their status as the original indigenous people of South Africa. 
She critically examines the nature and application of the concept of indigeneity 
as it has been applied to the Khoi-San, and especially as it has been used recently 
to differentiate them from other non-European South Africans and accord them 
special privileges. Erasmus’ treatment exposes the ultimately contingent nature 
of race and the practice of race labelling, and questions the value of labels such as 
“indigenous” especially when they are applied as sops without substance. 
Njabulo Ndebele ends this section and the volume with his provocative chapter, 
“South Africa beyond ‘non-racialism’”. Here, Ndebele looks beyond the damage 
wrought to individuals and societies by race and racialised conceptions of the 
human condition to examine the real costs of these phenomena to the world, 
as they have played out over centuries. After counting the horrific worldwide 
humanitarian and economic costs of racism, he does not dwell in bitterness or 
pessimism, however. He sees a bright future and, in South Africa in particular, a 
new human order grounded in a “majoritarian human norm that carries the motive 
responsibility to create a new and humane future for all”. 
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In the diversity of its chapters and their respective authors, we have in this volume 
a unified loud voice, arcing towards a world without race, race-thinking and 
racism. This is the voice that calls out the many origins of injustice that people 
have meted out to one another and experienced as the result of a racialised world 
order. The chapters in this volume were born out of the unity of humanity that was 
experienced during the STIAS meetings of the EoR Project, and it is the hope of 
all the contributors that this loud and strong voice will be heard. With persistent 
effort, race will be transformed from common sense to nonsense.
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Introduction
The relationship between prejudice, hate and racism has an extensive and complex 
literature (see Davidio, Hewstone, Glick & Esses, 2010). The discussion, however, 
suffers, as Royzman, McCauley and Rozin (2005:27) suggest, from a kind of 
circularity. Much of it is self-validating. It uses examples of phenomena such as 
prejudice and hate to explain and account for what these phenomena actually are. 
This chapter is motivated by the urgency to understand them better. Situated in a 
larger project which seeks to explain how racism works as a process of reasoning 
– its psychosocial complexity and particularly its emplacement inside and astride 
the social and the psychological. The project has as its focus the individual mind, 
not as it functions as an autonomous psychological organism, but as it interacts with 
the larger social context in which it is located. At the core of the project is an interest 
in the cognitive dimensions of racism, prejudice and hate. How are they acquired? 
How do they become part of the consciousness of individuals and groups? 
RACISM’S WORKSHOP
Explaining prejudice and hate
Crain Soudien
1
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The immediate motivation for this work comes, it needs to be made clear, from an 
apparent upsurge in South Africa, and, indeed, in many other parts of the world, 
of hate-speech and hate-crimes motivated by racism and the need, in the moment, 
to respond to these events. As observers of hate crimes in South Africa, the South 
African Hate Crime Working Group note, while
[t]here are no official statistics on the number of cases of hate crimes, … 
human rights groups have documented a disturbing pattern of violent attacks, 
ranging from race-related attacks and targeted mob violence in residential 
and commercial districts occupied by foreign nationals, to severe beatings of 
LGBTI individuals and ‘corrective’ rapes and murders of lesbians … . What 
has been documented is likely only the tip of the iceberg as it is widely believed 
that many incidents – particularly lower level violence and harassment – go 
unreported …  (South African Hate Crime Working Group, c.2012:3)1
Supplementing this observation are the results of the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation’s 2015 Barometer Survey (Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:11) which 
shows that while more than a third (35,6%) of the respondents surveyed reported 
that they had not experienced any form of racism, 11,9% said that they experienced 
racism all the time. There is, however, a more fundamental concern. This concern 
has to do with the knowledge base of that which supposedly lies behind many of 
the most heinous murders that have taken place around the world and especially 
in South Africa – the knowledge of “race”. While there continues to be a group of 
scientists (see Edwards, 2003; Dawkins & Wong, 2005) who insist that the idea of 
“race” is real biologically, the consensus scientifically is that the process involved in 
the mapping of the human genome has revealed nature’s “real world of irremediably 
diverse individuality … Nature’s world of diverse individuality illustrate(s) that the 
concept of race has no genetic or scientific basis; and that there is no way to tell one 
ethnicity from another in the five Celera genomes” (Fields & Fields, 2014:6-8). 
This consensus denotes a turning point. In terms of what science currently knows, 
it is not possible to distinguish “race”, yet, in the minds of many it can be done. 
It can be done, and, what is more, sufficiently clearly that they will kill for it. It 
is how this falsehood works in the everyday mental logics of its custodians that 
requires urgent analysis. The “turn” has not yet happened for them, or, it has, and 
this requires a great deal more analysis, as the case of Barend Strydom explored 
in this chapter suggests, precipitated in individuals with deeply ingrained ideas 
of their superiority, race, gender, nationality, and more profound experiences of 
disorientation. Extreme violence is for them, then, the only way to “correct” the 
social order. 
1 See also the website www.lovenothate.org.za
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In relation to this disjuncture, the question holding the larger enquiry and 
motivating the study is: Do we know enough about how the idea of “race” lives on 
and why it constitutes such an extraordinary site of self- and group-capture? Do 
we understand its compulsions, the feints and parries, subterfuges, deceptions, 
dishonesties, falsities, and superficialities it harbours within itself? 
Towards getting at these issues – the paradox inside the turn the world is 
experiencing – the chapter raises the issue of what takes place between the social 
and the psychological, and specifically that which Krysan (2000:154) has described 
as the “imbalance” in the psycho-social discussion – the dominance of the cognitive 
and the neglect of issues of affect. I am interested in affect broadly, but my focus in 
this chapter on the form of hate. I do so, as suggested above, against the apparent 
persistence around the world, and pointedly in countries such as South Africa 
and the United States, of deep, egregious, and sometimes violent forms of social 
discrimination, often with racial, gender and religious features. It is in response to 
the latter, as part of my own interest in the relationship between reason and affect, 
or the emotional and the political, or, more prosaically, the heart and the head, that 
I have chosen to focus on the emotion of hate. To understand hate better, there is a 
need to return to the foundational understandings that exist around prejudice, hate, 
and their related syndromes. There is need for refreshing the analytic tools and 
discursive frameworks that are available for understanding contemporary racism.
The chapter begins with a review of what we know about prejudice and hate 
in psychological terms. The research base for hate, it needs to be said, especially 
forms of hate in relation to racism and sexism, is distinctly smaller, less empirical, 
and less theoretical than that for prejudice. While hate is often subsumed within 
explanations of prejudice, largely correctly so, there is need to show how it can be 
distinguished from other forms of prejudice and how, in this distinction, it works. 
With this understanding, the chapter begins with an exploration of prejudice, what 
it means and how it is related to hate. It then draws out the major debates around 
hate, what it is and what it includes and excludes. In the conclusion, the chapter 
looks at the case of the South African white supremacist, Barend Strydom, who 
murdered eight black people in 1988. The judge who found him guilty cited hate 
as a factor in the perpetration of the murders. The purpose behind the exercise is 
to make better sense of what is meant when hate is invoked alongside of and in 
the process of discriminating, in whatever form, against another person or group. 
How does it relate to prejudice and what does it depend on; moreover, what does it 
recruit and mobilise in the process of taking position in relation to another person 
or group? I raise these questions because, one can argue, both its meaning and how 
it works, are loose propositions which are yoked into service behind explanations 
of phenomena, such as racism and sexism, in frequently unedifying kinds of ways. 
As propositions they perform all kinds of functions.
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Prejudice
Prejudice, building on the work of Gordon Allport (1954; 1979) and Thomas 
Pettigrew (1959), has a strong literature based on a relatively strong research 
and empirical record of research into discrimination. While, as Jacobs and Potter 
(1998:par. 5) have pointed out, “sociologists and social psychologists have long 
wrestled with the concept of prejudice, (and) have been unable to agree on a single 
definition”, the work of Allport (1954), Pettigrew (1959) and Aboud (1988) has 
anchored the different approaches scholars have taken to the discussion. There is a 
reasonable consensus that prejudice is a negative attitude towards individuals and 
groups based solely on their membership of a group to which is attributed certain 
characteristics. Aboud’s (1988:6) extension of this is that prejudice is a “unified, 
stable, and consistent tendency to respond in a negative way towards members of a 
particular ethnic group”. 
Allport’s (1954) five level model of prejudice, lain out in his foundational work, 
The Nature of Prejudice, remains one of the most useful texts for understanding the 
ways in which human beings manage what we would in contemporary times would 
call othering. As other scholars have suggested, it involves coming to attitudes, 
dispositions, and forms of behaviour towards others through three key moves. 
The first move is that of classification, the second is attribution and the third is 
evaluation. In the first, people are classified and categorised in particular kinds 
of ways. Then, secondly, they are allocated membership of one or other of the 
categories. Finally, they are evaluated positively or negatively (see Zick, Kupper & 
Hovermann, 2011). It is this three-step progression through a process of reasoning 
by which the Allport model has come to be known as the cognitive approach.
There are five levels in Allport’s analysis. These levels, on a continuum of intensity, 
are antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination. 
Antilocution, as the term implies, is the “talk” form. It is the least intense form of 
othering involving prejudice-laden forms of speech amongst individuals about 
others upon whom certain disliked social, cultural and other attributes are imposed. 
Extermination stands at the other end in this spectrum of prejudice. It involves the 
deliberate decision on the part of an individual or a group to eliminate, remove, 
or destroy another group based on their perceived attributes and characteristics. 
In-between, generally, but not always, in ascending order of both consciousness and 
scale, are avoidance, discrimination and physical attack. Avoidance is the escalation 
of speech to action – the decision to actually avoid individuals from groups 
projected as the object of dislike. Important about avoidance is its restriction on 
the self. It has no direct impact on those who are the object of dislike. It may also 
still remain within the confines of individual behaviour. Discrimination arises when 
Racism’s workshop |      15
an individual and more consequentially groups make the decision to exclude or 
withhold from others’ rights and entitlements, such as access to public goods and 
facilities. Physical attack occurs when an individual or group moves to violence 
against an other or others who are the object of dislike. 
Why prejudice exists and arises is a fundamental question in the discussion. This 
question was engaged in a deeply important debate between Allport and the German 
social theorist Adorno. The debate is important for a number of reasons, the most 
important, of course, is accounting for the scale and intensity of the holocaust. 
What had happened at a supposed apogee of civilisation was unprecedented in 
its barbarism. That six million human beings could be clinically and thoughtlessly 
exterminated demanded explanation. The intense moral confusion the holocaust 
brought on could not simply be consigned to history. 
What was Adorno’s thesis? Adorno and his colleagues argued that the rise of 
fascism in Germany was the result of an individual’s personality type. Based 
on psychometric studies (including case studies and clinical interview), using 
what they called the F-scale (F for “fascism”) they concluded that deep-seated 
personality traits predisposed some individuals towards harshness, cruelty, 
totalitarianism, and anti-democratic ideas. They described this as the authoritarian 
personality. Authoritarianism, characterised by nine different markers, they argued, 
predisposed people to prejudice (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & 
Sanford, 1950; McLeod, 2014). Of these, three were particularly significant, 
namely Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission and Authoritarian Aggression. 
In terms of this, the authoritarian personality tended to have a rigid adherence to 
conventional attitudes and values, was hostile to those perceived to be of inferior 
status, deferential to those of supposed higher status, and had a tendency to 
condemn, reject, and punish those who did not conform to what was understood to 
be the convention (McLeod, 2014:13). Adorno et al.’s (1950) own work attributed 
the authoritarian personality to a combination of socialisation and child-rearing 
patterns and family structure. In families where authoritarianism arose, typically, 
a strict father figure dominated the family structure. Others who have adopted this 
approach suggest that authoritarianism may also be, in part, genetic.
Allport and his colleagues’ challenge to the Adorno thesis was not that the 
authoritarian personality did not exist, but that it did not explain how, amongst 
other things, whole social groups could be prejudiced. Was every person classified 
white prejudiced? Was every person considered male prejudiced against people 
considered female? It also implied, somewhat contradictorily, that all the members 
of a social group perceived to be bearers of prejudice would have to have an 
authoritarian personality. A key point Allport sought to make was that there was no 
such thing as a prejudiced personality type.
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Why people were prejudiced, Allport, his colleagues and the major group of scholars 
who have followed in his wake argued (see Roets & Van Hiel, 2012:349), had to 
do with the fundamental cognitive need to make sense of the social space in which 
they found themselves. It is for this reason that the Allport approach has come to 
be called the cognitive approach. Roets and Van Hiel (2012) argue that “… some 
people really hate uncertainty and therefore rely on the most obvious information, 
often the first information they come across, to reduce it. (And that is why they 
favour authorities and social norms which make it easier to make decisions).” In 
relation to this, Allport and Pettigrew began their argument with the view that 
prejudice was not a personality trait. Personality, they suggested, was biologically 
determined at birth. Prejudice was something else. It was psychosocial. It arose in 
the process of the individual or the group making a judgement about another based 
on previous decisions and experiences (Allport, 1979) and could be understood as 
the use of a negative feeling, as in “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant 
… A feeling, favourable or unfavourable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not 
based on actual experience” (Ponterotto, Utsey & Pederson, 2006). Critically, it 
was located in consciousness – a faulty and inflexible generalisation – and had three 
components: a cognitive component, an affective component and a behavioural 
component. Allport, staying within the Freudian tradition, argued that what 
caused it was an
[u]nderlying insecurity that seems to lie at the root of the [prejudiced] 
personality. [This insecurity was the result of] unresolved infantile conflicts 
with parents or siblings … [or] persistent failure in later years [which]… 
Produced a crippled ego in need of a crutch.. [In such personalities] prejudice 
… develops as an important incident in the total protective adjustment … 
central to which is repression … Associated characteristic devices to bolster 
a weak ego … include ‘moralism’, ‘dichotomisation’, a ‘need for definiteness’, 
‘externalisation of conflict’, ‘institutionalism’, and ‘authoritarianism’: the 
earmarks of a personality in whom prejudice is functionally important. 
 (Allport, 1979:396-397)
Much of the current discussion about prejudice has followed in the theoretical 
footsteps of Allport and his colleagues. It proceeds on the basis that prejudice is 
based on social perceptions or attitudes towards others which are themselves 
based on stereotypes. These stereotypes may be deliberately taught as is the 
case in school systems all over the world where faulty “facts” about people who 
are supposedly different from oneself are actively propagated in the curriculum. 
However, they may also simply exist in implicit, unspoken, and unarticulated forms 
– gestures, reactions, and dispositions to others which circulate in the social spaces 
inhabited by individuals and groups. In both cases, they operate on the basis of 
attribution of internal properties to a person or a group based on external markers 
or characteristics of those persons or groups. The external markers could be both 
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symbolic and physical – names with respect to the former, or physical attributes 
such as gender and skin colour with respect to the latter. 
Formally, what one is seeing in the process of attribution is the unfolding of a 
complex relationship between the social and the psychological. Attempts to explain 
this relationship make it clear that the making of prejudice is not just simply social 
or psychological. It is in the interplay of the two. In this interplay are the following 
dimensions or elements: knowing, adjusting, value-expression and ego-defensive. 
Each element is fundamentally formed at the interface between the social and 
the psychological. It is about the social, as in the group, however the idea of the 
group is constituted, being processed through the cognitive apparatus of the 
individual, or what others have described as the mind in society. Knowing, as a 
result, is about making sense of experience in its primarily social form, and the need 
to understand the world. This is always accompanied by the need to adjust – to 
respond to the normative order. Adjusting is, therefore, responding to inducement 
or punishment, and the decision in relation to the stereotype to do or not to 
do those things which will secure for one approval and so inclusion. Again, this 
appears to be individualistic but is fundamentally about the individual responding 
to the social. Value-expression is that decision to use or adopt a stereotype to 
achieve self-actualisation and so a sense of integrity/identification with one’s social 
environment. Ego-defensiveness is the shoring up of a stereotype to protect the ego 
against self-criticism. This last element is derived from Freud in his argument that 
people seek to displace their aggressions and frustrations in situations when they 
cannot direct their anger against the real cause of their frustrations, which may be 
located in some completely different issue or factor. This produces what he called 
scapegoating where frustration produces aggression and aggression frustration. 
The power of this work is its appreciation of the multiplicity of social and 
psychological forces that are at work in combination – complex forms of personal 
insecurity underpinned by weak ego forms held together by prejudice.
Two derivative explanations of prejudice have developed in the last 30 years or 
so in response to criticisms of the perceived psychological or individualistic bias 
to this general theory. One is the theory of social dominance and the other is 
social identity theory. Social dominance has as its essential tenet the notion that 
dominant groups believe that there is a natural hierarchy amongst individuals and 
groups which justifies their attitudes and actions over those they deem to be their 
inferiors. This allows them to act out their feelings towards subordinate groups. 
Social identity theory was developed by the prominent social psychologist Tajfel 
in the 1970s. Tajfel, building on, first, the idea that individuals and groups when 
in the presence of others will instinctively make distinctions between themselves 
and those perceived to be other to themselves, and so will emphasise their own 
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perceived social identity. Secondly, the idea that they will naturally stress their own 
positive self-image, argued that social identity lends itself to the production and 
reproduction of prejudice.
Three important versions of social dominance which have sought to lift the 
significance of the social in the making of prejudice are available in the work of 
Jackman (1994), Sidanius and Pratto (1993), as well as a stream of research building 
on the scholarship of Blumer (1958). Jackman, writing from a Marxist perspective, 
argued that racism emanated not from the psychological, but from group interest. 
Dominant groups created myths to justify and perpetuate existing inequalities. 
Racial beliefs including prejudices were “merely ‘cognitive props’ developed by 
the dominant group to effectively defend their dominance – not with force and 
hostility, but with, as Jackman calls it, a ‘velvet glove’” (Krysan, 2000:151). A more 
psychological version of social dominance is offered by Sidanius and Pratto who 
argue that “[t]he causal force behind group conflict (and by implication racial 
policy attitudes) is a human drive for group domination” (ibid.). Social dominance 
in this view is distinguishable from personality and individual characteristics and 
depends strongly on the legitimising myths of the dominant social group. Holding 
the focus of this chapter in perspective, the emphasis on hate, “Sidanius and his 
colleagues explicitly dismiss antiblack affect as an important predictor of racial 
prejudice … What is important is one’s attachment to the in-group, ethnocentrism, 
and a general ideology of group superiority” (Krysan, 2000:152). 
Valuably, in cognisance of the discussion about the relative valence of the social 
and the psychological, inheritors of the Blumer tradition (1958) such as Bobo et al. 
(1997) (also see Bobo, 2000), have sought to locate prejudice, even in its individual 
expression, in its wider social context. Bobo (2000:140-143) suggested that:
The core argument here is that racial politics involves a nettlesome fusion of 
racial identities and attitudes with racial group interests. It suggests that many 
whites will oppose affirmative action not so much because they see a race-
based policy as contravening their loftiest values or because they have learned 
a new, politically relevant set of resentments of blacks; but rather because they 
perceive blacks as competitive threats for valued social resources, statuses 
and privileges.
Two observations about this explanation are important to make. The first is its 
emphasis on the social. It suggests that groups (or individuals) make assessments 
about their interests which are derived from their perceptions of the realities of the 
conflicts in which they find themselves. These assessments “(are) not necessarily 
an objective assessment of [what those realities are]” (Krysan, 2000:153). So, for 
example, the perception of the threat of losing a job on the part of a white person 
could be underpinned by the prejudice that “blacks are pushing too fast” (ibid.). 
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The second observation, pertinent for the discussion, is that the explanation does 
not work with these assessments in their psychological form. There is, it can be 
argued, insufficient reference to the affective.
What are we left with in this discussion? I would like to suggest, and this anticipates 
the discussion on hate which follows below, is that the discussion has helpfully 
foregrounded social factors in the reasoning processes involved in the making of 
prejudice. This description of the process of reasoning, however, I would like to 
suggest underplays emotion and the significance of affect in the ways in which 
individuals and groups structure their explanations for why they behave as they 
do. There is a need to bring affect into much clearer perspective to show how it 
produces what I would like to describe as bad cognition. The range of affective 
conditions, in all their positive and negative inflections, from mild preference 
and or distaste to searing love or hate, and their articulation with the cognitive 
needs much more empirical scrutiny. How emotion interacts with the cognitive is 
undoubtedly complex but needs to be understood. It is against this that the chapter 
turns to the significance of hate. 
Hate
More than 60 years after Allport wrote The Nature of Prejudice we are now 
beginning to think more deliberately about where the phenomenon of hate fits into 
this framework of prejudice. Behind this development are two issues of concern. 
The first is analytic. It has to do with the need to distinguish hate more clearly 
within the spectrum of psychological dispositions involved in the phenomena 
of racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination. Its loose use and somewhat 
profligate deployment in making sense of all forms of bias, discrimination and 
othering (around whatever form of identity or object of attention) is unsatisfactory. 
This leads to the second concern, that of how we should be acting – the realm of 
the political. This concern is about how to make sense of hate so that we can act in 
ways that are politically appropriate and meaningful. In light of both the persistence 
and the apparent shifts in the forms and dynamics of racism, there is a need to 
understand it better in order to respond to it more efficaciously. 
The most significant theorist on hate in the contemporary period is Robert 
Sternberg (2003) (see also Sternberg and Sternberg, 2008). Sternberg (2003:299) 
makes the point that “the dictionary definition of hate is “to have strong dislike or 
ill will for; loathe; despise”, or “to dislike or wish to avoid; shrink from”. These, he 
says, serve as useful starting points but are not sufficiently detailed as an ending 
point. Interestingly, in his unfolding of his Duplex Theory of Hate, he himself does 
not venture a more satisfactory definition. What he does do, and this is sufficient, 
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it is suggested here, is develop a theory of what it is. This theory rests on five 
fundamental claims about hate. These are that:
1. Hate is very closely related psychologically to love.
2. Hate is neither the opposite of nor the absence of love.
3. Hate, like love, has its origins in stories that characterise the target of 
the emotion.
4. Hate, like love, can be characterised by a triangular structure generated by 
thesestories.
5. Hate is a major precursor of many terrorist acts, massacres, and genocides.
 (Sternberg, 2005:38)
I return to this below.
In an important intervention in what hate is, Royzman, McCauley and Rozin 
(2005:27) take issue with descriptions of the phenomenon, which essentially make 
it either what they call ostensive or stipulative in its form. An ostensive description 
or definition essentially is one which invokes what are thought to be examples of 
the condition to define the condition itself: “… a definiens is communicated by 
either literally pointing to or otherwise indexing a case in which the definiendum 
is thought to be in evidence … Thus, one may give an ostensive definition of  ‘pain’ 
by pointing to a person in the throes of a toothache and saying … ‘This is what 
pain is like’” (ibid.). A stipulative definition constructs the content of hate and 
then goes to look for it (Royzman et al., 2005:22). It is essentially self-validating. 
Hate in both these approaches is whatever is going on. One sees Royzman and his 
colleagues’ argument clearly in the two references cited here of Sternberg. In the 
first, he describes what the components of hate are; in the second, he develops his 
taxonomy of types of hate. For the record, he says that hate has three components: 
the negation of intimacy where individuals or groups seek to place distance 
between themselves and others because others arouse repulsion and disgust in 
them; passion which could take the form of anger or fear in response to a threat; 
and decision-commitment which is marked by cognitions of devaluation and 
diminution through contempt for the target group (Sternberg,  2005:39). These 
three components generate seven different types of hate, cool hate (negation of 
intimacy), hot hate (passion alone), cold hate (decision-commitment alone), 
boiling hate (disgust of negation of intimacy plus passion), simmering hate 
(negation of intimacy plus decision-commitment), seething hate (passion plus 
decision-commitment) and burning hate (negation of intimacy plus passion plus 
decision-commitment) (Sternberg, 2005:30-40). 
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Royzman and his colleagues (2005:31), interpreting this literature, come to the 
following conclusion:
Our analysis leaves us uncertain about the much-cited link between hate and 
intergroup violence such as genocide, ethnic riots, or hate crimes. If hate is 
defined ostensively through paradigm cases of armed conflict and killing, 
then the notion that hate is responsible for mass violence is a tautology. 
Conversely, if hate is to be spelled out in terms of its lay meaning, as a form 
of inhibited defiance, or in terms of a stipulated meaning, for example, as a 
syndrome of inverse caring, then the empirical evidence for the link between 
hate and intergroup violence remains to be seen. That is the very status of 
hate as a progenitor of evil rests on a prior conceptual decision about which 
phenomenon one is willing to probe under the heading of hate and which 
one will opt to see as ‘being not about hate at all’.
Given these challenges, they are reluctant to describe hate in categorical terms. 
There is no single formulation, they say, that will satisfy the demands posed by any 
interpretation of what hate is. Following this opening gambit for making sense of 
hate, Susan Opotow (2005:122) helpfully says that “the psychological study of hate 
has a curious centrifugality that deals with particular manifestations of hate, but 
offers few cross-contextual analyses that examine the core meaning of hate across 
contexts”. To take the discussion forward, Royzman et al. return to an explanation 
provided by Shand (Royzman et  al., 2005:5) who wrote in the 1920s. Shand 
described hate as a bundle of episodic dispositions united by a common emotional 
object or a common category of such objects. It was the perfect antinomy of love. 
Love involved the positive alignment between the emotions of the lover and the 
fortunes of the beloved. Hate was the alignment in the negative: “It was neither 
a special emotion nor a blend of emotions, but rather a tendency to emote in a 
number of ways to a number of situations involving the object of hatred” (Royzman 
et al., 2005:6). Irwin Staub (2005:52) describes hate in similar terms: 
[…] hate is built out of a complex of cognitions and emotions. The cognitive 
components are likely to include devaluation or a negative view of some other 
and the perception of threat from that other. The emotional components are 
likely to include dislike, fear, anger, and hostility. Another likely element 
of hate is a sense of rightness or justice about acting against the object of 
one’s hate. 
This can take ideological form – the belief that a desirable ideal will produce a 
better world. Opotow (2005:125), reading the literature on hate, described it as a 
“compound construct mingling anger and aggression … its emergence is relational, 
cumulative and a response to attacks on one’s personhood”. 
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It is this difficulty of the compound nature of hate, I want to suggest, that has led to 
its loose use in many contexts and situations – most notably in the evocation of the 
phenomenon of hate crimes.
Some issues: How do prejudice and hate work?  
Do they work differently?
With this explanation above, can one say that hate is categorically different to 
prejudice? Does it consist of different elements to that of prejudice? The fullest 
explanation of how hate works is available in the writing of Sternberg (2005). 
He suggests that the basic processing system “that applies to the formation and 
processing of impressions about groups and individuals is the same” (Sternberg, 
2005:38). What is this processing system?
Sternberg’s processing involves the three components described above: negation 
of intimacy or distancing, passion, and decision-commitment. Distancing arises 
from the arousal of repulsion or disgust an individual or group feels in relation 
to a person or group. It may arise from the actions of the person or a group, or is 
stimulated by propaganda which depicts the person or group in subhuman or less 
than human ways. Passion in hate expresses itself in anger or fear in response to 
a threat, and decision-commitment is characterised by cognitions of devaluation 
and diminution through contempt for the hated group. These components 
generate in various combinations the seven types of hate described above. In their 
accumulation and combinations, these elements generate three levels of danger: 
mild hate-based when one of the components is present, moderate hate-based 
danger when two of the components are present, and severe hate-based danger 
when all three of the elements are active (Sternberg, 2005:41). Sternberg takes 
this process explanation a step further by invoking the idea of the story-based 
underpinnings of the development of hate. Hate does not simply arise. It is, he says, 
fomented. It is fomented by people who use stories to find self-esteem by devaluing 
others. Important about the story is that it is constructed around a stereotype. That 
stereotype, however, is utterly threatening. It is portrayed as the embodied evil and 
danger. The purpose of the threat is to activate distancing, passion, and decision-
commitment. 
When one compares this description of the internal make-up of hate to that 
of prejudice as described by Allport, is there a significant difference? Tony 
Jefferson  (2015), a criminologist, is useful here. In a searing analysis, he argues 
that, actually, in explanations such as these an elision takes place in the general 
discussion. This elision is the blurring of the lines between emotion and cognition: 
“… [t]he emotional dimension of hatred and the cognitive dimension of prejudice 
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have become erroneously elided (to the detriment of properly understanding 
either: the notion of positive prejudice completely disappears, for example).” The 
point he makes is that there is a difference between hatred and prejudice and that 
they have different origins. While there is a connection between them, prejudice 
does not automatically progress to hatred. Criticising Allport, he comments:
[…] for all his contributions to the cognitive dimension, he was unable to 
come to grips with the emotional investment involved in extreme prejudice 
(or hatred) that he himself acknowledged needed to be understood. From this 
point on, a cognitive approach to prejudice and othering came to dominate 
research into racism yet without giving up the idea that it was attempting to 
explain the hatred involved in genocide.  ( Jefferson, 2015:129)
In making sense of Jefferson’s argument, it can be easily deduced that he is saying 
that hatred is characterised by extreme emotion and that it is the emotional 
intensity of hatred which distinguishes it from milder forms of prejudice. This 
would, however, be simplifying the argument to a banality. There is, I want to 
argue, some merit in his insistence that there is a difference between prejudice and 
hate and the urgency he conveys in his work that we should understand hate better. 
But there remains the task of saying more clearly what the differences between 
prejudice and hate are. To help in this task Jefferson looks to the work of Young-
Bruehl (1996) who challenged the idea that prejudice was a unitary phenomenon 
and that the various expressions it took were simply variations on a theme. Her 
argument was that it was possible to identify and locate distinct causes in different 
kinds of prejudice and so, for example, in anti-Semitism one saw the emergence of 
what she called the obsessional type who saw Jews as dirty and aggressive. Racism 
stemmed from a hysteria which was rooted in sexual fear and homophobia. A major 
issue in her argument is the role of unconscious desire in racism, sexism, and anti-
Semitism. This desire is distinct from the conscious love of one’s own group, she 
suggested, that was behind much of prejudice. 
Jefferson does not entirely go along with Young-Bruehl’s use of character types 
and the almost fixed ways in which she deploys the idea of types in coming to 
understand behavioural outcomes. “This is partly because”, he says, “the idea of 
character (like personality) does not convey the incessant dynamics underpinning 
behaviour for which a processual analysis is more appropriate”. But, and this is the 
value of his intervention, he suggests that there is a developmental trajectory in how 
what we might understand to be the ways in which prejudice progresses to hate. It 
is this that is useful because what he is doing in this analysis is suggest that there are 
socially contingent factors that become relevant in the dynamic that plays itself out 
in a person’s life. What happens in this analysis is not the inevitability of particular 
forms of behaviour, but an explanation which brings together the psychological 
24      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
– the types – and the social – the circumstances in which people find themselves, 
in ways which are clearer: “What it means, very simply, is that particular types of 
prejudice will flourish in societies where the associated character types are enabled 
in some ways.” ( Jefferson, 2013:13)
A way forward: Between prejudice and hate
Critical in understanding how to move forward in the discussion about the 
relationship between prejudice and hate, is understanding the nature of Jefferson’s 
objection. Useful as his assertion is that an elision takes place in much of the 
discussion, I would like to suggest that there is sufficient evidence in the existing 
discussion to justify holding prejudice and hate together as not only cognate but 
fundamentally related phenomena. Both involve cognition, belief, and attitude. 
The presence of these elements allows one to map Sternberg’s seven types of hate 
onto Allport’s five different levels. What is different between them is the emphasis 
Sternberg places on emotion – hate is fomented he says – and the way in which 
he locates emotion as an activating factor in the direction which prejudice takes. 
A point to emphasise is that emotion/affect is not absent in the Allport analysis. 
His five-level explanation of prejudice includes the suggestion that, under certain 
circumstances, an individual or a group will take steps to move from simply 
harbouring an attitude, what he called antilocution or even avoidance, to acting on 
his or her attitude, what he called physical attack and extermination. In describing 
these phases, Allport was careful to talk about the social conditions in which they 
occurred. Ponterotto and his colleagues (2006:15) quote Allport’s description of 
the physical attack phase and make the point that “[u]nder tense and emotionally 
laden conditions, or even under peer pressure, it does not take much for an 
individual to move from the discrimination stage to the physical confrontation …” 
It was Hitler’s antilocution pressure, Allport argued, which made it possible for 
Germans to cross the boundary to taking the decision to embark on a process of 
exterminating people who were classified as Jews: 
It was Hitler’s antilocution that led Germans to avoid their Jewish neighbours 
and erstwhile friends. This preparation made it easier to enact the Nurnberg 
laws of discrimination which, in turn, made the subsequent burning of 
synagogues and street attacks upon Jews seem natural. The final step in the 
macabre progression was the ovens at Auschwitz.
However, Allport does not distinguish the activating dimensions of the experience 
enough. Directly relevant to his theoretical gathering, together with what is taking 
place here, is his description of “emotionally-laden conditions”. But, powerful as 
this invocation is, he does not, in explaining the cognitive processes that are at 
work here, make sufficient allowance for the work that emotion does. Cognition, 
as a process of acquiring thought and sense-making, is rendered too restrictively 
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as a social experience. What this leads to, I suggest, is the need for emphasising the 
covalence of the affective alongside the cognitive, and a restatement of the prejudice 
continuum in a way which accommodates processual or fomenting factors, 
especially those which are emotional. How this may be done is to recompose 
each of Allport’s five stages and include within such a recomposition not only the 
behavioural forms associated with each type, but the full complexity of social and 
psychological forces that are present. This would reconfigure the model not simply 
as a typology or a classification of types of prejudice, but as a syndrome of fluid 
complexes or structures which have inside of them interactive cognitive, emotive 
and behavioural factors. What such a model makes possible is in direct response 
to the second remaining concern I draw attention to above, the identification of 
hate inside its psycho-social ecology. The opportunity this presents is that of 
working with Jefferson’s idea of enablement, of seeing much more distinctly the 
ways in which the social and the psychological interact to catalyse, or indeed their 
opposite, to neutralise or stabilise each other. The value of this approach lies in 
entering, more explicitly, the space in which the encounter between the mind and 
its social environment plays itself out, and towards understanding the processual 
nature of the experience, establishing what the constants and variables are that 
arise. The opportunity it presents is that of developing a framework, as opposed 
to a schema, for identifying the distinct psychological and social conditions 
that arise in combination in what I would describe as the zone of enablement 
and for understanding the complex and unpredictable ways in which these play 
themselves out. 
In bringing this part of the discussion to a close, a final comment on enablement 
is necessary. In the general thread of argumentation used in many explanations 
of enablement, it is said that it is often people’s experiences which confirm their 
attitudes. The work of Minard (1952) and Pettigrew (1959) has been helpful here. 
At the core of that work is a concern to explain the shifting behaviour of groups 
of people in different contexts. This work emphasises some of the complexity 
of prejudice and how it works. It is neither stable and consistent nor fixed and 
permanent in either its forms or the outcomes it will produce. The forces which 
animate it produce shifting dynamics and variable outcomes. Minard’s (1952) 
work, to illustrate, shows what the complexity is. More than 60 years ago, he 
conducted a study of a group of black and white miners in a town in the southern 
United States. He looked at their attitudes towards each other when they were 
below ground and then again when they were above ground. The conclusion to 
which he came, to explain what was happening, was that the social norms of the two 
spaces were distinct and came to effect how people behaved and particularly how 
they managed their prejudice. The norm below ground was towards friendliness 
between miners. Above ground it was the reverse. Enabled above ground were 
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attitudes that were effectively disabled below ground. This is helpful in thinking 
of enablement, but even so it is not sufficient. What needed to be understood 
was the way the normative order worked, its compulsions and prohibitions, why 
it sometimes stimulated agency, negative agency, and why sometimes not (see 
the recent work of McLeod, 2008). Why is the norm, as an activational device, 
functional and sometimes not? ( Jacobs et  al., 1998). What this points to is the 
need for recognising the general but unique features of each event or incident. 
In closing this discussion, I refer briefly to the case of Barend Strydom, the 
perpetrator of one of contemporary South Africa’s most important examples of 
how hate works. Strydom was the self-proclaimed founder and leader of a white 
supremacist group, Die Wit Wolwe. Die Wit Wolwe was established in Pretoria 
in 1988 by a group of 21 Afrikaners for the purposes, as they explained at their 
founding meeting, of
1. The advancement of Protestant Christianity.
2. The identification, exposure of and struggle against, particularly, the ANC/
SACP Alliance, Satanism, Communism, Marxism, Humanism, Liberalism, 
Free Masonry, the Broederbond, the International Monetary Fund and all 
their front organisations, with whatever means we have at our disposal.
3. The establishment of our own free Christian Republican Boerevolkstaat. 
 (Strydom, 1997:57) 
In the afternoon of 15 November 1988, Strydom, then 23  years old, made his 
way to Strijdom Square in the city of Pretoria armed with a hunting knife, a 9mm 
Parabellum Beretta Pistol and over 500 rounds of ammunition. He had a mission to 
accomplish – die “Slag van Strijdomplein”, rendered less dramatically in English as 
“the Battle of Strijdom Square” – to take the battle for the freedom of the Afrikaner 
people to the enemy. On the morning of the event, Strydom had gathered with 
three confederates at the Voortrekker Monument and agreed there that he should 
be the one to see through the implementation of the plan to attack the enemy in 
the heartland of Afrikanerdom, the city of Pretoria. He had phoned the media 
before the operation and told them that the event of which they had been warned 
was about to happen. He strode onto the square and within 15  minutes had 
hunted down and killed seven people. A week before, Strydom had undertaken a 
practice run. He had driven to Weiler’s Farm, an informal settlement in De Deur 
South of Johannesburg, randomly identified a shack and shot at two of its sleeping 
occupants, killing one. Because it was a rainy night, the operation, he said, was not 
entirely successful. But he had proved to himself that he could kill – he had become 
a freedom fighter (Strydom, 1997:75). By the time he was arrested at Strijdom 
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Square, he had murdered eight people. Strydom was arrested and quickly brought 
to trial. The trial judge, Mr Louis Harms, told him in finding him guilty that:
If the sentence creates the impression that I want you kept permanently out 
of society, then that impression is correct. There is no hope of rehabilitation 
for you. You have no remorse and you would happily repeat what you 
have done. Your crimes were barbaric, the consequences indescribable. 
It was premeditated and carried out without feeling. In the interests of the 
community, you should be removed. You remain a danger.  
 (Smith, 2008:par. 3-5) 
Yet, in seeking to characterise what had happened in this critical period of South 
African history, this episode did not lead to what Strydom had hoped for, an all-
out war between white and black people. The sacrificial role he saw himself playing 
did not proceed to a generalised process of extermination of black people. While 
he received a great deal of support from other Afrikaners, very few followed his 
example. There were, in the context, sufficient conditions which inhibited and even 
stopped large numbers of people to act on their prejudices. They did not cross the 
boundary from belief of their superiority to physically attacking black people.
But Strydom’s hate still needs to be explained. Judge Harms (Document 
K29.2037:687-688), in assessing the expert testimony, came to the conclusion that 
the only factor which bears a causal relation to the deed was his political beliefs and 
feelings of hate. As far as his hatred was concerned, Harms (ibid.) said,
I quote […] from R v Hugo page 228:
‘Now it seems to me that a settled hate or bias against a person does not by 
itself constitute an extenuating circumstance whether there is foundation for 
it or not. A normal man cannot allow the prejudices or antipathies which are 
ordinarily kept within reasonable bounds to become so exaggerated as to lead 
him to kill a human being. It is not every warped or prejudiced mind that 
can be said to be suffering from a ‘delusion, erroneous belief or defect.’ There 
must be a clear element of abnormality. The clouding of a normal brain by 
hatred goes no further than the motives giving rise to hatred.’ 
He came to the conclusion that Strydom was driven by pure political fervour. 
He did not accept that what had happened was explainable in terms of Strydom’s 
personality. 
In explaining the extreme forms of behaviour that came to be enacted, I would like 
to suggest that the summing up of the judge was legally correct. He dismissed the 
salience of influences such as Strydom’s age and his upbringing and concluded that 
the “the only factors that really have a causal bearing here were his (Strydom’s) 
political beliefs and his feelings of hate” (Document K29.1920:31) (Soudien’s 
translation from the Afrikaans). His assessment of the expert testimony before 
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him was based on a careful separating out of fact and conjecture. He could not, he 
emphasised, find any basis for the psychologist for the defence’s contention that 
an experience of extreme trauma had occurred in Strydom’s life such that he was 
impelled to kill: “There was no such evidence” (ibid.).
What Judge Harm’s summing up does is support the general approach taken by 
Staub. As cited earlier, Staub (2005:52) had described hate as being: 
[…] built out of a complex of cognitions and emotions. The cognitive 
components are likely to include devaluation or a negative view of some other 
and the perception of threat from that other. The emotional components are 
likely to include dislike, fear, anger, and hostility. Another likely element 
of hate is a sense of rightness or justice about acting against the object of 
one’s hate. 
Confirmatory as this legal reasoning is of the general hate literature, it leaves, still, 
the central issue of how to account for, as in Allport’s (Ponterotto et al., 2006:15) 
description, “mov(ing) from the discrimination phase to the physical confrontation 
stage”, or in Jefferson’s (2013:13) approach, the processual development trajectory 
from prejudice to hate. Harm’s summing up contained all the general elements 
required to come to an accurate forensic assessment of what was at play in the case. 
It did not deem it necessary, however, to deconstruct the processual nature of the 
events. Such a deconstruction would have been useful and would have given the 
Strydom narrative its contextual specificity. Central to that specificity, in attempting 
to take the analysis forward, are Jefferson’s dynamics which take Strydom, and 
virtually nobody else, from one state of consciousness to another. 
What happens which makes Strydom cross the boundary from prejudice to hate? 
Central, I would like to argue, and this is effectively minimised and not used as an 
opportunity for deconstruction, is what Judge Harms distilled as the question of 
Strydom’s political beliefs. His political beliefs, said Harms, were the cause. The 
activating factor not referenced in the trial was the intense testing of Strydom’s 
political belief. That testing was essentially the dismantling of apartheid. The period 
was marked by the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the unbanning of the 
African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP). South Africa, at that moment, was passing over 
from white supremacy to becoming a democracy. This moment in the history of 
South Africa was deeply traumatising for Strydom. He would open his Belydenis 
(Confession) with the following line:
Van kleins af het ek geywer vir onse God en die Boerevolk. Ek het ’n 
roepingstaak-ervaring belewe deurdat ek moes opstaan … Besetting van 
Boergrond was aan die orde van die dag, dit moes plek maak vir plakkers 
… Dit word ’n amptelike onverklaarde oorlog. Ons bejaardes word wreed 
aangerand, verkrag en vermoor. Daar word met ’n bus in die Westdene-dam 
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gery en 48 Boereseuntjies and dogterjies sterf … Is dit beskaaf of barbaars? 
Uit God of uit satan? Dis alles deel van ’n uitgewerkte plan teen die Boerevolk 
… [Nou] verwag Hy ook van ons om hulle wat sy naam to belaster dood 
te maak … (Strydom, 1997:7-9) [I devoted myself from childhood to our God 
and Boer nation. I experienced a calling to take a stand … The occupation of our 
land was the order of the day. We had to make way for squatters … An official 
undeclared war was begun. Our older folk are being brutally assaulted, raped 
and murdered. A bus with 48 Boer boys and girls was driven into Westdene dam 
leading to their deaths … Is this civilised or barbaric behaviour? Is it of God or 
Satan? … This is all part of a plan against the Boer nation. God expects us now to 
kill all those who abuse his name.] 
For Strydom, whose normative order was constructed around the predestined 
superiority of white people, the possibility of living alongside of and as an equal 
to black people was unthinkable. He had committed himself from his final 
years at school already to fighting for the rights of the Afrikaner people. He had 
written letters of remonstration to all the major black South African leaders 
and internationally to figures such as Margaret Thatcher. When F.W. de Klerk 
announced the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela, it was a moment of 
immense betrayal for him. He had found even the establishment of the tri-cameral 
parliament, with separate chambers for whites, “coloureds” and “Indians”, and the 
ensuing acknowledgement of Islam and Hinduism, deeply objectionable. That 
people of different faiths were even sitting next to Christians caused him great 
hurt. In the course of his trial, the judge asked him if he believed that only white 
people were deserving (of God’s) favour. His reply was: “That is correct … In the 
documents of the Great Trek … black people are not regarded as people but as 
animals” (Strydom, 1997:121) (translated by Soudien from the Afrikaans).
In attempting to make sense of the holocaust, Staub (1989:98) argued that 
predisposition to fanaticism did have roots in a person’s childhood and personality, 
but once this was coupled to an ideology, “knowledge of the ideology … [wa]s the 
best guide to understanding his behaviour”. Staub is correct. He said that when 
Hitler was growing up, he was surrounded by a society soaked in anti-Semitism. 
What converts this anti-Semitism to racial hatred and, consequently, to genocidal 
action is, however, not sufficiently elaborated on. The answer, it is argued here, 
is necessary for explaining how prejudice advances to hatred. In the case of 
Germany, as Staub himself explained, the contextual circumstances of the 1930s, 
“[of] a people distressed by inflation, depression, joblessness, and political chaos, 
togetherness and unity had wide appeal” (Staub, 1989:99). This contextual 
explanation does not provide the neat clinical explanation of cause, but it is 
essential in making sense of the complexity of the dynamic in which the Germans 
found themselves. There were, in the cultural life of the Germans, inclinations to 
authoritarianism. This impacted on behaviour. But it was when this behaviour 
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was embedded in and available to political ideology that a particular combustive 
trajectory was inaugurated. Similarly, when Strydom was coming to adulthood, he 
was doing so in an environment normatively constructed around white supremacy. 
This white supremacy was elemental and pervasive in all the formative spaces in 
which he found himself – his family home, his church and his schooling. It was 
the disruption of this normative order, it is argued here, that came to move that 
normative order from prejudice to hate, from belief to action. Why, however, this 
did not become a generalised reaction in the Afrikaner community remains a 
question. It was sufficient to cause Strydom to move to hate but not for the wider 
Volk amongst whom he lived. It is this complexity in each of the contexts in which 
hate arises that requires elaboration. 
What are we to take away from this discussion in understanding prejudice, hate 
and racism? The most important is that while prejudice and hate are related, and 
while it is possible to bring the contemporary discussion of hate, as it is elaborated 
by scholars such as Staub and Sternberg, into conceptual alignment with the way 
prejudice is mapped out by pioneers such as Allport, and, thereby, to confirm 
the general features of the prejudice-hate schema, there is need to recognise the 
distinctiveness with which hate manifests itself and comes to work. Hate, the 
point needs to be made, coincides with and is qualitatively similar at points to the 
different forms of prejudice identified by Allport, but, at moments or even periods, 
takes on a distinctive form which requires acknowledgement and explanation. 
This distinctiveness may be accommodated in Allport’s categories, avoidance, 
discrimination, physical attack and extermination, but these do not descriptively 
enough contain or, by themselves, explain the concentration of intense emotion, 
cognition and action embodied by the descriptor hate and bring us to a definitive 
understanding of what is going on in the othering experience. Simple dislike may 
be present in all Allport’s forms, especially avoidance and discrimination, but the 
intensity and effects of the combination of factors distinguishing hate calls, each 
time, for further study.
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AN UNLIKELY TURNING POINT




We often consider turning points in history to be major singular events like 
assassinations, earthquakes, and military coups that have an immediate impact 
on public life or policy. Many significant turning points are not, in fact, singular 
events and – at the time they occur – are often not seen as momentous. Viewed 
in retrospect, though, they loom large because of their transformative power. The 
introduction of new products or the inauguration of popular trends can be turning 
points because they can affect how people go about their lives or think about 
themselves as conscious actors in society. Terence Turner’s concept of “social 
skin” resonates here because skin itself acts as an interface for political, cultural, 
and social identity (Turner, 2012). In South Africa, the introduction of specific 
personal care products for the transformation of personal appearance, specifically 
the introduction of skin lighteners and hair straighteners, was an important, if 
unlikely, turning point. In the twentieth-century history of the country, these 
products made possible the alteration of perceived racial identity when “black” 
physical features were associated with inferiority and limited physical and social 
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mobility. The continued use of these products after the apartheid era denotes their 
continued power to transform self-perception and to lessen the perceived burden 
of blackness. 
Skin and hair are two of the most highly visible traits of the human body and the 
human social interface. These attributes are amongst the most important signifiers 
of age, ancestry, and attitude, and are some of the most important signals in the 
human nonverbal communication repertoire. People are assessed and judged by 
the appearance of their skin and hair (and clothing) and learn – in late childhood 
and adolescence – to navigate and manipulate social interactions by modifying 
the appearance of their skin, hair, and raiment. Modification of skin colour in the 
United States and South Africa is associated with multiple levels of social meaning 
because of its effects on race identity as well as on status within a race (colourism). 
In this chapter, I explore the specific effects of the development, commercialisation, 
and use of skin lighteners in apartheid era South Africa, and make the case that this 
innovation was a turning point in the history of race and racism in the country.
Skin lightening in historical context
Cultural preferences for light skin have arisen independently many times and 
have been reinforced when complementary “cultures of lightness” have come 
into contact with one another. The rise of agricultural and increasingly stratified 
economies throughout the Old World in the last 6 000 years coincided with the 
division of populations into groups that spent most of their days working outdoors 
and those that spent the majority of their time indoors. The associations of darker, 
tanned skin with outdoor toil and hard physical labour and of light skin with relative 
leisure and affluence, led to light skin becoming a signal of higher social status in 
most agricultural societies worldwide ( Jablonski, 2012). The public display of light 
skin was of great social importance in Eastern Asia and in Western Europe from the 
sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, but lightness took on new meanings and 
enhanced value as European colonies in the Americas prospered through the labour 
of imported dark-skinned slaves from Africa. Preferences for light or relatively light 
skin do not appear to have been widespread in Africa prior to widespread contact 
with Europeans, except in the Lower Nile of ancient Egypt, a hotspot of cultural 
and genetic intermingling. By Roman times, if not before, light skin was valued 
– especially in women – as a sign of privileged ancestry and lifestyle. Cleopatra 
(69-30 BC) took pains to keep her skin light, and her practice of bathing in asses’ 
milk for the purpose of skin lightening is legendary but possibly apocryphal. 
Having relatively light skin became synonymous with success and happiness, and 
people over the ages have sought to become lighter by various means ( Jablonski, 
2012). In parts of the world today, the sheer knowledge that a preference for 
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lightness is associated with higher status elsewhere is sufficient to promote 
desires for skin lightening and sales of lightening products. Lighter appearing skin 
can be achieved by using whitening cosmetics, bleaching agents to decrease the 
production of melanin pigment in the skin, or a combination of both. Whitening 
cosmetics and skin bleaches have been used for nearly two thousand years, but only 
in the last century has the production of these materials become sophisticated, 
commercialised, and highly profitable.
Favoured formulas for skin lightening agents developed independently in Europe 
and East Asia. The popularity of white makeup and lightening preparations 
increased even though their toxic ingredients caused a myriad of health problems. 
Illness was not sufficient to discourage the use of white cosmetics and lighteners. 
However, for many, the drive to achieve social approval or advancement through 
lightness was worth the risk. What was remarkable about the history of skin 
whitening before the nineteenth century, was that it was the province of genetically 
light-skinned people. Those already light wanted to look lighter because whiteness 
signified freedom from outdoor toil as well as spiritual purity ( Jablonski,  2012). 
Skin lighteners and lightening cosmetics took on different roles when they were 
adopted by people with dark skin, including dark-skinned South Africans living 
under Dutch and English colonial rule and the descendants of former slaves in the 
New World. Skin lightening agents have never been socially neutral; their use and 
effects have always been implicitly or explicitly political even if the people using 
them conceived only of their use in intensely personal terms. They were considered 
agents of increased social mobility and personal transformation to some, but 
instruments of subjugation to others. 
In many parts of the world today, people with dark skin – regardless of their location 
or ethnicity – are considered inferior to those with light skin. Colourism is a type of 
skin colour bias that involves systematic discrimination against the relatively dark-
skinned within a particular group (Herring, Keith & Horton, 2004; Hunter, 2007; 
Jones,  2000). Colourism has existed in many places for millennia because of the 
higher status accorded to people who could afford to spend their time indoors and 
lacked the darkened skin of those spending time outdoors. Colourism became more 
entrenched and institutionalised when people of visibly distinct skin colours lived 
in the same places and had offspring together. These conditions occurred widely 
in the Americas and the Caribbean during the centuries of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade and during colonial and apartheid-era South Africa. Positive attitudes about 
lightened skin intensified in South Africa under the influence of people and ideas 
from the United States from the 1930s onward (Glenn,  2008; Thomas,  2012a), 
leading to a steady rise in colourism. As one could have predicted, the institution 
of the pass laws and apartheid ushered in a period of prodigious growth in the 
popularity of skin lightening preparations in the country. 
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The commercial development of skin lighteners in the  
United States and South Africa
In social contexts of the United States and of other countries influenced by the 
colour consciousness of European colonialism, becoming lighter improved 
prospects for education and employment, social mobility, and marriage 
(Glenn,  2009; Hunter, 2005, 2007; Madrigal, 2006). In the United States, 
selective breeding towards whiteness was advanced as a long-term solution, but 
in the short term, many resorted to harsh chemicals to bleach their skin to more 
socially acceptable lightness ( Jablonski, 2012). Development, production, and 
marketing of skin-bleaching products on a commercial scale began in the United 
States in the post-Reconstruction era, as segregationist “Jim Crow laws” restricted 
the opportunities and prospects of African Americans, especially in the South. By 
the mid-twentieth century, skin-bleaching products and practices began to have 
a significant sociological and economic impact on people and business in South 
Africa as well. With the installation and enforcement of apartheid in the 1950s and 
especially with the passage of the Coloured Labour Preference Act, which reserved 
certain jobs for people classified as “coloured“, preference for people who could 
potentially pass as “coloured” became greater, and the popularity of skin-bleaching 
creams was not unexpected. Demand for skin lightening (and hair straightening) 
products seems to have been primed in earlier decades by the visits to South Africa 
by groups of missionary musical performers from the United States. Beginning 
at the turn of the twentieth century, these troupes (such as the Virginia Jubilee 
Singers) came to South Africa with a message of Christianised “racial uplift”. With 
their talent and “smart and tidy” appearance including visibly straight hair and, 
in some cases, light skin, the performers became role models for South African 
modernity (Erlmann, 1991). Their performances in the major cities of South Africa 
in the 1890s were popular, and the fact that they were attended by influential South 
African political leaders like Paul Kruger (Erlmann, 1988) appeared to authorise 
their popularity with communities of South Africans of European ancestry. The 
net effect of their popularity for all South Africans was validation of their physical 
appearance and their Christian approach to entertainment.
The rise of skin bleaching in South Africa
The largest markets for skin lighteners have always developed in places where 
the social costs of darkness have been the greatest. Mercury-based skin bleaches 
were introduced into South Africa from the United States in the 1930s and 
became enormously popular, especially amongst people classified as “coloured” 
and “black”. Skin lighteners were praised for “smoothening” the skin of the face, 
and for elevating the social status of both men and women. The company who 
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manufactured skin bleaches in South Africa was the American-owned Apex Hair 
Inc., which was founded by Sara Washington in the 1930s to bring hair straightening 
products and skin bleaches to a mostly poor and working-class clientele. Apex 
emphasised use of products conducing to self-improvement and economic mobility 
(Thomas, 2009; Weinbaum, Thomas, Ramamurthy, Poiger, Dong & Barlow, 2008). 
One of the ironies of the twentieth-century development of the skin-bleaching 
industry in South Africa was that it was connected strongly to African American 
entrepreneurship and the racialised role models that were common in the United 
States during the Jim Crow era. 
During apartheid, black women in South Africa sometimes used skin bleaches to 
obtain jobs reserved for “coloured” women, but more often they parlayed a lighter 
appearance to enhance their prospects for engagement in social and employment 
settings that privileged light skin and a somewhat more European look. The 
unsightly skin blotches – sometimes denoting permanent damage to the skin – 
that accompanied repeated use of skin lighteners were seen as positive evidence of 
being modern. Skin lighteners took away “the blackness”. Darkly pigmented skin 
had become a disease in need of a cure. 
It is impossible to know exactly how widely used skin bleaches were during the 
apartheid era, because many products were made by small companies and marketed 
locally. According to historian Lynn Thomas, however, skin lighteners had become 
so common in South African by the late 1960s that a 1969 survey showed that skin 
lightening creams were the fourth most commonly used household product after 
soap, tea, and tinned milk (Thomas, 2012b).
Thomas’ studies of the history of use of skin bleaches in South Africa highlight 
the intersection of cosmetic technology, politics, and economics that lead to the 
increased popularity of lightening products during the apartheid years: “… the 
appeal and prevalence of these technologies of the self depended upon expansive 
political and economic structures that privileged light-coloured skin, made 
manufactured cosmetics widely available, and promoted their use through glossy 
magazines and local sales agents” (Thomas, 2009:203). The rise of some of South 
Africa’s wealthiest and most influential industrialists, the Krok Brothers, was 
based on the coupling of modern production methods with clever packaging and 
ingenious advertising. The history of production and use of skin bleaches, and 
of opposition to the development and use of the products, demonstrates a dense 
interaction of racial hierarchies, capitalist commerce, and individual desires for 
betterment that parallel the American situation (Thomas, 2006, 2009, 2012b).
Opposition to skin bleaching in South Africa gained strength when anti-apartheid 
activists emphasised that lightening agents were loathsome products and should 
be avoided because they were harmful to health and to individual self-image. The 
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“Black is Beautiful” campaigns of late twentieth-century South Africa probably 
had more long-term success in reducing the popularity of skin lighteners than 
those in the United States, because they combined social and medical information 
into comprehensive messages of personal empowerment and national pride 
(Thomas, 2012b). In 1990, South Africa became the first and only country in the 
world to prohibit advertisements for cosmetic products that made any claims to 
“bleaching”, “lightening”, or “whitening”. Despite the combined action of social and 
medical activists, the market for skin lightening in South Africa has remained large, 
and cosmetics and skin-care companies have adapted their advertising vocabulary 
and ingredients in order to attract new users. 
Skin lightening also receives boosts from the popularity of light-skinned celebrities 
whose images are widely circulated via social and conventional media and whose 
complexions are widely admired ( Jablonski, 2011, 2012). Paradoxically, sales of 
skin lightening products increased in South Africa after 1994 because lighter skin 
and straighter hair were perceived as more modern and more professional ( Jacobs, 
Levine, Abney & Davids, 2016). It is far too simplistic to say that women (and the 
majority of consumers of skin lighteners are women) want to be white, but that 
retention of dark skin (and natural hair) reduces opportunities for professional 
training and advancement, and marriage prospects. 
After mercury-based skin lighteners were banned in the United States in 1973, 
products containing hydroquinone or monobenzyle ether of hydroquinone 
became more popular there and in South Africa. However, mercurials were still 
considered the most efficacious, and illegal imports into South Africa of mercurial 
creams and soaps manufactured in Europe, Great Britain and Ireland persisted until 
the making of these products was finally discontinued in the early 2000s. Illegal 
products containing mercury and high percentages of hydroquinone can still be 
found in informal markets throughout South Africa, despite their illegality. When 
women can’t afford to buy lighteners containing “safe” skin bleaches, they buy 
illegally imported hydroquinone-based products or resort to “under-the-counter”, 
locally manufactured mercury-based compounds, often with disastrous effects 
(Davids, Van Wyk, Khumalo & Jablonski, 2016).
South African and multinational companies have also been resourceful in extending 
their markets throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Selling hope has been easy when 
beauty, success, and happiness continue to be linked to lightness. Demand for 
skin lighteners is now high in African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania 
and Kenya with burgeoning economies and people eager to improve their status 
and prospects (Davids et  al., 2016; Jablonski, 2012; Levine, Powell, Davids & 
Jacobs,  2016; Street, Gaska, Lewis & Wilson, 2015). Advertising has mostly 
targeted young women of marriageable age, but has been credited with helping to 
shift male preferences towards women with light-coloured skin. 
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It is too simplistic to ascribe the use of skin lighteners to conformity under 
structural racism, because other motivations certainly enter into the complex 
personal decisions people are making about appearance ( Jacobs et  al., 2016). 
It is likely that people are making decisions based not only on perceived norms of 
physical attractiveness from the dominant world culture, but also on convenience, 
and because transformation of appearance relieves a level of psychological tension 
that they feel is generated in them when they interact with an unaltered appearance 
( Jablonski, 2011). 
Conclusion: The introduction of skin bleaches into South Africa  
was a genuine turning point
The introduction of inexpensive products for transformation of physical 
appearance, especially of skin colour, towards more European-based norms in the 
mid-1950s was a significant turning point in South African history, because these 
products allowed people to personally negotiate and mitigate the psychological 
challenges of looking “too black”. When a personal decision to use a product – 
even a seemingly minor one affecting appearance – allows a person to feel more 
socially accepted and acceptable and affords them the possibility of enhanced 
personal financial gain through better employment or social associations, then the 
product and the decision-making process are elevated in historical importance. 
The promotion of skin lightening products in South Africa has been about selling 
the promise of a better appearance, leading to social elevation and happiness. For 
nearly a century, tens of thousands of South Africans have made personal decisions 
in front of their mirrors every day to lighten their skin, because they have felt 
that a lighter appearance would make them look better or would make their lives 
somehow easier. This is a dramatic, profound and tragic turn of events. 
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SETTLER-COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM 
AND GEOPOLITICAL POLITICS
An overview of the mobilisation of race in South Africa 




This chapter sets out to analyse turning points in their historical context and 
sequence in South Africa by considering large-scale global movements and how 
these turning points have shaped and influenced the development of racism in the 
country. All individuals are situated in a specific time and place, and this situated 
spatio-temporal context is not isolated or independent. Thus, all individuals are 
subject to modes of thought and practice that are embedded in geopolitics. The 
foreign influences that exerted pressures within South Africa are either related to 
broad-scale economic policy or to global political ideals. I will start with a brief 
review of the earliest history of South Africa and its contacts with colonial powers, 
then proceed to examine earlier mercantile and settler-colonial periods. Studying 
earlier history is important to show how it shaped more recent history. The focal 
point of interest in this chapter is race, racial attitudes and racial policy, because this 
work has been undertaken as part of the STIAS long-term project, Being Human 
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Today: The Effects of Race. It is a truism to say that all political action is local and 
often very short-termed. I will not deal so much with local political responses or 
with the individuals that drove them. Rather, as a geographer, my focus is not the 
individual or a point in space or time, but how the situated place has an effect. 
This effect can be seen as autochthonous action or in terms of a wider geographic 
interchange. Both ideas are relevant to a history of South Africa. Being interested in 
global and long-term patterning of expressions of thought, I here look at colonial 
origin stories and statements of difference situated within a global rhetoric. This 
is not to say that any one side had a monolithic position. The Afrikaners were 
complex and nuanced and held many individual views – they had leaders of 
all persuasions, as noted by many South African historians, notably, Hermann 
Giliomee (2007). Complex and nuanced personal positions are often, however, 
reduced to the most simplistic rhetorical flourishes, for example, Mao’s “The East is 
Red”. These can become self-sustaining memes which are then used by opponents 
as well as original proponents. Any discussion of racism in South Africa must ipso 
facto be primarily concerned with the period of European global expansionism. 
I end this chapter around the time of Kennedy’s assassination in the middle of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of proxy war engagements. This was also a 
generation past the time of Nazism, when Nazi ideology had no appeal left except 
to the most marginalised and moribund. This time corresponds roughly with the 
Rivonia trial, the Sharpeville Massacre, and the rise of the armed wing of the ANC 
(African National Congress) Umkhonto we Sizwe and direct conflict in South Africa. 
At this time, we see the development of the late-stage apartheid repressive state in 
response to increasing pressures. My interests in this chapter are the strategic and 
global influences superimposed on South Africa rather than the internal political 
responses these influences generated. Recent history is the sum of historical and 
global influences, not just of individuals acting at any one time.
A turning point here is considered as an opportunity that was missed and that led 
to a particular racial consequence. The present is the very definition of lost turning 
points, so perhaps, these can be better thought of as missed imaginings. The nature 
of this kind of treatment – an examination of turning points – is basically a counter-
factual one, which by their nature tend to be somewhat polemical. The view back in 
order to determine turning points must be done without historical hindsight-bias 
or judgemental hindsight. Because, although we now know the outcome of history, 
it does not follow that historical contemporaries should have been able to guess the 
outcome because they did not have the benefit of hindsight-bias. 
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Prehistory
Modern humans in South Africa evolved in situ from prehistoric stock and clearly, 
the oldest residents, who are now the most isolated branch of humanity genetically, 
belong to the San group (Lachance et al., 2012). San people have resided in South 
Africa the longest and, therefore, have the clearest claim to land title. Overprinted 
on their genome, is that of the Khoekhoe, the cattle-herding people still living in the 
same area. These two groups have a history in the South of Africa far pre-dating any 
other. Because of the difficulty moving cattle into the Cape, due to its topography, 
ecology, and climate, the majority of the inhabitants of the Western Cape were San 
hunters rather than Khoekhoe herders.
Much later, people from West Africa arrived in South Africa. These people had first 
expanded into East Africa and then in two waves moved south. This movement 
was slow but relentless, being driven by demographic pressure. Direct evidence of 
these movements is not available in any historic texts, but they can be discovered 
through archaeological, genetic, and linguistic data (Lachance et  al., 2012). The 
Southern expansion of Central African groups with darker skin into the territories 
of the lighter-skinned San and Khoekhoe was ongoing at the time that Europeans 
first interposed themselves on the Western Cape. This put the three different 
groups into inevitable demographic conflict. The Cape was sparsely settled, and 
diseases introduced by the Europeans, such as the outbreak of 1715 smallpox 
pandemic, soon depleted the indigenous population. It was never an empty land, 
but compared to overcrowded and resource-poor Holland, it might have seemed 
as such to the settlers. An empty land is a common settler delusion and one firmly 
incorporated in the Dutch origin story in South Africa. 
South Africa’s strategic position
South Africa has been subjected to all forms of foreign interventions primarily 
because of its vital strategic position. Located at the intersection of the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans, it lies at the crossroads of the shortest and most easily navigated 
routes between the two largest and populous economic powerhouses of South, 
Southeast, and East Asia, and Europe. The alternative route around South America 
and across the Pacific was much longer and more difficult, being against global 
wind and ocean currents driven by the Earth’s rotation. The Dutch first settled it as 
a refreshment station en route to the prosperous Far East. It was also very important 
in World War II for supplying British forces in North Africa when the Italian 
military made the Mediterranean too dangerous and military shipping cannot pass 
through the Suez Canal or the Red Sea at times of conflict. South Africa resumed 
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in importance any time that the Suez Canal was threatened and again during the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars when large amount of war material was being shipped to 
the Far East from the American East Coast. 
South Africa also has strategic importance because of its resources. The first of these 
was Khoekhoe cattle, other fresh food, and water for the extension of exploration 
and mercantile trade. The most obvious resource of South Africa was its vast 
wealth, notably its gold, which was important as a cornerstone of global monetary 
policy until the great crash of 1931. Until then, most of the world’s currencies were 
reliant on the gold standard and South Africa controlled half of the world’s gold 
production during those years. Other strategic resources were those needed for the 
support of military armaments, including chromium, cobalt, vanadium, antinomy, 
tungsten and, especially, uranium, because it was an early source of enrichable 
uranium for nuclear weaponry (Borstelmann, 1993; Noer, 1985; Thomson, 2008). 
Less strategically restricted to South Africa but also very important were sugar, iron 
ore, and coal. Control of these strategic resources and the general mineral wealth 
always put control of South Africa into a global not a local geopolitical framework, 
with dire results for South Africa’s indigenous peoples. If South Africa had not 
been positioned at the major choke point of global trade, or if it had been devoid 
of important resources and great wealth, its history would have been more local, 
and the global community would have had little geopolitical interest in it. As it was, 
its strategic importance and wealth led to constant interference and these provided 
numerous potential times for turning points to develop.
Race, racialism and racism in settler, colonial or nationalist 
South Africa
Today, South Africa is still deeply racialised, a legacy from the period of apartheid. 
It was also deeply racialised in the past and this was a cause of apartheid in the 
first place. Today it is hard to speak of racism and racist ideology and imagine a 
period before the modern concept of race was developed ( Jablonski, 2012). The 
earliest interactions within South Africa were not racist formulations at the time 
(Du Plessis, 1972; Theal, 1922), but in retrospect they can be seen darkly through 
a racial lens and were not prejudice free (Goldin, 1987). 
The idea of settler-colonialism and the settler-state has become almost dogma in 
critical studies as it is here defined as:
The specific formation of colonialism in which people come to a land 
inhabited by (Indigenous) people and declare that land to be their new home. 
Settler-Colonialism is about the pursuit of land, not just labour or resources. 
Settler-Colonialism is a persistent societal structure, not just an historical 
event or origin story for a nation-state. Settler-Colonialism has meant 
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genocide of indigenous peoples, the reconfiguring of Indigenous land into 
settler property. In the United States and other slave estates, it has also meant 
the theft of people from their homelands (in Africa) to become property of 
settlers to labour on stolen land.  (Rowe & Tuck, 2016)
However, the term settler-colonialism encompasses many embedded ideas that 
are not synonymous. Settler-colonialism is at first sight a tautology, because any 
colony is, by definition, a settler establishment, but it is important to view these 
people as economic colonialists, not settler-colonialists. Economic colonialism is 
the imposition of projected power to extract wealth without the idea of necessarily 
taking the land or creating statehood. Imperialism is when a distant country projects 
its power without regard to the aspiration or welfare of the indigenous population. 
So, imperialism may or may not be concerned about extracting wealth, but 
imperialism does serve a strategic purpose. Modern colonialism or neo-colonialism 
is the achieving of the appropriation of resources without the actual imposition of 
imperial power or settlers. 
The first encounter with mercantile Europeans 
The Europeans came first as mercantile people looking for riches of the East and 
not those of Africa. They came by sea seeking an alternative to the land-based 
Silk Route of Asia. The global paradigm of this period of European expansionism 
was mercantilism, incorporating both economic colonialism and imperialism 
(Theal, 1922). The mercantile imperative, as a European right to expand around 
the world and plunder its riches, was seen by its contemporaries as a preordained or 
divine destiny. This idea is still dominant in the imperialism of Manifest Destiny in 
the settler rhetoric of the Americas. Another way of viewing mercantile imperialism 
is as the modern conception of “facts on the ground”, and “We are here, so God 
must have wanted it”. This is a modern interpretation of predestination that is 
particularly attractive to Calvinists, Evangelicals, and other twentieth-century 
imperialists. The expansion was not originally one of settler-colonialism although 
it was soon to follow (1922). The geopolitical background of the settler expansion 
of Europeans into the Cape was situated in the extensive wars of the period, be it 
the Thirty Years War, the Anglo-Dutch War, or the Seven Years War that was fought 
between the British and French. Refugees from European conflict settled wherever 
they could in both Africa and the Americas. They were driven by self-interest not 
national interest; they were refugees, settlers, or economic migrants. They were 
supported by the mercantile imperative to make profit but not driven by it. Human 
rights hardly existed as a concept at this time as this was the period of servitude, 
human ownership, the divine right of kings, and over-arching theocratic power. 
Settlers often incorporate divine status into their rhetoric to justify what would 
otherwise be seen as theft. The projection of power into South Africa at its first 
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settling by Europeans should not be seen in the terms used by the National Party 
(NP) creation myth, as the Dutch founding of a promised land, but as a by-product 
of global politics (Du Toit, 1983).
Early ideas were not embedded in race, but in terms of religion, 
monetary worth and location 
Mercantile attitudes towards indigenous peoples were not those of settler-
colonialists. For mercantilists, people were seen as either worthy of investment or 
they were a resource to be co-opted. Race had little to no explanatory power at that 
time and indigenous people were seen in terms of utility ( Jablonski, 2012). In South 
Africa, few people were enslaved, rather the local indigenous people were tolerated 
because they had cattle to trade. Slaves were brought into South Africa but many 
more came from the endpoints of Dutch mercantile interests in Batavia ( Java) and 
India. Indigenous South Africans were widely enslaved only after potential trade 
with them had been exhausted and the European settler population had expanded 
enough to provide the Dutch East India Company (VOC) with victualing services 
previously supplied by indigenous cattle herders. However, most of the Cape’s 
settler holdings were at that time small and poor, and European households often 
took but a single slave who lived with the family (Theal, 1922). Intermarriage, 
leading to interracial offspring, was quite common. To the early Dutch church, this 
led to fear of evil heathen influences. Non-Christians were seen as fit for conversion 
or as unworthy people by mercantile settlers, imperialists, and even by ex-slaves 
(Amponsah, 2013). All relationships at that time were thought of as a matter of 
religion and education, even though many settlers were little better educated than 
their slaves (Theal, 1922). The Huguenots and, a little later, German Protestants 
from the South of Germany joined the Cape settlers as new waves of reformation 
refugees. Many of the first Dutch settlers saw themselves as having been freed of 
Spanish subjugation and having escaped persecution in Europe. They did not see 
themselves as economic colonisers (1922).
To the upper class VOC, the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa were of little 
concern. The mercantile upper class, that is the privileged class, saw themselves 
as equally above the Dutch peasant as they were above the African indigenous 
peasants. Class tensions centred on taxes and control of the peasants living on near-
subsistence farming. Some of their number had been settled against their will as a 
form of press-gang employment. Some of these peasants slipped away from the tiny 
settlement around Table Mountain to be beyond the direct control of the  VOC. 
These people were able to live amongst indigenous groups without undue hostility. 
However, this lack of central control led to efforts to return distant settlers to the 
confines of the defined VOC settlement (Theal, 1922). This was probably the 
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first lost turning point: when poor Dutch escapees from the VOC lived within 
the confines of the indigenous population more or less peaceably. This potential 
for continued peaceful coexistence was soon lost. The VOC sought to estrange 
its lower classes from each other and passed laws about cohabitation. The VOC 
was exceedingly cruel in its treatment of errant slaves and other people considered 
property or without rights. Considering this, settler accounts of supposed 
indigenous barbarity, for example, a century later the stories about the Zulu chief, 
Dingaan, must be seen as self-serving. Lurid tales of heathen barbarism were used 
as a spur to develop separation of subsistence classes and to incite racism. They 
were eventually used as a justification for the destruction of indigenous peoples. 
Dutch tales of settler origin emphasise interracial strife. The Battle of Great Fish 
River of 1770 was a result of demographic conflict with indigenous peoples that 
was given great emphasis. Forever more, the Dutch would frame their interactions 
with the indigenous population in terms of celebrated conflicts. The Dutch 
church increased its antagonism towards indigenous Africans and strengthened 
its hold on the Dutch population. Church was used as an early unifying concept 
from historical contingency by European theocracies. Native position within 
the church was not straight forward. Some slaves willingly converted, only to be 
rejected by the church later. The interactions between locals and settlers were not 
monolithically adversarial and sometimes peaceful coexistences lasted for a while; 
there were numerous struggles, especially with groups living in more fertile areas of 
the coastal plain to the north (Ross, 2013). Any mention of support and trade with 
locals was replaced with ever more strident tones of conflict. The settlers’ origin 
stories lionised the settler and either denigrated Africans or sometimes portrayed 
them as fierce but vanquished opponents. Either way, the settlers sought to further 
their own settler-hero myth.
Dutch identity emerges in reaction to British economic colonialism
British colonialism in South Africa came as result of French attacks in India in the 
context of the Napoleonic wars. Their initial imperative was global, strategic, and 
imperial. It sought to protect the route to the British Indian Empire from hostile 
Dutch allies of Bonaparte, and thereby weaken French colonies in India. By the 
time the British settlers annexed the Cape, the Dutch had resided there for almost 
150 years. The philosophical attitude of English economic colonisers differed from 
the earlier Dutch settlers. Theirs was more exploitative and aimed at enriching the 
home country, not the profits of mercantile agents. They were not there to steal 
land as property to live on, as much as to steal what the land had to offer and to 
take it home (Thomson, 2008). The colonies were either customers (particularly 
for manufactured goods as in India), or a source of raw materials. Slavery soon 
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ended after the Napoleonic war in the British colonies and South Africa. South 
Africa was never a major supplier of chattel slaves. However, the threat of slave 
emancipation was seen as a threat to the Dutch settlers that relied on slave help on 
their small holdings, although NP narratives denied this as a source of grievance. 
The British mishandling of compensation from the emancipation of Dutch chattel 
or property slaves was enough to cause widespread financial hardship for the 
Dutch settler community. The declaration of Piet Retief at Grahamstown showed 
that dissatisfaction with the English rule cemented ideals of South African Dutch 
nationals as a separate identity, an ideal identity that would soon strengthen 
its hold. 
After the Peace of Westphalia, there emerged the definition of nationhood as being 
an ethnic idea, not just one of territory. In the early nineteenth century, this was 
expanded to include a linguistic element to the previous ethnic definition of 
nationhood. This Westphalian linguistic-ethnic conception of nation acquired a 
cultural aspect too. This complex Westphalian political conception gave rise to a 
new form of nationalism that was driven by the new and complex interaction of 
developing ideas of statehood and personal identity. The popularity of this new 
mode of national identity was foundational to Afrikaner aspirations to escape from 
British control. The dissatisfaction with the English colonialists, their financial 
impositions, the introduction of new and more favoured British settlers, and the 
financial mishandling of emancipation, led to The Great Trek. The move into the 
interior brought another round of conflict with more indigenous Africans. The 
Cape Dutch again saw their plight as that of a subjugated people united by language, 
culture, and church. They were being assailed by a foreign power and faced strong 
opposition by indigenous peoples they saw as heathens. 
Race was now paramount and would become ever more important as Voortrekkers 
faced stiff opposition from more powerful indigenous polities they encountered 
as they moved north. These polities were more centrally organised than the 
decimated Khoekhoe and San people indigenous of the far Southern Cape. The 
concept of race had been created in support of chattel slavery and mercantile profit 
( Jablonski, 2012). By the time of the Battle of Blood River of 1836, a discourse 
of race, power and specialness had been incorporated into both Dutch origin 
stories and was deeply into their zeitgeist. Blood River was another monumental 
conflict to be celebrated like Fish River. The Dutch were followed and displaced 
by ever more rapacious English colonisers, being driven out of Natal first, and then 
with the discovery of vast wealth in the Rand, driven out of almost everywhere 
else in Southern Africa that had value. They mostly became a marginalised and 
impoverished group.
Settler-colonialism, nationalism and geopolitical politics |      51
Modern imperialistic capitalism and colonialism
British globalised colonialism came to South Africa late and left early, but became 
immensely rich in that interval. British colonialism was not particularly important 
to the development of apartheid racism. The British behaved in South Africa as 
they did elsewhere, more as the classic economic colonialist force subverting local 
position and indigenous rights, serving commercial interests, enriching the home 
country, and projecting widespread paternalistic racism. Settlement was slow, 
small, and relentless but with the discovery of immense wealth, British policies 
became greedier and more self-benefitting. Poor white farming Boers were viewed 
as little different from indigenous populations and were often treated with the same 
paternalistic policies and attitudes.
The tendency by both Dutch and British, was to encourage tribalisation within 
the indigenous populations in an effort to divide and conquer. These multiple 
ethnic groups were as threatened as the Boer Republics were by the discovery of 
gold. However, the native groups were too disorganised and mutually antagonistic 
to prevent prospector incursions, and race separatism prevented a combined front 
being developed between indigenous groups and Boer farmers in the Republics. 
Race again emerges as the factor that defined a turning point that could have seen 
a common cause – the fight against British colonialism. This catastrophe had 
been predicted by Kruger who saw that the draw of gold would displace both the 
indigenous people and local settler-colonial population. Gold-fevered newcomers 
had repeatedly overrun the United States and Australia, disregarding previous legal 
or emotional titles to the land (Dubow, 2010).
In 1881, the tensions between abusive British colonists and Dutch settlers brewed 
into the Majuba Massacre. This became another monumental marker in Dutch 
origin stories of independence and separateness centred around national identity 
of the kind of non-racially based nationalism that emerged from Westphalian 
conceptions of statehood centred around language, ethnic, religious, and cultural 
separateness. The Afrikaners, in their self-declared Republics, felt encircled 
by (poorly-treated and hence hostile) indigenous Africans and, further, both 
Afrikaners and indigenous Africans were subjected to the caprice of rapacious 
British Outlanders. A potential for these two beleaguered groups to unite against 
the Outlanders was never realised and must be viewed as another lost turning point. 
Dutch settlers cement the concept of Afrikaners
It is around this time that the Dutch settlers transformed into Afrikaners, named 
after Afrikaans, the creole language that had been created in South Africa from 
Dutch and many other languages into a unique indigenous language. The Afrikaner 
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identity emerged from local cohesiveness and a feeling of final separation from the 
source country. The British replacement of Dutch mercantile power structures 
brought about the cutting of any remaining ties to a Dutch homeland except those 
to the Dutch Church. Most memories of Holland and European history were lost 
since Britain had severed Dutch settlers’ ties to Holland for generations. Ties to 
Holland were always less strong because of the nature of the original settlement 
being founded by economic migrants and refugees and not being a government 
sponsored settler-colonialist state. Transport to Europe was long, costly, and 
dangerous, so much so that Dutch and Huguenot smallholders were unlikely ever 
to return to Europe from the start. The clergy, military, and the mercantile officers 
regularly returned but most Dutch could not. Dutch farmers in South Africa had 
become increasingly poor. As they multiplied and came under pressure from the 
British, they moved to more marginal land, smaller plots, or were driven off the 
land into desperate poverty in cities. Poor Afrikaner whites were an especially 
embittered class.
The Afrikaner never wished for a New Holland, in the same way as the English with 
their New England, and they never dreamed of returning to idealised homeland 
like “Ol’ Blighty” as did the English colonisers. The Afrikaners saw themselves 
as a people forged in South Africa. From around this time, they invoked an 
autochthonous agency of their adopted home. Their homeland made them special. 
This I would say marked a developing indigeneity to the Afrikaner identity that 
earlier the South African Dutch and colonial English certainly never had. 
These developments left the Afrikaner with an inward looking and insular world 
view (Thomson, 2008). Afrikaners felt that they had Africa or nowhere. It is 
interesting that, a little later, Boer War prisoners would complain about being taken 
overseas as being cruel punishment because they were people of the land. This was 
a strange statement considering the Dutch were the most far-reaching maritime 
nation in the mercantile world. This shows the strength of Afrikaner belief in 
autochthonous agency.
The British seek to crush emerging Afrikaner identity
The Anglo-Dutch or Boer War, and the Second South African War, or as it was 
called by nationalists, the War of Liberation, finished forging Afrikaner identity and 
led to a much stronger hatred of the British. When the Boers rebelled, they felt the 
full draconian force of British imperial displeasure and were treated abominably. 
Although the British were somewhat magnanimous in victory, the potential for 
an enduring peace was squandered. The British in a display of petty pique further 
pushed Boers into militant Afrikanerdom. Governor Alfred Milner was determined 
to abolish Afrikaans language and culture and thereby destroy incipient feelings of 
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nationalism by forcing the Boers to speak English. This was a move the Afrikaners 
stubbornly resisted. This attempt to destroy Afrikaner culture only strengthened 
the group’s sense of isolation because no global power had come to their aid during 
the Boer War (except for minor input from Russia and Germany who were imperial 
foes of Britain). In the massive rebuilding that was necessary from the wartime 
scorched-earth policies of the British imperialist army, indigenous Africans were left 
out. More than 26 000 Boer women and children died in British camps, promoting 
another rallying cry for nationhood. The 13 000 Africans who died were forgotten. 
Another turning point for racial and national unity had been lost. 
The last gasp of colonial intervention in South Africa was that of Germany 
supporting Afrikaner aspirations and funding resistance towards the British in the 
early twentieth century. The 1914 outbreak of World War I was seen as a chance to 
reconstitute the Boer Republics (Bunting, 1964). The simmering hatred of British 
excesses of the Boer War and Milnerism were fertile ground for mobilisation and 
some Boers rose up. This led to a mini-civil war between Afrikaner polities that 
were forcibly put down by Boer War hero Jan Smuts and others in favour of the 
British. The Afrikaner nationalists were again crushed. In response to Nationhood 
in Australia and Dominion in Canada, South Africa was soon to become a 
Commonwealth nation with weakened colonial control. This lessened political 
control was not enough to ease nationalistic demands and was not accompanied by 
economic freedom from Britain.
The position of the British elite was particularly patronising and driven by profit. 
Ideas of colonial power and responsibility played out alongside the tired old trope 
of “the White man’s burden”. This, as the labour force was used to extract gold 
at maximum profit from British-owned mines at hardly sustainable wages. The 
mineworkers were intentionally split along racial lines, on the excuse that they 
would be dominated by what they insultingly termed “kaffirboeties” (black-friendly 
whites) – mostly newly imported British miners – followed by the communists 
who would take advantage of the African workers (Bunting, 1964:274-278). In 
discussing groups here, I use the terms “black” and “white” as they are still widely 
used in South Africa, but it must be recognised that these are not neutral terms and 
are not useful designators of diverse polities.
The early twentieth century saw the spread and mobilisation of racial policies to 
marginalise indigenous workers to provide cheap labour for increasingly expensive 
mine operations. South African gold is plentiful, but it is derived from low-grade 
ore and is expensive to extract. Government policies were instituted that prevented 
blacks from acquiring land, and included the introduction of pass laws and other 
excesses. This increasing repression saw a turn from earlier, more passive forms of 
native representation to ever more radicalised interactions with the government. 
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Complex interplay between groups of the South African population
There has never been a monolithic political movement in South Africa. The British 
were the closest with their pattern of globalised capitalist colonialism. After the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War, the Afrikaner polity was split into two blocks, those who 
hated the British and those who got tired of fighting them, the accommodators. 
After the British effectively left completely by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, 
the two blocks politically fought for control (Gibbs, 1950). The accommodators 
had a brief respite at the outbreak of World War II, but when austerity-ridden, 
post-war Britain withdrew its influence, hard-core nationalists rose to power. 
These conservative ethno-religiously defined politicians were the ones to instigate 
and develop the apartheid state. The different divisions of the Dutch Church 
also had different attitudes to World War II and to relations with Nazi-influenced 
organisations (Van Tonder, 2013).
The African indigenous populations were also divided between two modern 
global political movements, democratic capitalism and communism. They also 
had struggles between traditional power structures, and modern progressive 
attitudes based on appeals to universal humanist values. Native African nationalist 
movements started around 1882 (Lerumo, 1980:26), but did not unify as a single 
voice on the world stage in opposition to colonial exploitation, entrenched racism, 
or later, to the emergence of apartheid. 
Anti-British elements seek theories and allies on the global stage
In answer to wars with the British, Afrikaners felt the same crushed desperation 
of the colonised as did the other indigenous African people. In the 1920s, radical 
elements of anti-British Afrikaners sought allies to thwart British imperialism. 
Therefore, they sought support from traditional British antagonists, such as 
Germany, German South-West Africa (GSWA) and Russia. Soon after the Congress 
of the Comintern in 1919, most nationalists became wary of international Marxism 
and turned back to newly re-emergent Germany. Hitler’s implementation of a state 
composed of people sharing a common language without heed to existing national 
boundaries – in his case, greater Germany – appealed greatly: 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. 
Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes 
them to stand back for no one. We must follow his example because only by 
such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.  
 (Rev. J.D. Vorster, 15 September 1940 to Students meeting  
 at Groot Schuur from Vatcher, 1965:63)
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The Afrikaners saw in national socialism a fairer capitalist economic model that 
eschewed the hegemony of big business and bankers – British rather than Jewish 
in this case – and promoted a privileged middle class (of Afrikaners) without 
needing to extend egalitarianism towards non-whites. Even a few black African 
leaders spoke in favour of the Nazis (Vinson, 2012:201, note 139). In seeking to 
throw off British domination, they were still effectively engaged in a century-long 
decolonialist struggle.
Early communism
Communism appealed to many nationalist Afrikaners who resented capitalistic-
colonialism. They spoke admiringly of the Bolshevik revolution (Bunting, 
1964:36-37). Poor whites were particularly drawn to Bolshevism: Dr D.F. Malan 
wrote in 1919, “The Bolsheviks stand for freedom like the Nationalist party” 
(Lerumo, 1980:50).
The British exported a militant trade union attitude through visits to South Africa 
of United Kingdom Labour Party representatives like Kier Hardie and Lloyd 
George. In earlier labour struggles, white miners and workers were often organised 
around broadly socialist principles. As early as 1907, communist influence was 
apparent and this was further emboldened by the 1917 revolution (Lerumo, 1980). 
Labour activist David Ivon Jones, who invoked the communist cause (ibid.), 
was considered by conservative NP members as traitorous, libellous, and with a 
diabolical stance that eschewed the Church. He attended the third Comintern in 
1921 under the international socialist league (ibid.:42). By 1928, the Communist 
Party was predominantly black, but its leadership was still almost completely white 
(ibid.:57). The communist movement was to become permanently split, partly 
over race and partly over ideology. The Afrikaner partly rejected Marxism because 
it was, first, led by British and English speakers; second, because it was foreign; 
third, it was against national identities (internationalism); and fourth, because it 
stood for racial equality amongst workers. 
Kier Hardie had noted earlier that unfair work practices would lead to socialism 
rising in the native workforce. Labour practices, in general, supported racism at 
both the management and the interpersonal levels, and racism was used to further 
keep the workforce from uniting in the face of personal and institutional prejudice 
(Cox, 2000; Goldin, 1987).
With the founding of the South African Communist Party (SACP) by D.I.  Jones 
and S.P.  Bunting, the race issue was not important because class struggle was 
paramount (Limb, 2010:59). The most contentious issue on the part of the ANC 
was reaction to the pass laws. These laws were part of an effort to make labour 
cheap and were used to prevent urbanisation, and had the effect of preventing 
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black education. They also benefitted privileged white interests by preventing black 
collectivism and mass mobilisation. The ANC moved very slowly into the arms 
of the communists. For example, Josiah Gumede was invited and attended the 
ceremonies in Russia in November 1927 for the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Although essentially non-communist, he saw the need for help in the 
face of a pitiful response from white intellectuals and local and colonial government 
officials to racial and class inequalities. Both the imperialists and the capitalists 
saw no unity with a class struggle of black workers. There was a common notion 
of “Bantu Egalitarianism” and that they were essentially communists by historical 
nature. Nationalistic tendencies in the ANC even identified with the Hertzog 
government in seeing the need to escape British and international predatory 
capitalism. This potential alliance was thwarted by intransigent racism on the 
Afrikaner side (Limb, 2010:251). Racism also led to denigration of native causes 
with calls within communist ranks not to pander to the petit bourgeois of native 
nationalists with their traditionalist power structures. This must be recognised as 
another chance of sounding a common message of racial unity in class struggle 
being either lost or purposely destroyed (ibid.:378). 
The removal of the Cape Franchise in 1936 was another effort to emasculate 
critics. The tide was turning against the black workers and the ANC had lost some 
of its organising strength (Limb, 2010). The communists in the black effort had 
some support from the peasant movement and more particularly from the trade 
union movement. This was epitomised by the garment workers and their racially 
integrated action who were led by the Jewish leader, Solly E.S. Sachs. This was 
another propaganda opportunity for the National Party, which took on ever more 
of the German national socialist tropes of subjugation by both Jewish Bolshevism 
and Jewish capitalism (however much these two economic theories seem mutually 
exclusive today) (Bunting, 1964; Goldin, 1987).
Strikers frequently sought support from their black co-workers and would induce 
them to strike with them. The trade unionists were less racially divided at the start 
of their movement and were influenced by white labour struggles common then in 
Europe. This support was despite the fact that white workers were striking to keep 
a sevenfold advantage over black wage structure (Krikler, 2005). The use of the red 
flag in a march brought harsh criticism from nationalists and, by the time of the 
ascendency of the nationalists in the 1930s, most white workers were toeing the 
Afrikaner party line. In South Africa, race was a wedge issue that the nationalists 
used to divide organised labour into weaker racial groupings to the detriment 
of everyone except the capitalists and poor whites. The connection of labour 
movements and the black egalitarian struggle was permanently broken along racial 
lines by the scramble to protect jobs in light of the 1930s depression (Limb, 2010) 
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because poor whites sought to protect themselves at the expense of their African 
colleagues. The association with the African nationalists and communists arose 
quite early, from the desire to produce a united front against Afrikaner nationalists 
and their racism, but contacts between the ANC and SACP/CPSA vacillated from 
being close, with the two organisations having shared officers, to attempts by the 
two organisations to distance themselves from one another. 
Afrikaner nationalism looks to Europe
Any admiration of communism was soon abandoned by Afrikaner nationalist 
elements because international socialism seemed a threat to the ethno-linguistic-
religious national identity the Afrikaners had established for themselves. They were 
particularly worried by the atheistic tenets international communism espoused. 
Other international movements like Garveyism and Pan Africanism incited fear 
too (Vinson, 2012). The newer doctrine of national socialism seen in Italy and 
then Germany seemed much more tempting because fascism still accommodated 
privilege. The temptation to replace British privilege with Afrikaner privilege 
was irresistible. This process saw the continuous denigration of indigenous black 
populations and was unfortunately triumphant over any movement towards 
egalitarianism. The earlier British excesses made fascism and national socialism 
popular with a faction of Afrikaners because it was also seen as anti-British (Italy 
and Germany being stridently anti-British at the time) and by far preferable to 
non-nationalistic and atheistic international socialism. The tough ideals of the Nazis 
were just as seductive to Afrikaners as they were to English, Europeans, Americans, 
or the Japanese in the 1930s. It is important not to project back onto that time from 
what we now know. Then, no contemporary expected Hitler would murder millions 
of people in mechanised death camps. The overarching association of Hitler’s 
Nazism with the holocaust in the minds of most people today makes labelling 
something “Nazi” a severe insult. This was not so in the 1930s and really not until 
the horrors of Belsen or Dachau were seen on public newsreels. At the height of 
Nazi propaganda, there was no hindsight available to question the apparent social 
and economic success of the Nazis. Similarly, their military achievements seemed 
unstoppable until 1942 with El Alamein and Stalingrad. A large South African 
troop presence was deployed in El Alamein, making the vulnerability of the Nazis 
keenly felt.
Post-World War I social experiments in Europe
The acceptance of a role for Nazi policy in the politics of South Africa is still 
very strongly disputed by some South African scholars, for example, Hermann 
Giliomee. However, much of this is retrospective in as far as they now know the 
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outcome of the Nazi experiment. At the start of the War, even the Giliomee family 
were strongly pro-German (Giliomee, 2016). This is not surprising or particularly 
controversial because when national socialist ideology was being developed, it 
was globally very popular. In its earlier days prior to German aggression, virtually 
all developed countries either flirted with it, for example, Oswald Moseley in the 
United Kingdom and The German American Bund in the United States, or they 
adopted it directly, like the Axis powers, Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and their 
sympathisers Spain or Portugal. Consequently, many similarities between the 
ideas of national socialism about self-determination in terms of cultural, ethnic, 
religious, and racial nationalism coalesced into the conception of Volksgemeinschaft. 
This same development was echoed in the Dutch community of South Africa in 
relation to perceived threats from English colonialists, and indigenous Africans 
social pressures. 
Recently, strident arguments about Nazi influence have centred around Eugen 
Fischer’s influence in Stellenbosch University (Robins, 2016:273-274), but 
arguments about Nazi influence have been long and vociferous (Dubow,  1995, 
2015; Duffy, 2006; Durham & Power, 2010; Furlong, 2003, 2005, 2010; 
Giliomee,  2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2012; Grundlingh, 1990). Most of these 
are not from an historical political perspective but are post hoc arguments, insults 
and defences against same in light of post-war knowledge of outcomes. Only a few 
individuals have continued to mobilise Nazi Volkish sentiments and these are tiny 
fringe movements are devoid of political power. I believe this remains true even 
considering white-privilege protectionism and the very recent revival of right-
wing extremism.
I am not here suggesting that apartheid is comparable with our post-war 
understanding of Nazi ideology and action. The Afrikaners with their strong 
religious attitude and divided ranks would have never considered genocide. It 
happened in the German occupied territories, because they were isolated by 
war. In a post-war globalised environment, black genocide was unthinkable, 
because it would have led to a massive native uprising in the manner imagined by 
Fanon (1963, 2008). The backlash would have led to an almost certain punitive 
international intervention. 
The connections to Nazism are in its political conceptions and underlying 
philosophies. The retreat of South African nationalists from the Germans and Nazis 
followed soon after the first military failures of the Germans threw the future of the 
movement into doubt (Gibbs, 1950). The public denial of Nazi influence started 
before the end of World War II but by its end, and especially during the Nuremberg 
War Trials, when evidence of mass atrocities became widely known, any public 
support was silenced (Gibbs, 1950; Sparks, 1990). This did not stop wide-scale 
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pardoning of Nazi war agents and sympathisers in South Africa, though. The 
desire to distance oneself from Nazi theory is understandable today. No one, not 
even Germans, wants to be associated with Hitler, despite the massive support the 
Nazis once had in some segments of German society (Childers, 1984; Fritz, 1987). 
However, in private, stalwart pro-Nazi elements in South Africa like Oswald Pirow 
– who was considered by the British and Americans as leader of the pro-Nazi wing 
of Malan’s National Party – were still seeking alliance with the British fascist leader 
Mosley (The Security Service, 2012). In this document, he is quoted as referring to 
the accused as the “Martyrs of Nuremberg” (The Security Service, 2012).
Nazi theory centred on concepts common to South Africa and other racist settler-
colonial states. Nazi propaganda was popular and many South Africans were 
pro-German even if Nazi theories were not widely discussed. This was to change 
after the war.
During the Second World War, the entire family was pro-German. 
Neighbours congregated at Grasberg to listen to the broadcasts of Zeesen, 
the pro-German short-wave radio station. One of my first political memories 
is of my disappointment at reading in the paper in 1945 that Germany had 
surrendered. I cannot recall, however, that the Nazi ideology or even Adolf 
Hitler was ever discussed. When the horrors of the Holocaust became known 
later, it was a great shock to the family.  (Giliomee, 2016:6)
One overriding concern was that of racial hygiene (Bunting, 1964:97; Childers, 
1984; Dubow, 1992, 1995, 2010). This was to be achieved by the spatial 
arrangement of races (separateness and deportation or living space), and 
prevention of interracial marriage (Childers, 1984; Klausen, 2002). The races were 
to have separate and disparate education objectives, including low-level technical 
education for racially inferior menial workers, as specified in Banting Education 
Act (Bunting, 1964:206). Under the Nazi regime, Eastern Europeans were the 
racially inferior, serving the culturally, intellectually, educationally superior 
paternal population. This policy, as formulated by Rosenberg, Himmler, and 
Goebbels, sought to restrict education to the minimum necessary to maintain an 
illiterate agrarian work force, and a barely literate (8th grade level) but technically 
competent cohort of factory workers, who would be supervised closely by German 
managerial staff (Childers, 1984). In South Africa, science and education was 
generally only for the benefit of State and Church, and both State and teacher 
came before family (Bunting, 1964). Max Eiselen, the first minister of apartheid 
education, was trained in Nazi classificatory techniques and put forth the policy 
of education for inferiority (Sparks, 1990:195; but see Robins, 2016). By 1941, 
the nationalists were openly discussing the Boer Race (Sparks, 1990:42) and Prof. 
Geoff Cronjé was talking of religious race-determination (Bunting, 1964:97). Due 
to the strong influence of the Dutch Church (Giliomee, 2003b; Ritner,  1967), 
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Nazi-style eugenics was not adopted in South Africa as it had been in segregationist 
America or Germany (Larson, 1995). Other ideas such as the anti-materialism and 
anti-individualism of early Nazi thought, strongly appealed to the NP with their 
ideal of the selfless Boer (Noer, 1985:44). The idea that a nation was its people 
resonated too (ibid.:12). The Dutch Reformed Church certainly was not itself 
directly Nazi inspired. Afrikaner support for Nazi ideas was nuanced and, in many 
cases, unspoken (see, for example, Giliomee, 2003a). This position is not accepted 
by critics such as Patrick Furlong. Whether by direct influence or indirectly from 
similarity of cultural roots, there was a strong affinity to ideas and fears about 
democracy and racial impurity. These movements were not generated only within 
South Africa: They were world cultural memes driven by anxiety about the end of 
the Old World order of colonialism and Eurocentric hegemony after World War I.
The ideal of the worker was unusual in national socialist Germany. The unions were 
seen as a danger to Weimar Germany because they were thought to be controlled 
by international communists. So, Hitler nationalised them, and reduced them to 
single, non-competing workers’ representatives with sole responsibility to the Nazi 
state. The same idea that was called for in 1941 South Africa (Bunting, 1964:262). 
The call for oaths of loyalty was another policy area that resonated both within 
party members and non-party members. The South African press controls called 
for in 1937 were ostensibly to prevent press insults of Nazi leadership (1964:228). 
The nationalists shared Hitler’s fear of a free press. Democracy by a purposely 
uneducated and unsophisticated majority was derided, although hints at the need 
for a dictatorship soon quieted with Hitler’s defeat. Equal rights were equated to 
communism (ibid.:162) and against party doctrine because it would lead to full 
integration of populations. The fear of native representation was exacerbated by 
having been spurred on by global rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and Russian 
encouragement of colonial self-determination. 
The craze for racial typing was widespread since the end of the nineteenth century. 
The  nationalists identified a clear connection between the Dutch and Nordic-
Alpine  Germanic race types. In the late nineteenth century, Europe there had 
developed racial ideas that elevated Aryan or Nordic people as a special creation, 
genetically unique, and claimed them to be the pinnacle of development 
(Chamberlain, 1911; De Gobineau, 2000). Ideas of racial purity and nationalism 
were soon amalgamated to give rise to a potent quasi-biological, lingo-nationalist, 
with white-supremacist tendencies. These would become the foundational 
philosophies of fascist regimes in the second quarter of the twentieth century. 
These policies first saw their dreadful potential enacted in present day Namibia, or 
as it was then, German South-West Africa (GSWA). There, 70% of the indigenous 
people were killed in battle, murdered, or incarcerated in atrocious conditions 
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or left to die of exposure on cold and damp Shark Island. This genocide was a 
rehearsal for lebensraum, wide-scale enrichment through ethnic-based theft, and 
military-scale murder, all common to the solution seen in occupied Poland and 
Government General to the east. GSWA was to have extensive influence on Nazi 
attitudes and policies through Hermann Goering, whose father was administrator 
there (Sowden, 1944). The fact that segregationist attitudes in South Africa predate 
Hitler, does not falsify a Nazi commonality. Concerns over racial purity and fear 
of mixed marriage spring from a common eugenicist theory developed in Europe, 
America, and South Africa (Larson, 1995). Jim Crow laws in the American South 
grew in part from the same influences that Nazi philosophy did (Bernasconi & 
Lott, 2000; Chamberlain, 1911; de Gobineau, 2000) and eugenics (Larson, 1995). 
Further evidence of the increase in Nazi influence can be seen in rising Anti-
Semitism in the 1930s and tropes of Jewish capitalism that led Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
to call for Jewish boycott in South Africa (Robins, 2016:32) were definitely 
developed and borrowed from Nazi propaganda, as was the distribution of the 
forged Protocols of the Learned Elders of the Priory of Zion (Bunting, 1964:63). 
Anti-Semitism rose considerably in the 1930s (Bentwich, 1942; Shain, 2017). 
The Anti-Semitist’s policy sought to prevent Jewish and Southern Europeans from 
emigrating to South Africa. These were formalised in immigration quotas in 1930 
and the Alien Act 1937 closed the door to the plight of German Jewry (Gilbert, 
2010; Shain, 2017; Sowden, 1944). The Nazi espousal of racio-ethnic group-think 
eschewed individualism. This was a suitable model for the Afrikaner where the 
group was centred on Dutch Reformed Church (Thomson, 2008). 
An ideology of racial specialness, power, will, and ethno-cultural-linguistic and 
religious exclusivity, can be shaped to serve almost any purpose. In the twentieth 
century, it was mostly used to enrich the power-holders. The emerging new 
bourgeois and petit bourgeois saw themselves as rightful heirs to the wealth of the 
disintegrating aristocracies all over Europe. In South Africa, they saw national 
socialism as being centred on their own interest because this was not the socialism of 
Marxism (Borstelmann, 1993). The strong paternalistic governmental framework 
favoured by national socialists resonated with a large fraction of Afrikaners, and 
further interest was fanned by British indifference, maltreatment, and excesses. 
There was also an unreasonable attachment to the grievances of dead generations, 
as few peoples are as guided by a sense of their past as Afrikaners (Thomson, 2008).
Future nationalist leaders such as J.G. Strijdom, H.F. Verwoerd, and B.J. Vorster all 
supported Nazism openly well into the 1940s (Harrison, 1982; Thomson, 2008). 
Oswald Pirow, the defence minister, personally met with Salazar, Franco and 
Hitler in 1937 (Sparks, 1990:172). Increasingly from 1929 onwards, fears of racial 
defilement from mixed marriage leading to a weakening of Afrikaner strength and 
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vitality, were seen in the terms of racial purity formulated by Rosenberg, Himmler, 
Hitler and the Nazi elite. Influential men in this formulation were Nazi convert 
and German-educated Dr Piet Meyer, along with Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, Dr Nico 
Diederichs, Prof. Geoff Cronjé, Dr Daniel Malan, and the ferociously anti-British 
Dr Albert Hertzog (Citino, 1991; Gibbs, 1950). By 1944, a committee of the FAK 
(Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge) concluded that any move towards 
egalitarianism between blacks and whites would be race suicide (Harrison, 1982).
The appeal of national socialism and fascism was not universal. This is exemplified 
by the strident contrast of apartheid leader Dr Daniel Malan to his family member, 
the Allied war ace, Sailor Malan, who was proudly pictured with his black Caribbean 
fellow flying ace. These tensions could have led to another Afrikaner civil war. This 
was narrowly avoided in early 1939 when Smuts’ group took control, supported 
by pro-English Afrikaners and English South Africans. This was fomented by his 
sending of armed police to pacify the Nazified and militarised police in GSWA, 
which was still a League of Nations mandated territory of South Africa. GSWA 
had been organised into a strong Nazi camp encouraged by common identity, 
anger at Versailles Treaty based mandates and impoverishment, need for German 
strategic sea lanes, and support of regional Nazi espionage capabilities (Wilkins 
& Strydom, 1979). It had instituted a NASDP Party organisation, and the Hitler 
Youth, wide scale indoctrination and a call for reunification with Germany as soon 
as Hitler came to power in 1932. It also maintained a strong anti-Semitic posture. 
This led the South African mandate to formally ban both the NASDP (Nazi 
Party) and the Hitler Youth in GSWA during 1934. Despite this, Hitlerisation or 
Nazification of GSWA was complete in 1939 with a large contingent volunteering 
for Wehrmacht service (Sowden, 1944). Although Hitler often espoused respect for 
Britain and its Empire, he always demanded the return of former German African 
colonies, foremost being GSWA (Hofmeyr, 1939). There were clear designs too 
on South Africa’s strategic materials and especially its gold because Nazi expansion 
had nearly bankrupted German foreign reserves. The timely intervention of Smuts 
was decried by Hertzog and Malan (Gibbs, 1950). Malan identified so closely 
with the Nazi cause that he termed himself Volksleierin during the election of 
July 1943 (Sowden, 1944). The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique 
were another fascist influence upon South Africa. Although the Portuguese 
dictator Salazar was not a pure Nazi, he was a pseudo-Nazi like his neighbour, 
Franco. Salazar differed in that his racist formulation was more reminiscent of 
the ideology of mercantilism with the strong support of Catholicism. He and 
Franco were models for a theocratic interpretation of Nazi racial supremacy that 
the Malan fraction could adapt (Bloomberg & Dubow, 1990). Mozambican 
waters were a haven for Indian Ocean activities of the Kriegsmarine, during World 
War II and spies were run out of Lourenço Marques (Fedorowich, 2005; Furlong, 
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2005; Sowden,  1944; Sparks, 1990; Vinson, 2012). One of these spies was said 
to convey messages directly to Dr Malan from Third Reich foreign minister, Von 
Ribbentrop, but Malan was not the most extreme of the pro-Nazi factions: that 
honour went to Dr Oswald Pirow and his New Order Party (Bunting, 1964:89). 
Another direct message to the paramilitary Ossewabrandwag was transferred by the 
spy, Robey Leibbrandt, who later fell out with and was betrayed by its leadership 
(Fedorowich, 2005), one of many pro-Nazi, anti-British paramilitary orders styled 
on the Nazi SA (Sturm Abtleilung or Brown Shirts) that sometimes battled with 
South African and British soldiers, carried out sabotage, or engaged in espionage 
(Campbell, 1943; Fokkens, 2012; Furlong, 1988, 2005; Gibbs, 1950; Hodes, 2014; 
Marx, 1994; Scher,  1986; The Security Service,  1943; Van Rensburg,  1956; 
Wikipedia Contributors, 2015). They were even more nationalist, anti-democratic, 
anti-Semitic, and saw South Africa as a national socialist dictatorship based on 
Dutch Nordic identity and a Protestant Theocratic State espoused by Dr Du Plessis 
(Gibbs, 1950). Goebbels, always an opportunistic propagandist, had instituted 
the highly listened to and well-received Afrikaner language of Zeesen radio 
transmissions 1931-1944 (Chetty, 2012; Church, 1939; Gibbs, 1950; Marx, 1992; 
Mhlambi,  2015; Monama,  2014; Saerchinger, 1938). In  1941, Goebbels 
reassured the South Africans that Germany would respect their independence 
(Sowden, 1944). This statement was in direct contradiction to the intelligence that 
led to Namibian intervention in April 1939 (1944).
Malan couched his arguments for not going to war in support of Britain using terms 
identical to those of Hitler, that an attack on Germany was a godless Bolshevik plot 
driven by Jewish world financial interests and that, in addition, such a move would 
favour British capitalism in South Africa (Gibbs, 1950; Thomson, 2008). The only 
protection from Jewish predators of South African gold would be a nationalist 
religious constitution. Like in Germany, the Jews were to be the scapegoats of the 
dictatorship. The nationalists remained publicly committed anti-communists in 
the 1930s (Harrison, 1982; Thomson, 2008). They also were adamant that they 
were uniquely African (Thomson, 2008). Malan’s political platform for the 1948 
elections was one, foremost, of cultural chauvinism. It had three equal planks: 
apartheid, religious conservatism and anti-communism; history has tended to 
ignore all but the first, but the other two were equally important at the time 
(Thomson, 2008). The NP surprised everyone by a leap to power in the election 
of May 1948. The start of nationalist power saw the concentration of wealth into 
Afrikaner hands. Black South Africans were relegated to an increasingly subservient 
and disempowered role. We must recognise here another possible turning 
point: South Africa’s recognition of the failure of Nazi ideology and its repulsion 
towards the outcome of the belief in Volkish superiority that led to genocide in 
Nazi-held territory. This series of events horrified previous German supporters 
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(Giliomee,  2016). The English settlers and pro-Smuts Afrikaners could have 
crossed tightly defined Eurocentric Volkish groupings in South Africa to become 
more united. Many South Africans were divided as to the intentions of Germany 
towards South Africa. Those with a sense of history saw the same threat from 
Germany as they did from GSWA: The intention to colonise, displace Afrikaners, 
and take Afrikaner wealth for the benefit of a European power. Others so hated the 
English that a German overseer was seen as more negotiable or otherwise somehow 
preferable. As mentioned, Goebbels’ reassurances seemed believable at the time. 
Smuts prevailed because he united the more centrist Afrikaners with English and 
was just more anti-German than many of them, probably because his experiences 
in World War I. 
After the end of World War II, there was a loss of support for Nazi extremist views 
by many people in the centre of the Dutch Church. This was as a result of the 
disclosure of Nazi genocide and the details arising from the Nuremberg Trials. This 
reaction could have been deployed to unite the majority of white South Africans 
against extremism, and could have enabled the more liberal parts of the right-wing 
of South African politics to modify the pronouncements of the harshest proponents 
of Nazi-like policies. However, this turning point opportunity was lost. The birth of 
the United Nations (UN) and the widespread appeal of newly emerging concepts 
of Universal Human Rights led to a fear of rising democratic rights and aspirations 
amongst the racial majority. Racial fear prevented any softening of attitudes and 
may have even caused a hardening of apartheid sentiments. A similar expression 
was found with increasing calls for justice in post-World War II Jim Crow South. 
This too was met with a hardening within the deep South of the United States for 
enforcement of Jim Crow laws, and stronger opposition to intervention from more 
liberal elements in the rest of the country.
The British colonialist attitude after the start of decolonialism
The British might have been uncomfortable with nationalist policies, but most of 
that discomfort was based on concern over whether the nationalists would impact 
profits. British missionaries and humanitarians played an important role and were a 
reasonable resort for entreaties from black leaders in the form of petitions starting 
as early as the 1870s. From the establishment of a tiny intelligentsia in the black 
community through to its disappointment with continued British racism, even 
after World War I, through to the petition after the Atlantic Charter, there was very 
little evidence of radicalism. Their pleas for help still fell on deaf ears (Limb, 2010). 
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Indigenous people respond to nationalist provocation
Slowly stripped of all representation, voice, power, and especially wealth, the 
black community, by far the greater part of the population, was collectively 
impoverished. This emasculation and impoverishment would obviously lead to a 
black response (Gell, 1953). The African response was much more cultured and 
nuanced than would be expected from a people suffering this level of abuse in a 
post-World War II environment. The Atlantic Charter brought a new optimism in 
African independence movements. These movements in South Africa petitioned 
in 1940 that they be allowed to have representation. They were buoyed by 
Article iii with its reference to anti-colonialism and self-determination and access 
to open free markets. This was paid lip-service during the Cold War period when 
support of European colonial colleagues and pro-American regimes prevented 
any support for independence. Americans feared that even civil rights movements 
could be hijacked by communism. The formation of the UN and the Declaration 
of Universal Human Rights, as well as UN-backed rejection of racial stereotyping 
(UNESCO, 1952), were all major empowerments to black aspirations. 
It is now very clear that the desire for freedom amongst disenfranchised black 
South Africans was essentially an internal one that grew from political and 
economic oppression; it was not a product of outside agitation. The excesses of 
the colonialists and nationalists ensured that full democracy would become an 
Africanist aspiration. There was a resistance to any appearance of an armed struggle 
at this time, partly as a result of the fear within the African movements of not 
wanting to be seen as furthering Russian objectives in a strategically important part 
of the world. It was with great prescience that Oliver Tambo tried hard to prevent 
the black struggle being seen as taking sides in the Cold War. The nationalists 
tried equally hard to do the opposite and frame black aspirations as communist 
threats. American and Western indifference to African pleas eventually forced the 
ANC to seek support from Russia, the only place where it was being offered. This 
had consequences. The move to armed struggles was slow and reluctant, and was 
forged in an alliance with leftist revolutionary elements (Ellis, 2011). The struggle 
started slowly and had only a few hundred trained fighters even two years after its 
start (Shubin, 2008). Even so, the ANC was under direct CIA engagement by the 
mid-1950s and reportedly the CIA was the source of information leading to the 
Rivonia arrests (Thomson, 2008:43).
Multicultural support for more equal treatment moves to the left
Later African aspirations, and those of more fair-minded Europeans in South Africa, 
culminated in the Freedom Charter. The formulation of the Charter was suppressed 
66      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
by the repressive regime because if was as a large, mixed-race, multi-ethnic and 
multi-class group that came together to write it. The Freedom Charter was an 
exemplar of multicultural reconciliation and reasonable demands (Editors, 1955). 
Its weakness was in its appeal for state ownership and equal distribution of 
national resources. These were not unreasonable demands considering wide-scale 
nationalisation in post-war Europe, but they were antithetical to the Afrikaners in 
power. It looked like communism, and this did not sit well with Anglo-American 
capitalists either. The response to the writing of the Freedom Charter was typically 
repressive and led to the arrest of its leaders. It was even claimed that the Charter 
was evidence of a a criminal conspiracy to bring about a communist overthrow. 
The trial went on forever, but was ultimately unsuccessful. It is unclear if even the 
nationalists actually believed their own charges. I think they did, but there needs to 
be an analysis of internal communication to say definitively one way or another. It 
was certainly enough to scare off a McCarthyism-ridden America from supporting 
the Freedom Charter, and that might have been part of the motivation for the 
charge in the first place. The other was to hold the framers of the Charter in custody 
long enough to let things settle down (Sparks, 1990:240-242).
The African response to provocation was bipolar. One side sought to engage 
colonial masters in terms of civil rights or human rights and to operate through 
colonial legal structures, that is, to appeal (somewhat naively) to the colonial 
master’s better natures often in terms of newly adopted Christian values. They 
saw colonialists as progressive and evolving. The other mode of action sought to 
gain independence and self-determination as promised in the Atlantic Charter. 
The internal political dynamics behind these points of view were mixed and 
complex. The more conservative approach was dominated by existing elites, 
often within traditional authority structures. The ANC, coming from a traditional 
Native Council origin, had more sympathies amongst the traditional authoritative 
structures, because chiefs were often scared away from communist engagement 
due to fears that their traditional power would be usurped. The suggestion supplied 
by the nationalists that Marxists would destroy the neo-traditional authority of the 
Native Council gave them pause (Robins, 2016). 
Communism amongst African indigenous groups
American rhetoric during the Cold War was reserved for two constituencies: 
The political audience at home first, and in support of international capitalism 
second. The overarching goal of American policy towards Africa was to prevent the 
spread of communism anywhere. This was a favoured trope the NP knew it could 
manipulate.
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As the left wing of the ANC became more supported by mass movement outside 
of traditional authority, they often employed Marxist rhetoric and spoke of struggle 
and equality rather than the more conservative native’s calls to rally around civil 
or human rights as the basis of struggle. These different approaches were often 
blended and never very clear (Fortescue, 1991). SACP had some influence, but 
traditional ANC leaders remained unsure (Nugent, 2012:302). Walter Sissulu, 
Brian Bunting and Ruth First visited the Soviet Union in 1950 (Shubin, 2008). 
The rioting that broke out in South Africa on that May Day convinced the National 
Party regime that it needed to suppress communism (Thomson, 2008).
Communism was systematically made illegal in South Africa with recommendations 
that it be treasonable and might carry a death sentence. As a result of Russian 
cooperation with the Smuts World War II government and allies in general, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) opened a consulate in South Africa 
in  1942, but it was closed in 1956 amid mounting hostility on the part of the 
nationalist apartheid regime. The Soviets were accused of engaging in subversive 
activities. In the 1950s, this became a hailstorm of protest with nationalist invective 
about interracial sex amongst godless communists, calls to close the Soviet 
Consulate by the Dutch Reformed Church, fears of the expropriation of South 
African wealth, claims that communism was despotic, and most ironic of all, that 
communism incited interracial hostility (Bunting, 1964:Chapter  10). This fervour 
was again located in distant global tendencies and politics, as it was situated in the 
milieu at the height of the Cold War.
Wherever there were struggles of independence in Africa, the Soviets avowed moral 
support. This was invoked by nationalists as proof of probable outside interference, 
casting Soviet support in the terms of anti-capitalist, atheist, foreign domination, 
and a threat to American world order (Citino, 1991). This threat was a potent 
claim by the nationalists for them to be either left alone to deal with it, or to be used 
to frighten American interests to invoke intervention. The nationalists cleverly 
manipulated American opinion throughout the Cold War and were keen to join in 
multinational policing actions in proxy wars such as the Berlin Airlift, the Korean 
conflict, and by offering to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
(Borstelmann, 1993). In 1960, the USSR declared universal support for decolonial 
actions as a policy it had always supported but had not formalised (Schmidt, 2013).
Nationalism, be it of Afrikaner National Party origin, or from the African National 
Congress, or in the form of various Pan African nationalisms, comes from a rise of 
intellectual imagining promoted by elites. It is hard to situate these struggles within 
a class structure, as a worker-based or mass-peasant movement because they were 
both from below and from traditional authority groups working together (and 
at times against each other) to promote a decolonial agenda. The South African 
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indigenous left was constantly in flux because it was supported by platforms of 
migrant workers and sedentary farmers, and was never sufficiently fixed to enable a 
coherent mobilisation. This was a side effect of the homeland Bantustan policy that 
may have been intended; it certainly benefitted nationalist resistance to progressive 
humanitarian change. Population dislocation of black South Africans effectively 
stopped an anti-capitalistic mass movement from being formed into a popular 
and united front of action. So, besides imposing near serfdom, the land acts and 
pass laws imposed on black workers ensured their inability to organise properly 
and worked to keep wages at poverty levels (Sparks, 1990). The tiny African 
intellectual elite was kept both small and at an arm’s length from sources of power 
within the governmental framework in a typical effort of imperial racism (ibid.). 
This colonial stratagem succeeded in artificially lowered wages, but this had the 
effect of suppressing local demand and ultimately hindered the development 
of the nation, just as Booker T Washington had noted, “One man cannot hold 
another man down in the ditch without remaining down in the ditch with him” 
(Washington, 2014). The fear of a subjugated majority predisposed the nationalists 
towards instituting a colour bar and then full apartheid. The less fair the system 
became, the more repressive it had to become, thereby sowing the seeds of its own 
inevitable destruction. 
By the start of the armed struggle, a number of African freedom struggles were 
complete or nearing inevitable completion, notably in the French possession 
of Algeria and British Ghana. The “winds of change” speech by British Prime 
Minister Harrold MacMillan and pronouncements by American President John 
Kennedy demonstrated to the nationalists that their days were numbered. To delay 
the inevitable removal of non-democratic white dominance, the NP and its allies 
answered with secession from the Commonwealth, a ratchetting-up of terror, and 
turning a deaf ear to ever more clamorous entreaties by both the free world and 
Eastern Bloc. Apartheid South Africa was becoming a pariah state. Maintained by 
revenues from gold and its proxy wars in Asia, the apartheid regime was able to 
hang on for another 30 years. 
International response to perceived communist threat
America was stuck in a logic of capitalism and did not see that its short-term self-
interest in supporting repressive regimes in southern Africa would promote the 
cause of Marxism, which was the one thing it feared most. (The whole of this 
subject is fully discussed in the book, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle [Borstelmann, 
1993].) Despite the apartheid regime’s penchant for provoking a black response, 
the regime was seen as an effective bulwark against Soviet interest in strategically 
important South Africa (Thomson, 2008:7, 23). The repression of all political 
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redress and opposition, the rejection of outside intervention, and the continuation 
of gross racial inequities ensured that after 1950 the black response would be forced 
to turn towards revolutionary action. America recognised that ignoring legitimate 
political grievances would push the apartheid regime to ratchet up its security 
apparatus until it provoked racial violence (Thomson, 2008:23). Repressiveness 
of apartheid grew in concert with the response of black and liberal activists 
(Thomson, 2008). The NP was able to use the bogey of communism to pass The 
Suppression of Communism Act to give itself draconian powers to suppress dissent. 
It sought approval for these acts by scaring opposition from America with invoking 
Soviet support (Borstelmann, 1993; Thomson, 2008). Even American critics of 
the nationalists acknowledged their vocal and fierce anti-communist credentials 
(Visser, 2007). 
Any American second thoughts about support for the NP were silenced by the 
invasion of Korea, as attention to global politics supplanted concerns over civil 
rights. South Africa capitalised on this turn of events by volunteering units of the 
South African Defence Force for action in Korea. The racist attitude of America can 
be seen by its constant support for Eastern Europeans and indifference to African 
suffering (Thomson, 2008:30). All thoughts of support for ANC-led African self-
determination faltered on the need to support colonial powers in Europe, even 
though America considered that this would push the liberation struggle into Soviet 
hands. The USSR was very much the follower rather than the instigator of Cold 
War interest in Southern Africa (Thomson, 2008). The constitutional crisis of 1951 
was resolved by another open Hitler admirer, J.G. Strijdom (Noer, 1985:41). He 
used the unconstitutional means of house and court packing. He was particularly 
annoyed by liberal protest that crossed racial boundaries (ibid.:40). Despite this, 
the American administration under President Dwight Eisenhower continued to 
be persuaded by NP goading and internal McCarthyism to see Soviet expansion 
behind every liberation movement (Borstelmann, 1993). The strategic position 
of South Africa, the explosion of Soviet atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and 
concern over South African uranium further intensified these fears (ibid.). The 
truth was that the USSR was playing catch-up at this time and was only responding 
to American intervention (Thomson, 2008:44). America knew of the eighty-
year history of Russian involvement in South Africa from the time that Russian 
volunteers were fighting for the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War and feared ongoing 
involvement. However, complete bilateral ties between the ANC and the USSR 
were not developed until 1960 (Shubin, 2008:239). America took notice of all visits 
to the USSR by South African communists and of all connections between African 
nationalist and Pan African movements. Soviet rhetoric supportive of liberation 
resonated with American neuroses (Borstelmann, 1993). This saw the Roosevelt 
position of being receptive to, but not supportive of, pleas for civil and human rights 
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in South Africa weakened by the blatantly racist Truman (1993:Chapter  3) and 
rejected by Eisenhower. This would reverse again under Kennedy (Noer,  1985), 
but ever-hardening positions from President Lyndon Johnson through President 
Richard Nixon culminated in the outright rejection of any humanitarian pleas by 
the hawkish administration of President Ronald Reagan (Thomson, 2008). The 
tropes marshalled by supporters of the apartheid government had taken hold of 
the American government. This is illustrated by writings in the State Department’s 
journal, Problems of Communism, that stated that due to contacts with Moscow the 
ANC had moved from being, “dedicated to the pursuit of civil and political rights, 
to a vanguard movement with strong Marxist-Leninist elements with its political 
goals being, … an ally of the USSR in its geopolitical aims” (Thomson, 2008:5-6). 
Even as the Americans adopted harsher rhetoric against the apartheid government, 
it invariably increased official cooperation with it, or at least prevented sanctions 
(Borstelmann, 1993). They thereby lost friends on both sides of the struggle 
and empowered leftist leaning (Noer, 1985). The American response vacillated 
between outright support by civil rights leaders, to being outraged, from wishing 
to have democracy to the claim of Representative Joe Waggoner of Louisiana 
that, “… the natives are not capable of producing any semblance of what we call 
civilization” (Noer, 1985:225). (See Chapter 6 of his book, No Easy Solution, for 
more detail.)
Later Dutch-Afrikaner attitudes
Like the early American colonialists, the Dutch escaped British colonial imperial 
power and with The Great Trek, they threw off the suffocating British. They 
effectively decolonised themselves and then continued to become both a post-
colonial people and an internal settler-colonial community (Mignolo, 2009). They 
escaped the colonial power imposed upon them only to impose it on others. Their 
escape was not driven by a capitalist drive, because they left the richer resource 
base for a much poorer one in the Karoo. Lastly, they were not driven by egalitarian 
drives even though they had the dignity of shared poverty. The Voortrekkers did 
not have a strong class structure. Their authority system was based around their 
church and community. They invested the land with agency and the power to 
transform and define themselves as a linguistic-ethnic-religious people, effectively a 
nation-state without the trappings of nationhood. They lived an illusion of freedom 
located within the logic of colonialism (2009).
The British left them alone initially but soon made incursions into the Natal region 
because it had good ports. The discovery of vast wealth in the South African interior 
ensured that their Republics would be destroyed by colonialisation in classic 
capitalistic resource appropriation. This culminated in their national identity being 
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destroyed by the British in the Anglo-Boer wars, although recently, this attitude 
has been subject to some revision (Grundlingh, 2010). The attack on the Dutch 
ended with Milner’s attempt to destroy the Afrikaner. This only strengthened 
them further, leaving them with the resentment of a colonised people. Upon their 
freedom in the post-World War I period, they behaved like newly decolonised 
people. They took on the values of their oppressors, harked back to a mythological 
beatific past, and sought every kind of privilege for themselves. In adopting their 
colonial master’s values, they saw themselves as an elite, becoming more patronising, 
more racist, and more keen to maintain their own internal colonialist relationship 
(Mignolo, 2009; Therborn, 2020:Chapter  4). They were at one and the same time 
postcolonials and settler-colonialists. This situation is unique to South Africa, but 
the British-Americans came closer to this position than any other settler-colonialist 
society (Mignolo, 2009:82-94). Although the Afrikaners saw themselves as an 
indigenous people, in effect they were postcolonial internal colonisers. They had 
adopted some of the same attitudes as the British. The Afrikaner position was 
very different from settler-colonialists with a much shorter history like those in 
Zimbabwe or in Kenya. 
Discussion of turning points
What turning points can we identify in the context of global sociopolitical 
movements? The first is that, if it was not for mercantile meddling, a more 
integrated and harmonious society might have developed in South Africa from the 
beginning. Some of the Dutch peasants who slipped away from the tiny settlement 
around Table Mountain to be beyond the control of the VOC were able to coexist 
with indigenous groups without undue hostility. Their liberty posed a threat to the 
VOC, however, and the company soon made efforts to return these distant settlers 
to the confines of the defined VOC settlement. 
We can recognise another lost turning point as the failure of Dutch settlers and 
African indigenous peasants to seek interracial unity in the face of rapacious British 
imperial power. The British succeeded in colonising South Africa because the fight 
against them was piecemeal and uncoordinated. The Dutch felt no unity with the 
native African groups due to their history. Some even felt more kinship with the 
English than the African although this would not last.
Another turning point was lost when Dutch settlers could have united with 
indigenous African populations to thwart British expansion into the Boer 
Republics. The Dutch narrative of racial struggle and battle and growing support 
of racial segregation prevented them working to create a unified front against 
the British.
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The end of the Boer War was another lost turning point. Indigenous Africans 
and Afrikaners could have forged an alliance at this time for better treatment, but 
the racialised antipathy between the two groups was strong despite their sharing 
of many common struggles. Instead of seeking common community with fellow 
South African indigenous people, Afrikaners strongly advocated for colour 
separation and separate identity. This was an inevitable outcome of the creation of 
a group identity based on shared language, ethnicity, and culture that emphasised 
the ethnic separateness of the Boers and their racial struggle in the face of British 
colonial action. Race was now paramount.
The next opportunity would have been to unite against the British in a common 
cause. Racism stopped this from the start. The next time would have been in the 
1930s if indigenous African and Afrikaner workers had joined forces in light of the 
Depression and turned away from incipient nationalism in a united class-struggle 
against entrenched foreign exploitation. 
After the Second World War, the Afrikaners could have led the way on the African 
continent for recognition of human rights. The magnanimous attitude of Jan Smuts 
and his efforts at the UN could have been applied at home, but the Afrikaners’ 
desire for privilege and divisions within their own ranks led to the racist solution of 
apartheid winning out. 
We can also see how the wording of the Freedom Charter affected its reception. 
The document, with its apparent espousal of godless communism, could have 
been formulated in a way that made it less prone to attack. With the growth of 
communism, a more enlightened group of traditional power authorities could have 
joined the liberal whites and used the communist bogeymen themselves to cajole 
American self-interest to be on their side rather than that of the NP. Failing that, an 
argument could be made that to have started armed struggle as soon as apartheid 
was installed would have taken advantage of public opinion outside of South Africa 
that was supportive of self-determination and would have occurred before the state 
apparatus of repression became entrenched and powerful. 
In the end, most turning points were lost because the issue or race was mobilised 
in service of short-termed political expediencies or to ensure the continuation of 
long-term economic inequalities. 
Conclusion 
This slow rejection of Africanist causes led to ever-hardening of the NP policies. 
Malan’s strict successor, Strijdom, was followed by an even more repressive 
Verwoerd. Attempts to export American-style civil rights actions, for example, 
the Johannesburg bus boycott, met harsh resistance. Boycotts and other acts 
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of civil disobedience were never as strong as that in Montgomery because the 
South African black community was divided into factions, because the pass laws 
ensured a lack of cohesion, and because the regime was less scrutinised by foreign 
powers and hence less inhibited in its use of violence to suppress peaceful protests 
(Borstelmann, 1993). This harsh attitude culminated in the Sharpeville massacre. 
The ANC was soon to declare its own armed struggle. However, this coincided 
with a number of other global events. Kennedy was assassinated, the Vietnam War 
had started, Cuba was in crisis, the Cold War now consisted of proxy actions fought 
in third countries, and the Cold War threatened to become a hot war or even a 
nuclear war. The desire to avoid national destruction in a nuclear conflict led to the 
Cold War becoming a series of regional, hot proxy wars in Africa. The populations 
of America and Russia – the real protagonists in these wars – were safe and this 
was itself an unspoken manifestation of racism. Although these proxy wars were 
well funded at their start, they continued long after global interest in them started 
to wane. The apartheid regime took advantage of this lack of focus towards South 
Africa in global politics, to set about installing a rigid apparatus of repression in a 
regime that would last another 30+ years (Thomson, 2008). This was also a time 
when local politics become increasingly internal as South Africa was isolated by the 
Western powers. This policy of isolation by the West was for local and internal aims. 
Western powers (by appearing to be prodemocratic, egalitarian and anti-apartheid) 
were eager to mollify and distract the world from their own domestic problems 
such as the American civil rights movement. Within South Africa, isolation lead 
to lessening of global geopolitical influence and an increase in locally generated 
contours of fear, with action and reaction. The draconian nature of late-stage 
apartheid and the cost of maintaining it led to its downfall not by outside pressure 
or outside ideals being applied. Its end was presaged when the Dutch Reformed 
Church declared apartheid a “heresy” in 1988 and its Stellenbosch intellectual base 
deserted the cause. This settled the fate of the NP, despite the apparent military 
power of the state. When the cost of maintaining that military power exceeded 
the ability of the state to fund it, it ushered in the end of apartheid. The demise of 
apartheid was, in the end, from a local cause of economic necessity.
The Rainbow Nation that followed the fall of apartheid was one example where a 
racial turning point was bravely embraced by all sides and the expected rancour and 
retribution was avoided. That process is ongoing and needs to be carefully tended. 
However, in the greater history of South Africa, numerous other potential turning 
points where racism may have given way to interracial solidarity were squandered 
by the influence of commercial, colonial and global political pressures to benefit 
short-term interests and protect profits. This resulted in long-term impoverishment 
of South Africa with a terrible cost to its humanity. 
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FROM SETTLER TO POSTCOLONIAL
The turn of the South African nation-state 
in a comparative perspective
Göran Therborn
4
Virtually all countries see themselves as special and unique, which they are, in a 
trivial sense. However, an understanding of them can often be enhanced by seeing 
them as part and a variant of a type. Here, I look at South Africa as a nation-state 
and focus on the meaning of its turnaround in 1994. I shall not go into the proper 
history of the South African state and its turn, although I am, of course, starting 
from some elementary outsider knowledge of it. Instead, I shall deploy a framework 
for analysing types of nation-states, once developed based on empirical historical 
generalisation; of the rise of the right to vote in the world (Therborn, 1992, 2011); 
and their sociocultural and political implications. This framework differs from 
the bulk of the literature, both on nationalism and on state formation, by focusing 
on the kind of political conflict out of which a nation-state emerged, in particular 
against whom the claim to statehood and political rights of the nation was asserted.
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The importance of nation-states
In these globalised times, any serious discussion of nation-states, not starting 
from an assumption of their decline or demise, seems to have to begin with a 
defending rationale. Nation-states have tremendous historical significance. Their 
establishment was a seal of the power of modernity. Modernity meant a novel 
cultural orientation, no longer uncritically accepting the wisdom and the authority 
of fathers and ancestors, even questioning at least handed-down interpretations of 
the word of God, no longer prepared to follow the practices of tradition. Instead, 
modern cultures looked to the future as an open horizon and as a world to be 
created. Modernity in this sense rose and asserted itself at different times and in 
different forms in different parts of the world and in different sociocultural areas, 
science, art, philosophy of history, economic practices, architecture, sex-gender 
relations, etc., including politics. 
The nation-state was the key political form of modernity. While most nations 
invoke their past in their identity, the sovereignty of the nation-state implies a 
sovereignty over all past authority. The agenda of the nation-state is open to the 
future. The nation-state is perceived by the members of the nation as a means to 
create a new future for themselves. That is why there is such a demand for it. Since 
World War II, the number of nation-states in the world has quadrupled, and there 
is still unfilled demand in places like Catalunya, Kurdistan, Palestine, Scotland and 
elsewhere.
In terms of resources, from appropriation/redistribution of GDP to means of 
surveillance and of war-making and destruction, nation-states have never been 
stronger than today. Not only does the existence of nation-states matter, but so do 
their position, such as the very divisive issue of whether Britain should leave or 
stay in the European Union (EU) showed. It was also noteworthy that the leading 
campaigners in the referendum included the recent and the current Mayor of the 
supposedly supra-national “global city” of London, one for Brexit and the other 
against it.
Modern cultural orientations did not develop in any synchronised way, neither 
amongst sociocultural areas of human practice nor between populated territories. 
Modern political power was at least one of the most important victories of 
modernity. For analytical purposes, the nation-state has the advantage of being 
relatively easy to identify and to date empirically, and therefore lending itself to 
comparisons and effect studies.
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Four main roads to a nation-state
A nation-state is a sovereign polity claiming to represent and to be governed by 
a sovereign nation. This claim has always had to assert itself against other forms 
of political power. Struggles for a nation-state have developed along four major 
pathways, which may also be taken as ideal types, with some countries arriving 
at a nation-state along two or more routes. The sovereign nation can sometimes 
conceive itself as bi- or multinational, as a sovereign people consisting of two or 
more nationalities or national groups.
One road of struggle centred on an emerging nation against a prince, against a 
monarchical patrimonial state. This was the main pattern in Europe, whether by 
disruptive revolution, as in France and Germany, or by gradual reform, as in Britain 
and Scandinavia.
Another was by secession from the motherland, by wars of independence as in 
most of the Americas, or peaceful evolution, as by the Dominions of the British 
Empire. This was the way settler nations and settler-states established themselves. 
Settlers come from one land and occupy another. That has happened many times 
in history, but in the age of rising modernity the only settlers who created a nation-
state were Europeans descending from conquerors of overseas lands.
Thirdly, and most frequently, nation-states emerged out of emancipation from 
foreign colonial rule.
Fourthly, a few of the traditional realms threatened by European and United States 
imperialism in the nineteenth century managed to transform themselves from 
above, by a section of the existing elite, into modern nation-states, and survived. 
Japan is the paradigmatic case.
These modes of nation-state formation, including the big hybrid cases of Russia 
and China, have had enduring effects on the politics, culture and society of their 
countries, not per se systematically and directly on their economies.
South Africa as a settler-state
The Union of South Africa was established as a settler-state. The National 
Convention of 1908-1909, which prepared the South Africa Act of the British 
Parliament, consisted exclusively of settler representatives of the four colonies, 
Cape, Free State, Natal and Transvaal. Modern African politics had begun by 
then, and native congresses “humbly” petitioned the Convention and later the 
British Parliament for political rights – without daring to ask for participation in 
the Convention – but they were all ignored (Sheridan, 1972:52-57). In the Cape 
Colony, non-settlers had some political rights and, in what was conceived as a 
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political compromise, it could keep them. But natives had no rights in the rest of 
the Union, and the issues of incorporating the colonial “Protectorates” of Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland were left to the future, because their incorporation 
in the Union would have raised the question of African rights again. The leading 
Boer statesman, Jan Smuts, was explicit in his infamous 1917 speech to an imperial 
audience at the London Savoy hotel: “It has been our idea to make South Africa a 
White man’s country …” (Holland, 2012:30).
The South African Dominion became a sovereign nation-state rather soon. It was 
accepted as a founding member state of the League of Nations, and at the Imperial 
Conference in 1920, Lord Balfour declared that Britain and the Dominions had 
“equal status … in regard to internal or external affairs”. In the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster, the British Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 was repealed, and the 
Parliaments of the White Dominions got sovereign power.
All settler nations were inherently racist, all settler-states constitutively racist, 
because all settler rule was based on a notion of racial supremacy. South Africa was, 
in this respect, similar to the whole of the Americas, from Argentina to Canada, 
and to Australia and New Zealand, and radically different from all of Europe. 
Not because home-staying Europeans were necessarily less racist than European 
settlers, but because the issue of racial supremacy did not arise inside Europe – 
until the Nazis invented it. But there were two significant dimensions of variation 
amongst the settler-states. One was their conception of race. The Anglo-Saxon 
and Dutch conception was binary, white and non-white. The Ibero-American was 
hierarchical, with a scale of gradation, from white to brown and black, deriving 
from rather extensive racial mixing. This racist hierarchy was not strictly exclusivist 
and opened important channels of individual and family social mobility in the new 
Latin American nation-states of the nineteenth century and later. In independent 
Hispanic America, Indians were normally recognised as national citizens with 
voting rights. There were several Mestizo Presidents and military strongmen, 
occasionally also Mulatto, and Mexico had a prominent, elected Indian President 
in the 1860s.
Secondly, settler-states had different demographic compositions. Some had managed 
to kill off most of their natives, making the survivors marginal remnants in outlying 
peripheries, these included the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Chile and Australia. Others had strong native minorities, namely New Zealand 
and the rest of Hispanic America. Some had native majorities besides South Africa 
– Bolivia and Guatemala. Slavery added another demographic component. Large-
scale slavery was concentrated in an eastern American belt from Washington to 
Rio de Janeiro, and in the Caribbean islands. It was abolished in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, but has left enduring scars of discrimination and prejudice 
until this day.
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The racial issue became more central in South Africa than in the other settler-states 
because of a complex demography, making the essentially binary race conception 
difficult to manage. In 1910, whites made up 21% of South Africa’s population (11% 
in 1996) (Ndebele, 2016). In South Africa, settler rule had to be repressive and 
anti-democratic. While they have their own problems of repression and democracy, 
Bolivia and Guatemala never became racially polarised; this was due to large layers 
of Mestizos who could move in and out of power without challenging settler wealth 
and privileges. White settler politicians were all the time very aware, and fearful, 
of the settlers’ minority situation, and that both political and civic rights had to be 
judged on the criterion of ethnic “self-preservation”. The run-up to the Anglo-Boer 
War in 1899 centred on the issue of the franchise of the “Uitlanders” (foreigners) in 
Transvaal, that is, the (mainly) British immigrants who had come with the gold rush 
to Witwatersrand (Grobler, 2014:185ff.). So, the white settlers were themselves 
deeply divided, and the non-whites comprised three distinctive groupings – each of 
them culturally and economically very differentiated – who could never be handled 
as one. The South African “coloureds” were no Mestizos or Mulattos on an Iberian 
ladder of colour, though many were of “mixed blood”. While excluded from white 
society, they were often not descendants of the majority black population, part 
of them were descendants of Malay slaves and Muslims, others of Khoi-San cum 
European descent, Christian and Dutch-speaking (Thomas, 2014). The Indians 
had originally been imported by the British as indentured labourers on the sugar 
plantations in Natal, later followed voluntarily by some traders (Vahed, 2014). The 
big group was the black Bantu.
The 1910 Union was based on a delicate reconciliation and balance between the 
British and Boer “races”, as they were sometimes referred to at the time (Giliomee, 
2014a:286), and in the preparations for the Union constitution it was underlined 
that “the black vote should not be permitted to upset the balance between the 
two white population groups … (Scher, 2014:264). The white managing of the 
different non-white populations involved racial exclusion and segregation from 
very early on, long before post-World War II apartheid. The Native Land Act dates 
from 1913, and the urban Group Areas Act, excluding blacks from proper urban 
residence, from 1923 (Pretorius, 2014:271). In 1924, Indians were deprived of 
their municipal franchise in Durban, after their trade and property rights had been 
restricted (Vahed, 2014:578). In 1926, a Mine and Works Act reserved several jobs 
either for whites or for “coloureds” (Thomas, 2014:556).
Racial rehabilitations
After their national formation, many nation-states have had popular moments 
when the voices and the interests of the people of the nation outside its constitutive 
elite have broken through, have been heard and have been put on the state agenda. 
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In Europe, these popular moments have mainly been working-class moments, of 
working-class suffrage, of “municipal socialism”, and welfare states. In the settler-
states, class has been overlayered with race, sometimes overshadowed by it. As the 
people nearest to competition from natives, cheap foreign labour, and descendants 
of slaves, the settler working class has been particularly susceptible to racial 
demarcation. “Keep Australia White” was the first plank of the Australian Labour 
Party from its foundation until the early 1970s. During the white miners’ mass 
strike in 1922, workers marched in Johannesburg under the banner, “Workers of 
the World! Unite and Fight for a White South Africa!” (Holland, 2012:32). In the 
United States, a pan-ethnic white working class constituted itself, confronting black 
migration to the industrial North.
Popular moments in the settler-states have, therefore, rarely had a strong working-
class character. Instead, there have been populism and racial rehabilitation. 
Populism, as anti-establishment “rabble-rousing” or mobilisations, usually by a 
charismatic leader of a structurally heterogeneous “people” against the elite, has 
been a very important phenomenon of twentieth-century Americas. It does not 
seem to have been very significant in racially rigidified South Africa. The “poor 
white problem”, which attracted political attention and United States Carnegie 
research funding in the 1920s, was not a basis for populist mobilisation.
Racial rehabilitation is what in the settler-states corresponds to earlier working-
class recognition in Europe. It appeared on a broad front in all the settler-states in 
the last third of the twentieth century. There was international pressure from the 
increasingly successful anti-colonial movement and from the Soviet bloc in the 
Cold War. In December 1965, the United Nations (UN) adopted a Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (in force after ratifications 
in January 1969). The discriminated and marginalised people of the settler-states 
were gathering strength generating their own intellectuals and spokespersons 
through niche access to study milieu, generally radicalised in the 1960s. In the 
United States, a courageous and militant civil rights movement, white and black, 
developed, finally delivering the right to vote to African Americans, about two 
centuries after the settler secession. 
Political iconography and museums went into a mode of racial rehabilitation, soon 
followed by official apologies for past acts of injustice. In the 1980s-1990s, United 
States racial iconography started to change significantly, particularly in the federal 
capital. African American soldiers in America’s wars were recognised, and Martin 
Luther King got a full memorial statue on the National Mall in 2011. An African 
American Museum is now, belatedly, standing on the Mall, and American Indians 
at last got an official recognition in a museum in 2004.
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Canada was the first of the ex-British settler-states to belatedly acknowledge the 
rights of the natives, who got some land rights included in the Constitution of 1982. In 
its Museum of Canadian Civilization in Ottawa-Gatineau, the country was also the 
first of the British Empire secessions to pay full official respect to the natives. Unlike 
later recognitions in Wellington, Canberra and Washington, the Canadian museum is 
not a native niche. It brings the natives into the centre of Canadian history. 
Until the 1970s, “Keep Australia White” had been national policy, and the first 
programme plank of the Australian Labour Party. Australia has been more reluctant 
in recognising the natives than Canada, but in 2001, on the occasion of the 
Centenary of Australia’s Federation, the new Australian National Museum included 
an architecturally ambitious annex building of “Australian Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders Studies”. In the same year, a large commemorative ensemble was 
started in the Parliamentary Triangle by Lake Burley Griffin, Reconciliation Place, a 
claim to settler-native reconciliation, including symbolic recognitions of Aboriginal 
country origin, land rights, and of Aboriginal leaders.
New Zealand was unique amongst the settler-states of the British secession in 
having from the beginning to pay some recognition to the natives, the Maoris – 
a relatively large, well-organised people with fighting traditions who got delimited 
land rights and a recognised minor place in the settler polity. However, Wellington 
has always been a white settler town. In 1998, an iconic Maori-centred, albeit not 
exclusively, National historical museum was opened, Te Papa (Our Place). 
Racial rehabilitation started much earlier in the principal capitals of Iberian 
succession. The new states of Mexico and Peru did not see themselves as 
exclusively settler-states, and included pre-Columbian motifs and connections 
in their iconography and their master narratives. In the 1850s, the great Liberal 
Benito Juárez, a Zapotec Indian, became a Supreme Court Judge and, in the 1860s, 
President of Mexico. In the 1920s-1930s, there arose a wave of native cultural 
recognition, particularly in the two old imperial vice-royalties, Mexico and Peru, 
both centres of major pre-Columbian polities.
The implosion of apartheid in South Africa was part of this global process of 
existential human equalisation, which also included epochal advances of women’s 
rights. In South Africa, the end of apartheid was more than racial rehabilitation, it 
meant the beginning of the construction of a new state and society. 
However, before that, the country had in a way its specific form of racial 
rehabilitation. This was the advancement of the Afrikaner “race”, with its own 
language – Afrikaans, no longer Dutch – on constitutional parity with English 
– with a national name – no longer “farmer” (Boer) – and its mobility into the 
urban economy (Gillomee, 2014a, b, c). This process also included a monumental 
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iconography, above all the Voortrekker (Pioneers) monument, commemorating the 
Boers’ exodus out of the British Cape Colony and the creation of a new settlement 
after a bloody battle victory over the Zulus, founded at the centenary in 1938 and 
inaugurated in 1949. Furthermore, an original modernist monumental ensemble 
has been dedicated to the Afrikaans language, completed in 1975, probably unique 
of its kind in the world. 
By the 1970s, the regime had reached its limits and had to make adjustments. 
Industrialisation had given muscle to the black working class, and the 1970s saw 
a series of trade union formations and vigorous strike movements. Shortages of 
skilled labour opened, which capital leaders like Harry Oppenheimer explicitly 
laid at the door of apartheid discrimination. In 1970, the income gap between 
whites and Africans had reached an historical low, with the annual per capita 
income of the latter being only 6,8% of the former. Then it turned slowly upward, 
but the figure of 9,1% for 1917 was surpassed only in the second half of the 1980s 
(SAIRR, 2010:Chapter  79). Wages in the gold mines show the same pattern, white 
privilege culminating in 1970, at 20,9 times the black African wage (11,7 times in 
1911), and then drastically eroding to 5,5 times in 1982 (Hirsch, 2005:11). Vital 
inequality also began to change in the 1970s. In 1969-1971, life expectancy at 
birth for a “coloured” person was seventeen years shorter than for a white person 
(Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1978:3.19). The gap had been relatively stable at 
least since the 1930s, then for 20 years after that (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
1960:B32-33). However, by 1984-1986, it was down to ten years (Central Statistical 
Services, 1997:3.15). White South Africa never bothered with vital statistics of the 
African population and, since 1991, official South African statistics produces no 
life expectancy data by race at all. A group of demographers have, however, made 
an estimate according to which black life expectancy in 1984-86 was 60 (56 for males, 
63 for females) (Dorrington, Bradshaw & Wegner, 1999), 12 years shorter than for 
whites, two years shorter than for “coloureds”.
Options and meanings of 1994
While part of an epochal worldwide process of change of race and gender 
relations, and more specifically of a rehabilitation of discriminated, despised and 
exploited races in all the settler-states, the end of South African apartheid had a 
particularly profound meaning and impact. It meant the end of a state of settlers, 
for settlers, and by settlers. This was exceptional, but not quite unique. Something 
similar happened ten years later in Bolivia, after quasi-insurrectionary popular 
mass mobilisations against neo-liberal economic policies, negotiated into a 
Presidential election, electing the country’s first Indian President, Evo Morales. 
The new government then launched a Constituent Assembly, which created a 
new “Pluri-national” republic, recognising the majoritarian set of Indian nations. 
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The most direct reason why South Africa could not become something like post-
1970s United States was, of course, the demographic composition of the country. 
In South Africa’s democracy, the former “master race” was no more than a ninth of 
the population, and declining.
But what was the new South Africa to be, in political culture and political 
economy? For the African National Congress (ANC), there appears to have been 
three options on the table. One was a liberal democracy and a left-wing social 
democracy. That was the programme of the Freedom Charter of 1955, supposedly 
the guide of the ANC and its allies. It was similar in content to the British Labour 
party programme in 1945 and to the Common Program of the Mitterand coalition 
in France in 1981. It was put aside without serious discussion. On Mayday 1994, 
Mandela was interviewed in South Africa’s largest newspaper and declared: “In our 
economic policies … there is not a single reference to things like nationalization, 
and this is not accidental. There is not a single slogan that will connect us with 
any Marxist ideology” (Marais, 2001:122; cf. Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000:17). 
Notwithstanding, the Freedom Charter had stated: “The material wealth beneath 
the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transformed to the ownership of 
the people as a whole” (Turok, 2011:33). Instead, the ANC adopted a mildly social 
democratic Reconstruction and Development Programme originating from the 
trade unions (Hirsch, 2005:Chapter  2). Radical social democracy with a socialist 
perspective was clearly out of tune with the times, in the period of the “Washington 
Consensus” on global economics, the high tide of neo-liberalism just after the 
implosion of the USSR and the whole Soviet bloc. South African big capital had 
gained ANC legitimacy by openly distancing itself from the apartheid politicians.
The second option was liberal democracy together with ordinary, developmental 
capitalism. In a sense, that was the default option. It was the one de facto chosen 
by the leadership, and the outcome many, or most, people undoubtedly think they 
have got. In South Africa, liberal democracy took a progressive, clearly egalitarian 
form. The negotiations between the regime and the opposition first laid down a 
set of fundamental principles with the coming new Constitution must embody, to 
be tested by a Constitutional Court. The first Principle was: The Constitution of 
South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, a common 
South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed 
to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races” (Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000).
Actually, I would argue, it has not quite turned out that way. The mortgage of the 
past, the century of holding down the majority population by all means available, 
by law, by exclusion, expulsion and spatial segregation, and by armed might has left 
too many scars and divides for a full-fledged liberal democracy to take root in the 
ashes of settler domination.
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The third option was a postcolonial democracy with a political economy of 
developmental capitalism. It was implied in the Africanist tendency of the ANC 
and of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). That tendency had been significant in 
the ANC, but always secondary, although the ANC as a whole had seen itself as 
akin to the anti-colonial liberation movements of Africa. The crumbling regime 
tried yet another option, its first, a power-sharing consociational democracy with 
certain veto points for the minority, but this was rejected by the ANC (Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000).
The chosen liberal democratic option has been very successful in organising a 
democratic transition, probably also contributing to the far right’s final abstention 
from armed violence. Fair pluralistic elections and an independent judiciary have 
given the country a relative democratic stability. The “equality clause” of the 
Constitution cleared the way for affirmative action of racial redress. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was a brilliant invention in the handling of past 
state injustice.
However, alongside, or intertwined with, its liberal elements, South African 
democracy also carries important features of postcoloniality – a concept I use, 
on the basis of previous research, as part of the analytical framework of nation-
state formation sketched above, and completely independent of all the variants 
cultural “postcolonial” theories. (For an overview of the latter, see for example, 
Ashcroft [2001] and McLeod [2007].)
Postcolonial South Africa
Postcolonial nation-states have developed three distinctive characteristics, which 
have endured in various forms and to a variable extent. One is their conception 
of the nation as a colonial product turned into a nation by anti-colonial political 
struggle. The boundaries and the cultural content of the nation is taken as given 
by the contingent and usually very arbitrary demarcations of colonial power and 
administration. This politically overdetermined nation has little of sociocultural 
cohesion and is kept together mainly by postcolonial political power. This power, 
and the anti-colonial movement which led up to it, therefore tends to see itself as 
the embodiment of the nation, tending to put limits to political pluralism, even in 
functioning electoral democracies such as India, with its Nehru-Gandhi dynasty 
and until recently overwhelming Congress Party. The political postcolonial nation 
is prone to continuous friction and recurrent sharp, violent conflicts between the 
different ethnic and religious groups bundled together in it. While not precluding 
movements and struggles of class, class solidarity is clearly impeded and delimited 
by this sociocultural heterogeneity of the postcolonial nations.
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Secondly, postcolonial polities and societies have inherited a profound socio-
cultural duality from the experience of colonial domination. It is most directly 
audible in language. The great majority of postcolonial states have adopted the 
colonial language as either their official language or officiously as their language of 
high politics, judiciary, administration and business. Unless there had developed 
a lingua franca prior to independence – like Arabic, Swahili or Bahasa Indonesia 
–  choosing one native language as the national language would have triggered 
violent conflict. At the same time, native languages continue to be the everyday 
medium of communication for the majority of the population, who mostly do not 
master the ex-colonial language. There is then a deep cultural divide between the 
postcolonial elite and the postcolonial people.
This duality is also expressed in two different attitudes to the colonial experience. 
To the postcolonial elites, the colonial rulers were generally role models in many 
respects of education, religion (particularly in non-Muslim Africa), comportment, 
dress, lifestyle and advantages. Upon independence, the new rulers typically took 
over, not only the colonial positions of power, but also their rich emoluments and 
large servant staffs, and the ex-colonial neighbourhoods with their swimming-pools, 
golf courses and exclusive schools. At the same time, the new elites harboured a 
great deal of resentment against the colonisers for their humiliating discriminations 
and exclusions. This second attitude, the elites also share with the postcolonial 
population at large, raising recurrent demands for reparations, compensation 
and redress.
Thirdly, history and symbolic historical politics take on a special significance in 
postcolonial states and societies, deriving from the colonial denial of and contempt 
for the history of the colonised peoples. Often the latter were conceived as “peoples 
without history”, and their precoloniality as “savage” or “barbarian”. Moreover, 
the colonial conquest and the development of colonial modernity meant that 
the precolonial polities and societies had been defeated and overtaken. For the 
postcolonials, it therefore became an important task of the state and social and 
cultural institutions to explore, recover and create their precolonial history, and 
to narrate the development of the nation as colonial suffering and as anti-colonial 
struggle. This concern with pre-modern history may also take institutional forms, 
including recognition of pre-modern authority.
These three typical traits of postcolonial nation-states and political cultures have all 
left their imprint on post-apartheid South Africa.
There is clearly a typical postcolonial trait in the dominance and the nation-
representing pretensions of the ANC, whose previous President thinks it will 
“rule fully until Jesus comes back … we have been blessed” (Van Onselen, 2016). 
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A resolution celebrating ANC’s “75 years of struggle”, claimed: “The formation of 
the ANC in 1912 signified the birth not only of the ANC, but also of the South 
African nation” (Turok, 2011:117). No government party in an ordinary liberal 
democracy would survive a series of elections presiding over an official rate of  25% 
unemployment (by OECD 2015:12 standards, 35%) and with more than 60% 
of the vote at that, in 2019, after 25 years of not very successful governing down 
to 57,5%. In its electoral campaigns, the ANC is regularly playing an Africanist 
postcolonial card against its main rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA). President 
Zuma used it extensively in the 2016 local elections campaign, for example: “They 
are snakes, the children of the Nationalist Party … They think a black person 
can’t run the country” (Mkentane, 2016). In spite of its impressively successful 
reconciliatory transition from a settler-state to a postcolonial one, the frictions, 
tensions and recurrent internal violence of heterogeneous postcolonial nations 
continue to re-appear in South Africa.
While South Africa has 11 official languages, the two colonial ones, English and 
Afrikaans, are the languages of the elites and the professions, and, it seems, of the 
schools, which do not appear to try to connect their colonial language instruction 
to the native mother tongue of their pupils (Soudien, 2012:153-154). The opening 
up of higher education to African students has brought the language issue into the 
conflict arena by student movements. 
Equality in postcolonial countries has typically been interpreted as equality 
between the new elite and the former. This has clearly been an important strand, 
if by no means the only one, in ANC government policy of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), and its priority to the racial distribution of top positions 
in all walks of society and state, over general economic and social inequality. The 
public governmental aim is to keep income inequality the highest in the world until 
2030, as indicated by the official economic goal of a Gini coefficient of 0,6 in 2030, 
that is, more inequality than any other state today, except neighbouring-cum-
similar Namibia (National Planning Commission, 2011:24,  54). The African share 
of the country’s most advantaged 5-6%, in terms of income, wealth, housing and 
consumer items, has increased from five per cent in 2004 to 29% in 2014 (SAIRR, 
2016:337), a change into privilege faster than the rescue from abject poverty, 
down by 15 percentage points (SAIRR, 2016:339). Overall income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, remains about the same as in the last decade of 
apartheid, just below 0,7 (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn & Argent, 2010:13; Ngepah & 
Mhlaba, 2013:fig.  2a).
Julius Malema, when he was still in the ANC, expressed the desire for colonial or 
settler privilege most bluntly: “We must have everything that white people have” 
(Posel, 2013:68). His founding of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) later also 
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represents an example of the recurrent resentful demands for undoing the colonial 
dispensation and its persistent effects of durable inequality.
The urban duality of the settler-state is still visible in the postcolonial cities of South 
Africa, where a good third of the population of the capital city, Tshwane, as well as 
of the business centre, Johannesburg, the financial and airline hub of Africa, have 
no piped water at home, and about a tenth lack electricity in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century (Gedye, 2016a, 2016b).
Constitutional Principle XIII  1 recognised the legitimacy of traditional chiefly 
authority: “The institution, status, and role of traditional leadership, according to 
indigenous law, shall be recognized and protected in the Constitution. Indigenous 
law, like common law, shall be recognized and applied by the courts, subject to 
the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing 
specifically therewith.” It has been estimated that about 18 million South Africans 
are living, to varying extent, under traditional authority ( Johnson, 2015:136; 
cf. Oomen, 2005). This is another postcolonial duality, frequent in Africa and also 
occurring in Asia, for example, in Malaysia.
Thirdly, the new South Africa has invested heavily in symbolic politics. Symbolically, 
the postcolonial South African state manifests itself above all in the country’s new 
national monument, Freedom Park in Tshwane, arguably the most sophisticated 
and elaborate national monument of the world. It is also yet another expression of 
the remarkable South African capacity for reconciliation after violent conflict, first 
manifested a century ago when the Boers, the Anglos, and the British Empire came 
together a few years after the extremely brutal Anglo-Boer War to set up the Union 
of white South Africa. Freedom Park has been laid out on a hilltop at a distance 
across a highway, but in sight of the grand Boer Voortrekker monument, and on 
Reconciliation Day, December 2011, the Park was directly connected to the Boer 
monument by a new road.
Freedom Park opened in 2007, with additions continued after that. It is the most 
elaborate, deliberated and original symbolic ensemble in modern history, perhaps 
ever. It is a masterpiece of postcolonial iconography, anchoring the nation in 
precolonial African culture, narrating its long road to a postcolonial state through 
violent oppression, colonialist industrialisation and urbanisation, and through 
heroic and ultimately victorious resistance.
It is based on Indigenous Knowledge Systems. Tribal elders, traditional healers and 
(indigenous) anthropological Africanists were extensively consulted and crucially 
involved in the design. The layout is a symbolic landscape based on African 
principles and expressed in concepts of African languages. It has three main parts. 
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The first part that was constructed and the most distinctively African is Isivivane, a 
sacred place where the spirits of the fighters for freedom are resting. It is demarcated 
as a circle by 11 boulders, one for each of the country’s nine provinces, one for the 
nation as a whole, and one for the international community contributing to the 
struggles against racism and apartheid. 
The then president, Thabo Mbeki, questioned its abstract anonymity, and a new 
section was built, S’khumburo, a Remembrance complex – including a Wall of Names 
of identified victims of wars in South Africa, from precolonial wars and colonial 
genocide and slavery to apartheid repression – and a Gallery of Leaders. The latter 
is divided into three categories of descending size – South African, Continental 
and World leaders who have contributed to African freedom. The still open list 
currently (c.2013-2014) mentions four names in the third category: African-
American scholar and activist WEB DuBois, Jamaican Back-to-Africa politician 
Marcus Garvey (who notoriously collaborated with white racists for his scheme), 
Che Guevara, and Toussaint L’Ouverture, the leader of Haitian independence. 
The South African gallery is ecumenical and includes, alongside defunct historical 
ANC leaders from Luthuli to Tambo, the founder of ANC’s rival organisation, PAC, 
Robert Sobukwe, nineteenth-century Zulu warrior kings, two white anti-apartheid 
militants (Bram Fischer and Helen Joseph), and, upon second thought, two Boer 
commanders from the Anglo-Boer War, De Wet and De la Rey.1 The choice of the 
latter two is not quite obvious. Both participated, together with four other Boer 
generals, in the National Convention of 1908-1909, where De la Rey belonged to 
the anti-African diehards, together with the Natal delegation, who voted against the 
compromise of letting the Cape colony keep its non-European franchise, for the 
time being (Brookes & Webb, 1962:241). 
//hapo, a Khoi-San word meaning “dream”, is the third major component of the 
Park, located in a boulder-shaped edifice. It is a museum of African cosmology as 
well as of history, starting with the origins of the Earth, its Peopling, the world of 
Ancestors and via colonialism, industrialisation and urbanisation, portrayed mainly 
from the angle of the exploited, going up to contemporary Nation- and Continent-
building. (See further Oliphant, Serote & Raman, 2014.)
1 A first list of 24 names was announced in 2009, and may be found at www.politicsweb.co.za. 
By 2014, there were 37 names (Oliphant et al., 2014:43), and additions can be identified at 
www.archivalplatform.org
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Envoi
The enormous inequality of South Africa is not a creation of apartheid racism and 
therefore did not disappear with apartheid. It is an effect of the racism inherent 
in all settler colonialism, aggravated even before apartheid by the particular 
conditions of South Africa, where the majority of the population was excluded, 
not only from most of the land and all the mining wealth, but also from the urban 
industrial economy fueled by mining rents. The end of apartheid has meant a 
profound transformation of South Africa – its state, its political and civic culture, 
its economy, its ethnic and “race” relations – which cannot be adequately grasped 
as an establishment of democracy and an abolition of racial discrimination, as a 
change similar to what happened in the American South in the 1960s and 1970s. 
It has been argued here that viewing the process as a transition from a settler- to 
a postcolonial state and society is more fruitful for understanding the outcome 
as well as what was at stake. For good, or as well as for bad, the turn of the South 
African society and state to postcoloniality constitutes a significant element of the 
stormy social laboratory the country is. 
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WAYS OF BEING
“Race” as common sense;  
non‑racialism as humanist necessity
Gerhard Maré
5
Introduction: From here to there
There are so many ways in which race continues to be accepted as the essential and 
predominant explanatory tool in social life. There are probably as many reasons that 
are, and can be, advanced for groups living through racialism. But, if questioned, 
explanations would not always be easily forthcoming: common sense acceptance 
removes the need for reflection – why does the sun rise every morning? Surely it is 
presumptuous, and even insensitively condescending, to suggest that such a state of 
affairs has to be challenged, never mind deliberately undermined? As specimens of 
a category, as it is with all such constructed groupings, means not only being born 
into, but also with “specimendom”. However, driven by historical and contemporary 
knowledge of the effects of simply accepting the status quo of social identities, 
I will argue why each one of us has the obligation to question such common sense, 
even desirable and desired, way of being. The most important motivations for 
my argument relate to the gross effects on personal and social relations, and how 
racialism and consequent racism obscures the full complexity of global problems 
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humanity experiences at local levels. We are in this together, whether we like it or 
not. The “small blue dot” will survive without us, but let us destructive humans at 
least try to be part of it.
But where to start? 
There is the story – often told with variations on a common theme – of the person 
lost, asking for directions, and after listening to several attempts to explain many 
routes is told “No, you can’t get there from here”. Then there is Rebecca Solnit – 
A Field Guide to Getting Lost (2006) – making the case for questions, deliberately 
being in the unfamiliar, because that demands confronting the unknown, and 
not just accepting apparent (selfish) certainty. There remains also Rick Turner’s 
argument for an imaginative journey through utopian thinking towards creating a 
world beyond the apparently unchanging social relations that exist (1972/2007). 
I unapologetically return here to issues that have concerned me over decades since 
the 1970s, and unfortunately seem to be more relevant by the day – fortunately 
I  am not alone in these concerns, and I pay respect to some of the fellow-
travellers –  some who have died in the struggle to question and argue for a very 
different world.
Here
Who would have thought that some 60 years later I would personally be confronted 
daily with the real possibility of nuclear devastation – then a scratchy news film 
item, now two warped immensely powerful men slinging insults and threats? Who 
could have imagined that human responsibility for extreme climate uncertainty and 
global extinctions would be denied against scientific evidence – at times because it 
is scientific? To bring it home, who would have imagined daily race classification in 
a democratic inclusive South Africa? No, you can’t get there from here.
However, this is where we are, with the responsibilities that it brings. I present 
my understanding of the here and now, in respect of one small, but important 
to millions, aspect of the big social picture: “race”, “racialism” and “racism” in 
twenty-first century South Africa. We have to address the continuation of the 
notion of “race”, living through racialism, and confronted with racism. “Race” 
operates frequently, in many societies, as an ideological element in meeting social, 
economic, and political needs. It is also claimed existentially as essential in being 
human in distinctively culturally rigid ways. However, I argue that, whatever the 
need expressed, race is an obstacle to be overcome because of the unavoidably 
destructive consequences of its existence, employment and deployment, towards 
whatever ends. In such an approach, “race” can obviously not be addressed in 
isolation from historical socioeconomic, political, and existential contexts.
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The past we have to understand, in its complexity and consequences; doing so 
in critical ways that allow us to be in the present as active, engaged citizens; with 
imagination and sense of moral engagement and social responsibility, confidently 
to work collectively towards a desirable future. All too obvious when it is put 
like that. 
Maybe the most challenging question surrounding civic engagement and action 
is, first, honestly to address “why” it needs to be undertaken, at the social and 
personal level. I put forward reasons, but the question ultimately demands that we 
perceive and confront the obligation to step out of false security, or fatalistic belief 
that change is not possible. Discomfort has to encompass not only the material 
boundaries set by race – a grim reality for the majority or large minority of citizens 
in racialised and racist societies – but also to disturb the cognitive, the sense-
making of what is around us and hence our capabilities within it.
Discomfort raises not only the need for change, but also the concomitant need to 
imagine a utopian future in the sense that it speaks to all as a desirable goal, even 
if it does not convince most in the moment. Social action here refers to collective 
action as well as action within and acceptance of socially shared space; it demands 
acknowledgement of shared humanity and also the differently experienced 
responsibilities that go with that from multiple locations; it requires a notion of 
involvement beyond the power of individual desire. 
What
In this chapter, I accept the challenge of “it is not possible to get there from here”. 
I do it because, as I tried to warn in relation to ethnic mobilisation some decades 
ago, not to take the unclear alternative route since it carries with it horrifying 
consequences. I do so by disentangling and re-entangling terms, calling for their 
contextualisation by posing the “why” and the “how” questions, with suggestions 
of the “what” of a motivational goal. 
However, any goal requires conceptual clarity of the need for distinguishing 
between “race”, “racialism”, and “racism” – what should we escape – but also the 
manner in which they exist, function, and articulate in society. This last point 
is crucial – “race” can be looked at in isolation from any expression of the belief 
only if perceived and accepted as a biological fact. Otherwise it exists and can be 
understood only as a human created and deliberately maintained sense-making 
element, in sociopolitical, spatial and historical context, entangled with other social 
processes, beliefs, and structures. At times, religious or cultural beliefs are essential 
to justifying race-thinking, often we have to explore power and class relations to 
make sense of its continuation.
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The STIAS project, Effects of Race, where my writing takes place, uses the 
summary word “race” in the English language. Even if project members, including 
myself, may have operated within several first languages, we have not drawn 
attention to the implications for social analysis. I understand “race” to refer to 
the specific categorisation of humans into putative biological groupings (called 
“races” or various euphemistic equivalents). It is a powerful socially constructed 
perspective on the world within which we still find ourselves. It has been subject 
to alteration, adaptation, and to a variety of justifications and uses since the time 
of creation and first employment – its reproduction ensured by those with power 
and means to do so. For example, the specific understandings of how to distinguish 
between races, and hence the meaning of the word, has changed over time, even if 
not in essence then at least in significant emphasis. In its first use, it was applied on 
the basis of appearance, which effectively overlapped with geographical location, 
and was shaped by who did the initial labelling of whom, also reflecting inequalities 
of power expressed in various ways. 
In addition, various explanations have been given for the existence of human 
racialised diversity in appearance, culture and modes of life, such as the powerful 
Christian call on the story of Ham; definitions of “civilisation” from specific 
perspectives; or the might of the sword or the gun in the creation of empires 
and subjugation of people. Especially during the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century, social Darwinist “scientific racism” provided explanation with 
focus on the measured body, in its outward appearance and proportions, and 
internal constitution to provide evidence of unavoidable biological difference 
(Malik, 1996:90-91; Dubow, 1995; Walters, 2019). Race allocation served to prove 
a hierarchy of evolutionary progress and “intelligence” and attributes associated 
with those terms, and allowed specific treatments. More recently, a biocultural 
approach dominated such as during apartheid, with the stress on ethnic aspects 
of race differentiation along with the always-present biological. It continued to 
imply evolutionary justification, with progressive gaining of abilities, in preferably 
separate spaces. With the genome revolution, there have been attempts to use the 
existence of genetic populations to confirm notions of race distinctiveness. This 
runs against the predominant genome proof of the fallacy of such distinctions as 
“races” as the continuation of what had been thought to exist historically (Fields & 
Fields, 2012). “Race”, as concept and focus of research, is operative especially in the 
academic/intellectual field where questions are asked and arguments developed. 
Maintaining “race” always has a purpose and justification.
Racialism or race-thinking refers to a variously shared understanding amongst many 
humans that races exist, as part of “being human today”, with a variety of ways in 
which cognitive proof is found – we “think” race, but the idea is already present. 
It refers to the actions (at every level, and not only at the personal) that are informed 
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by such understanding as well – we operationalise our thinking, attaching race 
labels all the time in practises. This refers then to the common sense (racecraft), 
the ideological existence of race as everyday. The variety of contexts demand 
investigation of the processes through which the ideology of race is produced, 
employed, and operates, as well as where it is (or could be) undermined. Again, 
historical change, political location, and personal variation in such thinking, are 
essential dimensions to include. Processes of socialisation and mobilisation, and 
template creation lie at the core. Actions that flow from racialism are, in some cases, 
claimed as innocuous and even essential to well-being – in cases where race is 
thought about and not just with. 
What I have not mentioned directly, except in passing, is the reason why race-
thinking should be so powerful. I acknowledge here a book important in my 
own thinking, namely Kenan Malik’s The Meaning of Race (1996:5; see Maré, 
2017:149-152). Malik argued throughout that “the creation of a race is the product 
of social need, not biological fact”. Hence, as the social changes, so the need shifts; 
and as the creation changes so it, in turn, affects the social world. For example, in 
South Africa the templates of race continue from apartheid to post-1994 democracy, 
but the needs demand different formulations of justification with different effects. 
To put it in a different way, the relationship power – ideology shifts. 
Non-racialism, in the manner I conceptualise it, refers to challenging and rejecting 
“race” as referring to essential (natural) recognisable human groupings (for a 
fuller discussion, see Maré, 2014:130-149). It does not mean colour-blindness, a 
nonsensical claim for anyone seriously combating racism and racialism; nor does 
it deny the power and historical and contemporary effects of the construct “race” 
– quite the contrary.
Finally, racism refers to the attribution not only of relatively benign characteristics 
through racialism, captured by the frequent soft and obfuscatory employment of 
“diversity” instead of “multiracialism”, but of degrading and always hierarchical 
attributions to members of races. This can range from denial of shared humanity 
to such labels as uncivilised, unintelligent, sexually promiscuous, disease bearing, 
amoral, etc. In this extreme form, it comes with personal and social consequences 
that psychologically degrade and may result in physical or material harm, even 
death and genocidal annihilation. Racism, the largely rejected social scourge, is but 
the extreme form of racialism, which serves as the bedrock of the former. 
Keeping that distinction in mind – between the three easily and often synonymously 
used terms – is essential to any attempts to overcome the effects of all three. 
In  South  Africa, the notion of non-racialism is frequently also expressed  as non-
racism, revealingly misquoting the Constitutional commitment to “non-racialism 
and non-sexism”.
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What is always at work in discussing and defining all three terms is classification: 
races, racialism, and racism do not exist without such allocation. It is a social 
construct for purposes. The categorical – in both senses of the word – allocation 
of groups of human beings, formally and informally, into putatively pre-existing 
constructed groups determines the unambiguous essence of every “specimen” of 
the category – whether “blacks”, “whites”, “Zulu” or any other. In addition, the 
category that is my first concern here, “race”, has extreme effects and extensive uses, 
albeit often existing as banal common sense. 
It is essential that the social construction and its effects be located within a 
wider context, within which it features with various degrees of relevance to its 
maintenance and employment. What importance should be granted to race? I have 
recently grappled with the implications of such a question in writing about race and 
inequality (Maré, 2017). Does race cause resource inequality? I suggested there 
that “race” (including racialism and racism), the name which is the construct, is to 
be seen as useful – even essential – in ordering social life and in its effects: firstly, 
in justifications (for forms of exploitation, domination, and distribution of goods 
and values, and hence features in templates of race) (for discussion of templates 
see Alexander, 2007; Maré, 2018). Secondly, it plays a major role in providing 
obfuscatory explanations hiding the manner and who benefits from racialism, and 
thus delays and even avoids effective measures to address social issues – such as 
inequality, as Fields and Fields argue (2012). And, finally, it can be linked with a 
range of context and time specific direct effects/consequences. This approach is 
necessary against one that sees race as the cause of much that is claimed can be 
addressed only, or primarily, through measures employing the very construct, 
such as proportionally equalising races (deracialising capitalism in South Africa), 
improving “race relations”, or providing worth to actually divisive social identities. 
In other words, to combat race in its use as an instrument and to avoid the trap 
of objectifying the phenomenon, it is essential to confirm the term as a social 
construct with original and subsequent ultimately disastrous negative effects, 
one which needs explanation in every discussion of effects. Not for one moment 
should accusation of devaluation or avoidance – for that is what it is perceived to 
be by many, such as through the accusation of “colour blindness” – deflect from 
the horrific effect of the employment of and mobilisation through the construct. 
Instead, it provides the very reason why its continuation, in whatever form, needs 
to be subjected to intense questioning, as well as actions towards separating it 
from its claimed essentialist existence. It carries the violence, humiliation, and 
dehumanisation of centuries with it.
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Why?
Should the world, never mind South Africa, not be content just with improving 
“race relations”? Why want to do away with a social construct that is there because 
it met and meets social needs? I have in part already given an answer, even if I still 
need to convince you. Its dehumanising effects on the individual and group, where 
Bauman’s argument of turning individuals into specimens of the categories to 
which they have been allocated (Bauman, 2000), should be enough – but it clearly 
is not. Race-thinking’s daily practitioners include many whose moral arguments 
and beliefs are discarded, adapted or put on hold in the interest of not rocking the 
boat; or in meeting the requirements of those in power; or of sensitivity to present-
day identity politics of race. The belief that it can be employed for positive reasons, 
and thus effectively confirmed and maintained, can easily be illustrated, with South 
Africa being simply one of the recent entrants. It is also a vivid example of how 
such use fails in its ostensible positive outcome. Elsewhere, such as in Brazil and 
the United States, the failure of such an approach, of clinging to race, to address 
inequality, and the effects of its categorising practices, are equally clear. The way 
in which it deflects, in its immediate day-to-day obviousness, to such catastrophic 
dangers as climate change and to the central cause of inequality, namely capitalism, 
is there to ignore. It suits the powerful that they be ignored. 
The immediate answer lies in the vehement rejection of acceptance – of race, 
racialism and racism, as above questioning, by anyone, anywhere; it lies in efforts 
to critically examine the conditions that maintain inequality in its expanded sense 
(Therborn, 2013), and to work towards addressing such conditions in small ways; 
to confront climate change in a similarly cumulative manner, and through personal 
life choices. My commitment is to exploring, understanding, and tackling not 
only the vicious operationalised effects that the term race always carries with it, 
but also to explore its existence and employment as the very effective obstacle in 
the way of dealing with real concerns of existence – of survival, actually, for most 
global citizens. 
There are, surprisingly it would seem after apartheid, more and more calls in 
post-1994 South Africa for the valuing and retention of race, not only as a state-
driven template, but also as an organising principle of social action and interaction. 
The calls could be multiplied if taking into account, in addition, such racialised 
notions as “identity”, “victimhood”, “our due”, “ethnicity”, “culture”, “minority”, 
“majority”, “biology”, “indigeneity”, “nation”, “patriotism”, “civilisation”, “settler”, 
“transformation/redress/affirmative action/empowerment”, “revenge”, and so 
forth. They are all held together by an identity of “us” (and hence of “them/they”, or 
more directly “you”), shaped already and increasingly by biological or pseudo/faux/ 
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near-biological ideas of essences. Each can also be extended by looking at the 
essential attributes that come into play from within and from without, or are 
implied, when the terms serve as explanation, justification, mobilisation, rejection, 
denigration, etc. Apartheid truly lives on in ways that were seen as abhorrent by all 
progressive forces under its vicious and all polluting rule. “Race” rules out shared 
responsibility for addressing local expressions of global issues.
Of course, looking back, some of the signs of what was to come were there, before, 
during and after the transition in 1994: race nationalism (from the white far right 
and from radical right Africanist voices); “tradition” openly demanded and fought 
for (especially as claimed from the KwaZulu Bantustan, but then confirmed as 
desirable continuities for the country); and with capitalism defined as something to 
be invaded and captured, made “ours”, rather than subjected to intense scrutiny after 
the fall of communism and of apartheid. In addition, the institutional arrogance that 
typified the African National Congress (ANC) during the transition continued. 
It was embedded, in part, out of necessity to keep on claiming sole legitimacy in 
“the struggle”, and in large part essential to claim an exclusive right to define what 
exists, what is good and desirable, and what is possible (Therborn,  1999), even 
if limited in terms of morality. This has been aggravated, especially since 2007, 
through an approach of (race) majoritarianism to democracy itself – an absurd 
description when race statistics indicate 80% “black African” population. How can 
racialism remain the new “honour code”, when it is so clear that it was presented as 
such under apartheid; blessed then, as it is now, through Christianity. Why is it not 
a code of dishonour when held post-1994? 
In summary, the answer to “why”, in this case, relates to the all-too familiar 
horrifying examples of the consequences of the creation and retention of any 
notion of essentialised putative human categories (from genocides based on race, 
ethnicity, nation, and religion), and the opportunities lost through the blinkering 
or blinding effect of such categorisation. What I write here is, in most ways, simply 
a reminder of the point made by Neville Alexander in the concluding chapter, 
“Enough is as good as a feast”, in his Thoughts on the New South Africa, published 
posthumously in 2013. He refers there to the
sincere, indeed naïve, belief in the values of freedom, equality, solidarity and 
democracy, which drove all of us in the decade of the 1980s, [and which] has 
been systematically eroded by the irruption of the narcissistic, dog-eat-dog 
virus that is spreading across the globe … [A]gainst this backdrop … I want 
to put the spotlight on the question of whether it is possible for us to ‘return 
to the source’, to borrow an exhortation from Amilcar Cabral – that is, once 
again to place at the centre of our vision, our plans and our behaviour the 
values on the basis of which we hoped to build the non-racial, democratic 
republic after the demise of apartheid capitalism.  (Alexander, 2013:189)
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How
Let me state, without fudging the issue, the “there” I have in mind cannot be 
contained through addressing certain aspects of race, racialism and racism (such as 
through legislation against racism, or public naming and shaming – necessary as that 
might be). It needs to be informed by an interlinked response, at all levels of society 
aimed at the various dimensions of race in its everyday existence as racialism and 
racism, and by refocusing on shared problems to be collectively addressed. It could 
never succeed through a focus only on the direct expressions and maintenance 
of racialism, abhorrent as that may be. The goal of a non-racial society must be 
investigated, theorised, and acted upon as an essential dimension of inequality, 
and through collective action against other global problems. It is necessary as 
part of a strategy towards “enough”, within which the demise of capitalism as it 
exists is core. Instead, the focus should be the ongoing investigation of alternative 
systems of production and consumption, and other measures of performance 
(Fioramonti,  2013). Forms of economic structure, in turn, relate inextricably to 
environmental effects, and thus social responsibilities. The non-racial utopia in this 
social formation, and many others, effectively means a future of “enough” – the one 
is intimately linked to the other, not, however, in the redistributive racial approach 
that dominates post-1994. This not to imply that the political and ideological are 
simply reflections of economic systems – they function in relative autonomy; but at 
the same time ideological change is only made possible if economic systems alter, 
with fresh possibilities (and demands) for human interaction. 
In the primary focus of the Effects of Race Project, and thus the goals addressed 
in this chapter, racialism and racism exist as major obstacles in themselves, and as 
concomitant to addressing inequality. There can never be serious commitment to 
“enough” – the “feast” that has to include the 99%, for it to have any meaning – while 
we are distracted and even prevented from addressing inequality through wrongly 
and partially attributing cause and effect. Side-tracking is possible because race 
is real in its consequences, real in its multiplicity of interferences, in its desirable 
presence (for some), in its functions as “racecraft”. Racialism is to be rejected in its 
essentialised maintenance and employment. Barbara Fields and Karen Fields draw 
attention away from just the emotionally-charged issues of racism to link racecraft 
to the effective, even if not always deliberate, avoidance of dealing with inequality, 
of obscuring “the intimate interaction between inequality and racecraft …” (Fields 
& Fields, 2012:16).
In relation to the specific focus addressed here, the future, if it is to be liveable, has 
to lie beyond the categories, beyond just race, of hierarchy, of essentialism, of what 
undeniably facilitated hatred, inequality, violence and extermination in the past, 
and continues to do in the present. Here too it sounds so simple and obvious: the 
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“beyond” is one of human solidarity, under whatever name. Paul Gilroy appeals 
to accepting that “beyond the corrosive power of racial categories”, lies “a more 
substantive human commonality” (Gilroy, 2010:64). However, that notion of 
“human commonality”, if it is in any way to be an attraction, an alternative to the 
clear value that racialism and racism holds for those in power or desiring power, 
will have to be clearly linked to a collective project, a democratic project, that 
mobilises those whose equality lies in striving and achieving in resource, vital and 
existential fields. The scale of such a task demands flights of utopian imagination, 
and mobilisation, requires an escape from what exists. Gilroy again, drawing on a 
Fanon that is rarely heard in the cacophony of selective claims:
He [Fanon] directs us to the costs for both victims and perpetrators of 
operating in an ‘epidermalised’ social and political environment where any 
common humanity is ‘amputated’ and authentic interaction between people 
becomes almost impossible.  (Gilroy, 2010:157)
In summary: expressing and working towards the utopian goal of equality, as 
captured by “Enough is as good as a feast”, and drawing on analysis and action in the 
three fields proposed by Therborn (2013) – resource, vital, existential inequalities 
– is already required of us. The need will intensify as socioeconomic and 
environment-related conflicts intensify, creating conditions that make it impossible 
to maintain exorbitant life for some – unless through even more extensive policing 
and exclusion – and misery, starvation and migration for the overwhelming 
majority. The role played by racialism and racism in hiding and deflecting attention 
from shared concerns, a role with its own consequences as mentioned above, also 
means that these readily available and embedded constructs of social categorisation 
serve as the obvious ideological support for race-populist mobilisation in times of 
local crises. Examples abound, here and elsewhere.
Recognition of the obstacles
Confidently describing the “how” of de-legitimating, invalidating and refuting 
the common sense of racialism, is a near-impossible task. It is a contest against 
the historically accepted social vision and experience; against those who directly 
benefit from its maintenance – and it is still capitalists; against those who are led 
to believe that racialism can be inverted in its effect of oppression – “using the 
tools of the oppressor”. However, at the same time there are also aspects of society, 
arguments and experiences to call on that can strengthen the case in South Africa.
The most pervasive obstacle is racialism as ideology – the manner in which a social 
construct, a term and a system created by humans, is turned into and maintained 
as valid to “being human today” through ideological power. Hence, the most 
appropriate theoretical approach is to analyse it as ideology; and here, once 
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again, I turn to Therborn’s argument in The Power of Ideology and the Ideology of 
Power (1999). He offers an approach that sees ideology as constructing two kinds of 
subjects – the first through subjecting individuals to ideologies, and the second to 
construct ideological subjects accepting notions of what exists, what is good, and of 
what can be achieved (what is possible). In each case, it implies the opposite as well 
– for example, presenting what is undesirable, and what impossible to achieve. In 
each case, it implies that those with power create and maintain ideological content 
to their benefit. Ideology works, through interpellation, in its call on people to live 
their lives as specific kinds of subjects. Ideologies do not change rapidly, but are 
reproduced in large part by drawing on prior knowledge and a “prior vocabulary.” 
Brian Fay uses that term in a way that is worth noting – he draws attention to 
“facts” and their use. In much of the world, what has been constructed, “race”, has 
become fact:
Note here that it is never phenomena themselves which are the facts but 
phenomena under a particular description. Facts are linguistically meaningful 
entities which select out from the stream of events what happened or what 
exists. But this means that in order for there to be facts at all there must 
be a vocabulary in terms of which they can be described. Without a prior 
vocabulary which a describer brings to a situation there would be no facts 
whatsoever.  (Fay, 1999:73, emphasis original)
Ideological construction of the social world takes place through words, a language 
that tells us the “facts” of “what exists”. This explains also why there might be 
variations in the words and the races. South Africa still has four.
We are born into systems of thought, captured in words, and not only social 
structures. Because of the embeddedness of certain ways of seeing the world 
and acting in it, Kwame Anthony Appiah examined remarkable occasions when 
“honor codes” of approved social behaviour change fairly rapidly, when what 
seems irreversibly “good” loses its value and what had seemed impossible become 
achievable (2010). Colonialism and subsequent systems of domination and 
exploitation, globally, ensured that we became race subjects. Apartheid built on 
and adapted such prior knowledge, of belonging to races, knowledge already shared 
by oppressor and oppressed. We are stuck in a racialised world, until … that is what 
exists. This the core acceptance required by any successful ideology, certainty 
about the world as it is described and lived and apparently required by us to be 
“comfortable”. We have been subjected and become specific kinds of subjects – 
racialised in this case.
That certainty is also reinforced through structural and organisational forms. 
What exists and is promoted with vigour, are formal and state-driven templates 
of capitalism and race. This project, post-1994 South Africa, for example, requires 
race classification and the equivalent of “race classification boards”, and to put a 
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firm stamp of approval on capitalism! The benefits of race classification in the 
distribution of profit and of posts in the capitalist system ensure the maintenance 
of the practices (for examples see Maré, 2014). There seems to be absolutely no 
chance in the foreseeable future for any change at the level of state templates, the 
army of practitioners, and of direct beneficiaries – both willing and reluctant. In 
addition, the ideological ether (the stink?) of race-thinking envelops the social 
formation. However, debate around, research into, analysis of, clear and convincing 
theorising, and making use of many spaces available are, and should be, employed 
towards disturbing what exists as common sense. Racialism allows the hardly 
noticed use of race labels to be everyday discourse, and not only in media, social 
or other, but also in daily conversation, teaching and lecturing, conversations in 
public spaces.1 
However, there are also aspects of society that can be advanced to strengthen 
the case of undermining the construction “race”. In South Africa, there are many, 
amongst which: first and central, the successful end of apartheid, a prime historical 
example of formal and oppressive racialism and racism, in favour of a democratic, 
“post-apartheid” society. I cannot use “post-apartheid” as an unqualified descriptor, 
for reasons already presented: the continuities of racialism, capitalism and tradition, 
in their present expressions do not justify using the prefix “post” in any unqualified 
way. However, it has meant, in the inevitable racialised terms, that “black Africans” 
(four-fifths of the census category) are in political, ideological, and social control, 
with the opportunity, for all, still, to create a truly human society.
Second, the Constitution of 1996, no matter how neglected as a shared goal, 
commits citizens and the state to “non-racialism and non-sexism”. Regular lip-
service is paid to “non-racialism”, retaining the term in what should exist, if fictional 
in claims for what does exist.
Third, the use of race ostensibly to create an equal society, one in which “enough” 
drives thinking, is failing miserably, ensuring the continuation of despair for 
millions. The goal remains, but the means have to be changed drastically, away from 
the belief in race as foundation for achieving equality. The demand for austerity, 
from below, will ultimately serve as that challenge.
Fourth, a perception of what it means to be human, beyond greed and 
consumerism, lies to be explored and claimed. It will be articulated from beyond 
racial dehumanisation, and even notions of human rights, which at present are 
largely left to the powerful to formulate and ensure.
1 The extensive archive of clippings around race, racialism and racism is being integrated into a 
collection at the Historical Papers collection at the William Cullen Library, University of the 
Witwatersrand (also see Maré, 2014:49‑52).
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And fifth, class-based theorising and social action offers a powerful alternative 
that has to be rediscovered and revived. It dominated South African struggles 
against apartheid, it lives in many memories and expressions, cultural, political and 
organisational. Whether in religious, trade union, artistic, and other forms, post-
apartheid carried commitments other than race. What they shared was a collective 
vision of another world, beyond the apparently immovable racist system. Where 
is that collectivity in the twenty-first century? It is there in understanding of and 
responses to the multiple effects of inequality and climate change, challenges that 
can be tackled in multiple ways, under a shared imagination of what needs to be. 
This argument is also clearly made by Ian McQueen, reflecting on activism under 
apartheid (2015). He concludes: “There are signs, …, that the 1970s are resurfacing 
as a sounding board to test alternatives to the current status quo. History may serve 
as a lesson, though, that these movements have to find viable ways of confronting 
the powerful force of populist nationalism.”
Such “viable ways” may well lie in the deliberate call for an “honour code” that 
does not rely on race, but on notions of humanity; one that does not shy away 
from confronting the massive problems facing South Africa and the world, but 
calls for innovative thinking and collective mobilisation and action; for structural 
as well as ideological change. Appiah describes “honour codes” as going beyond 
an individual sense of morality. At the end of his book, he says: “It takes a sense 
of honor to feel implicated by the acts of others” (2010:204). At the beginning, he 
wrote: “To care for your honor is to want to be worthy of respect.” Honour lies in 
both giving and receiving respect (2010:xviii, xix). Is it worthy of respect to hold 
on to racialism, never mind racism? 
Part of that discomforting honour code that needs to come into effect, I argue, lies 
in the recognition of the “entanglements”, as Sarah Nuttall described this much 
neglected dimension of any social formation (2009). It has been referred to by 
Dave Haslam, after the 2016 Bataclan shooting in Paris, as the “grey zone”:
Islamic State literature talks about a ‘grey zone.’ Originally the phrase was 
used with reference to Muslims who live happily alongside their neighbours 
of all faiths and types. Now it can be more generally applied to any space 
(social, cultural) where views find common ground. Islamic State wants a 
world without ambiguity, a world of binary choices. Their stated aim is to 
foment conflict and destroy the grey zone. An extreme response is exactly 
what Islamic State wants. A growing zone of coexistence is their biggest fear. 
 (Haslam, 2016)
It is such that those who benefit from upholding race also fear. The grey zone 
has also to include critical thinking on patriarchy, masculinity, tradition, nation, 
religion, and on humanity’s central responsibility as part of nature.
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One would have thought that the “entanglement” facilitated by social media would 
increase existential proximity and recognition – however, while certainly extending 
communication beyond imagination it has also fixed views and identifications, 
and allowed the wide distribution of insult, mobilisation (for the good at times), 
distribution of false news, labelling, and more. Silos of difference, silos of 
confirmation of difference once within them, flourish. Restricted, constricted, 
blind to all but what is shared within the ideological space – an anti-social media it 
frequently is. I grant that this is too extreme a statement, because there is so much 
diversity, rather than just difference, so much intimacy in our lives. But can be seen 
only if the blinds of certainty are lifted.
Conclusion
Hopefully I have made it clear that to address race, racialism and racism requires a 
complex approach, multidimensional in what is included, and multidimensional in 
what is proposed to counter its deplorable existence and effect in policy and daily 
life. Kenan Malik confronted the issue of resistance, revolt, in a piece published 
soon after the Manchester, UK, bombing (2017):
One answer may be that, as an individual, I possess a moral compass that 
Abedi or Khan [two of those involved] did not, which guides me away from 
such ideologies and from committing such barbarous acts. That may be a 
comforting thought for me, but the problem cannot be dismissed so simply. 
The difference is not just one of individual morality – it is generational too.
It was that last sentence that immediately drew my attention. Much is made of the 
unproblematic, selective and decontextualised cut and paste of what Steve Biko 
said in select written form (and why only him of his time); and of what Fanon 
wrote, slotted into the present, most often as simple confirmation and justification 
rather than contextualised understanding. Malik wrote a recent book on “the quest 
for a moral compass”, informing his personal note in the response, as a Muslim, 
to the Manchester terror. But his book ends with the acknowledgement that the 
clarity that religion claimed for providing direction during various periods over 
the past centuries no longer applies for many, if not most, on the globe today. 
“Today we require such comfort [as religion historically offered across the world] 
because we have lost faith in our ability to be moral cartographers … The human 
condition is, however, that of possessing no moral safety net. … It can be a highly 
disconcerting prospect. Or it can be a highly exhilarating one. The choice is ours” 
(Malik, 2014:344). I would add that the challenge is ours. A position on racialism 
is centrally a moral one; accepting a life shaped by a construction is after all is a 
matter of choice.
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But is that morality to be located in race? Malik responds to this argument: “It is 
not progressive politics that gives shape to contemporary disaffection but the 
politics of identity, which, over the past three decades, has encouraged people to 
define themselves in increasingly narrow ethnic or cultural terms” (2017).
The “progressive politics” to which he refers in his response is captured thus, as 
is social identity formation. It is worth presenting it at some length – and note 
the sources:
The institutions that [historically, in the UK] shaped what are now 
called ‘Muslim communities’ were not mosques, but secular and political 
organisations such as the Indian Workers’ Association and the Asian Youth 
Movements. [see Malik, 2012] The struggles of Asian communities were 
intimately bound up with wider working-class struggles. Migrant workers 
were at the forefront of industrial action, from the first significant post-war 
‘immigrant strike’ at Red Scar Mill … when Asian workers took action against 
the practice of forcing non-white workers to work more machines for less pay, 
to Grunwick … where in 1976 black and Asian women went on strike for 
more than a year, demanding union recognition … the first dispute of black 
workers that attracted mass support from the trade union movement.
This history provided the grounding for the struggles of my generation. We 
recognised the commonality of values, hopes and aspirations that bound 
together Asians, blacks and whites. Organisations of the left and of the labour 
movement provided us with the vehicles to give grievance a political form 
and the mechanisms for turning disaffection into the fuel of social change.
I was drawn towards politics by my experience of racism and politics [which] 
made me see beyond the narrow confines of racism. I came to learn that there 
was more to social justice than the injustices done to me and that a person’s 
skin colour, ethnicity or culture weren’t guides to the validity of his or her 
political beliefs. Through politics, I was introduced to the Enlightenment 
and to concepts of a common humanity and universal rights. I discovered 
the writings of Marx and Mill, Kant and Locke, Paine and Condorcet, Frantz 
Fanon and CLR James. 
But let me return to concluding the task at hand: first, the points made about 
the distinction “race”, “racialism”, and “racism” need to be factored into research, 
analysis, and suggestions for interventions. Second, the various levels at which 
the issues of race operate need recognition and foregrounding in suggestions for 
intervention – state templates obviously need policy work at a national level, but 
personal perceptions and ways of living need more dispersed attention, from the 
social to the interpersonal. Third, the articulation of racialism and racism with social 
justice more widely than the race issue, with inequality addressed more widely 
than the core resource inequality, with imagining a future, inclusive of the shared 
projects that we need to undertake collectively, has to be at the core of thinking 
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and action. To call on Malik for a final time, he writes: “In an age in which anti-
imperialist movements have faded and belief in alternatives to capitalism dissolved, 
radical Islam [or radical race essentialism, in the case addressed here] provides the 
illusion of being part of a global movement for change” (2017). What should that 
“global movement for change” mean for humanity and for our small part in it here 
on the southern tip of Africa? How do we factor race, racialism and racism into that 
wider demand?
Race is employed and exists and is reproduced under different conditions, towards 
various ends, and redress should, therefore, take this into account. The alternative, 
claiming race as the basis for all corrective action, leads nowhere, starting as it does 
with acceptance (gleeful in some instances, expressing a need for security in others, 
but also revengeful and blind to its always vicious consequences) of the biological 
fixity of the very construct of race – it had been done before and will continue to be 
done, albeit for different reasons and with different epistemologies. 
Certainly opportunities have been lost, here too. In the United States, such a 
moment was identified in the 1967 Supreme Court case of Loving v Virginia, which 
“invalidated state laws … that restricted interracial marriage.” A New York Times 
editorial comment, 50 years later, notes:
The legal scholar Dorothy E. Roberts argues that the court had all the 
evidence it needed to find that the racial claim underlying Virginia’s [the USA 
state] law was scientifically invalid – and so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional 
– and that the justices missed the opportunity to refute ‘the validity of race as 
a biological category.’ Had the court taken that approach, the Loving decision 
might well have been a more enduring strike against white supremacy – and 
changed the way the country talks about race.  (Staples, 2017)
We need to recognise, create whenever possible, and grasp those moments, small 
and big, when they arise.
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THE EFFECTS OF RACISM 




The Effects of Race Project sprang from the observations and realisations of 
many people who voiced their concern over the diverse and sinister effects of race 
labelling, racialism, racism, and “race-thinking” in general. Foremost amongst the 
descriptive phrases that arose repeatedly in early discussions, was the “everydayness 
of race”. For people in South Africa, the United States, and many other countries, 
the construct of race is an established part of social reality. Race is considered 
normal and a natural part of the social order. In these racialised realities, constructs 
of otherness underlie tacit and explicit expectations of character, intelligence, 
motivation, and behaviour. The concept of racialism – the formal acceptance and 
recognition of the reality of race and races – created a frame of acceptability for a 
range of behaviours from the personal to the political. Racism itself followed like 
a shadow, because the distance between people created by the establishment of 
otherness made it easier to unleash suspicion, derogation, and dehumanisation.
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In this chapter, I am not seeking to explore the psychosocial and societal problems 
caused by race, racism, and racialism because these have been and are being 
addressed much more authoritatively and sagely by others. Rather, I seek to draw 
attention to the wide-ranging biological effects of race-thinking and racism on the 
human organism.
The hidden scourge of race-thinking and racism 
Race-thinking and racism are associated with so many dehumanising negatives 
that it is hard point to one that is the point to one aspect that is the worst or most 
heinous. It is thus worth considering one of the less obvious – the effects on health. 
If I were asked what I would most like to change with regard to race and racism, it 
is the constellation of divers, serious, sinister, and often life-long biological, health 
and psychological consequences of acute and chronic stress on the human beings 
who are subjected to racial othering and overt racial discrimination. There are 
many kinds of acute and chronic stressors, and these affect individual physical and 
psychosocial health through many routes affecting, broadly, the circumstances of 
life. Many such stressors are subtle and may seem minor at the time, but their private 
and, often, hidden nature makes them all the more sinister and dangerous. These 
hidden insults are realised in adverse effects on the body and health that may be 
“silent” initially, but that exert their negative effects after a lifetime of accumulation. 
Some of these effects have the potential to span generations. Therborn (2018) has 
written that racism is best considered as an “existential inequality” that “affects us 
as persons by shaping our constitution and recognition as autonomous and integral 
subjects”. In other words, racism diminishes or denies agency and personhood. But 
we must see racism now as much more than this. It is also a “vital inequality”, a 
social construction that shapes human life courses “with respect to life expectancy, 
health, and mental-somatic development” (Therborn, 2018).
Racism is an institutionalised system of oppression that designates value to 
persons based on race or ethnicity. Racism and racial discrimination directly 
affect health and well-being through health disparities at multiple levels. They also 
indirectly affect health by affecting socioeconomic position. Institutional racism 
is characterised by large organisations and imposes practices that negatively affect 
access to health services. Personally mediated racism occurs when healthcare 
providers maintain preconceived notions about racial groups which then result 
in the provision of substandard healthcare to racial minorities. Lastly, internalised 
racism involves the embodiment and acceptance of stigmatising messages by 
individuals in racially oppressed groups from society (Prather, Fuller, Marshall 
& Jeffries, 2016). Internalised racism may be the most pernicious and least well 
understood, but recent research is providing insights into how chronic stress and 
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negativity affect individual health through multiple pathways, including epigenetic 
modification of genes that control key physiological reactions.
The lasting effects of stress caused by racism 
Racism has diverse and long-lasting effects on people and, far from being transient 
and “merely” psychological, it can cause irreversible and permanent changes to 
the body. The toll on personal health and well-being taken by racism, “from crib 
to coffin”, has been recognised for decades (Gee, Walsemann & Brondolo, 2012). 
Epidemiological studies have documented that the psychological stress attendant 
with racism has a significant deleterious effect on the development and progression 
of atherosclerosis, a precursor to serious cardiovascular disease (Saban, Mathews, 
DeVon & Janusek, 2014). An individual’s social context, especially during 
childhood and adolescence, is a powerful predictor of adult health, suggesting 
that the origins of health disparity are rooted in one’s early social environment 
and life experiences (Saban et  al., 2014). What research in the last two decades 
has revealed, is that social context influences the human organism at many levels, 
including the genetic. The physical and social environments in which a person 
develops and lives, trigger a series of biological responses that act on an individual’s 
genetic blueprint (their DNA) to adjust development and lifelong programmes of 
bodily and mental function. In other words, human bodies and human genes are 
being constantly remodelled by the physical and social environment and by life 
experience. Far from being a passive carriage for behaviour, the body is profoundly 
affected by behaviours and the greater environment. The genetic programme for 
the body’s structure and function is subject to modification by life experience and 
an individual’s environment in the broadest sense. Of critical importance to this 
discussion is that the ways in which the environment may differentially integrate 
with genomic information are extremely varied, and that the outcomes of these 
interactions cannot be predetermined.
There has been much discussion in the last decade about epigenetics and its 
effects on human development and health. Epigenetics is the study of changes in 
organisms caused by modification of gene expression rather than alteration of the 
genetic code itself. Epigenetic changes are chemical modifications to the genome 
that do not alter the DNA sequence, but influence expression of the encoded genes. 
Epigenesis, thus, is the transmission of information to new cells during cell division 
that determines how genes are expressed: which genes present are “turned on” 
and which are silenced (Combs-Orme, 2013). Epigenetic modifications may play 
a profound role in translating changes in the social and behavioural environment 
into changes in gene expression and thence to behaviour, via a long and winding, 
and not predetermined, road. The field of social and behavioural epigenetics is 
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focused on studying the effects of psychosocial stressors on the human phenotype 
(Mulligan, 2016). Many excellent reviews on social and behavioural epigenetics are 
available, including those written for specialists (Cunliffe, 2016; Denhardt, 2018; 
Notterman & Mitchell, 2015; Vick & Burris, 2017) and non-specialists (Combs-
Orme, 2013; McEwen & Getz, 2013; Oyama & Terry, 2016) alike. 
One of the most disturbing set of discoveries emanating from research on 
epigenesis is that the stresses realised by an individual can affect not only the way 
the genes of a person work, but that some of these stress-related modifications are 
heritable (Szyf, Tang, Hill & Musci, 2016; Vandegehuchte & Janssen, 2014). When 
genes that control the expression of brain proteins or that modify the function 
of the immune system are affected by environmental (including psychosocial) 
stressors, the effects can be extremely serious. Epigenetic studies have the potential 
to elucidate the specific biological mechanisms by which social conditions become 
physically embodied (Needham et  al., 2015). The negative biological effects of 
racism can be compounded over time because of the feedback loops generated by 
social and behaviour stressors, which induce negative emotions and accompanying 
biochemical and physiological changes. Behavioural functions are particularly 
sensitive to the programming effects of stress and nutrition during early life.
How exactly does racism affect the human body and why should it be considered 
an expression of vital inequality? When members of stigmatised racial populations 
respond to the pervasive negative racial stereotypes by accepting as true the 
dominant society’s beliefs about their biological and/or cultural inferiority, 
they can internalise the racism or self-stereotyping. Internalised racism fosters 
the endorsement of beliefs about the innate deficiencies of one’s self and one’s 
group, and leads to lower self-esteem and psychological well-being, which in turn 
could adversely affect health and health behaviour in multiple ways (Williams 
& Mohammed, 2013a, 2013b). Internalised racism is associated with alcohol 
consumption, psychological distress, being overweight, abdominal obesity, blood 
pressure, and fasting glucose (ibid.). Perhaps even more worrying, however, is the 
evidence that links social environmental conditions with changes in gene regulation, 
a relationship that parallels and extends the effects of the social environment on 
other physiological traits (Tung & Gilad, 2013). Social status and social isolation 
are associated with changes in gene expression for a large number of genes. It comes 
as no surprise too that, because of racism, residential segregation, and structural 
inequality in our society, women and children suffer disproportionately from 
exposure to poor physical and social environments (Shields, 2017).
The most common epigenetic mechanism associated with environmental and 
social stress involves the methylation of DNA. DNA methylation is typically 
associated with gene suppression, as methyl groups that become added to DNA can 
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interfere with the process of gene transcription. Alterations in DNA methylation 
serve as means by which risk and protective factors may affect an organism’s 
appearance and its activity (its phenotype). DNA methylation is also increasingly 
being recognised as a biological process that can influence our psychological 
functioning from infancy to senescence (Roth, 2013). Low socioeconomic status 
(SES) is associated with DNA methylation several genes related to stress reactivity 
and inflammation. To the extent that patterns of DNA methylation influence 
gene expression, these findings could help explain why low SES is associated with 
excess morbidity and mortality (Needham et al., 2015). Although we are far from 
a complete understanding of the cause-and-effect role of epigenetic mechanisms 
in health and disease, evidence is clear that epigenetic alterations are biological 
consequences of environmental input throughout the life course, with early life 
effects being the most critical. 
Epigenetic information is itself susceptible to change: its impact can be manifest 
as long as the environmental factor is present or can persist in its absence (Saban 
et  al., 2014). This is extremely important as we consider the reversibility and 
possible transgenerational impacts of epigenetic effects. Epigenetic marks may be 
transmitted across generations, either directly by persisting through cell division 
leading to the production of eggs and sperm, or indirectly through replication in 
the next generation of the conditions in which the epigenetic change occurred 
(Rubin,  2016). New evidence indicates, however, that DNA methylation may 
not result in indelible epigenetic marks and that different signals arriving at 
intervals over a lifetime act on the genome and epigenome of the time to affect 
the next phase of life (Patchev, Rodrigues, Sousa, Spengler & Almeida, 2014). 
Amongst the many things we don’t yet know is how consistent exposure to positive, 
supportive environments produce a methylation pattern that places children on 
a positive developmental trajectory, and more resilient to subsequent adversities 
(Szyf et  al.,  2016). We are also ignorant of the mechanisms whereby DNA 
methylation patterns defined by early life experience are altered with childhood, 
adolescence, and adult experience, and how these changes relate to environmental 
exposures  (ibid.). This information will help determine the best times for 
intervention, and the narrowness of the window for prevention. 
Epigenetic information does not mean “no hope”
The knowledge that epigenetic research brings to light is both worrisome and 
elevating with respect to the long-term mitigation of the effects of racism on human 
well-being. It leads us, first of all, to the realisation that it is incumbent upon all 
governments to recognise the seriousness of the effects on human well-being of 
epigenetic influences, especially in early life. Findings from epigenetic studies 
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should be used to promote widespread social reforms that fight the larger 
geographic, sociocultural, economic, and political contexts in which health 
disparities are embedded (Oyama & Terry, 2016). The development of a healthy 
citizenry capable of making rational decisions depends upon people growing up 
with adequate nutrition, protected from violence and gross insecurity, and raised in 
environments conducive to the development of emotional security. The negative 
influences of racism on human health are, in many respects, similar to the negative 
effects of extreme poverty. With much of the world now living in highly urbanised 
environments in which traditional modes of nurturing individuals and policing 
behaviour have been eliminated, governments have a solemn responsibility to 
insure adequate nutrition, physical and psychosocial health care, and reduction of 
the threat of violence, especially against the most vulnerable members of society 
(children, the elderly, and women). The role of “big government” in recognising 
these problems and preventing their further manifestation is self-evident and must 
be seen as the central role of the modern state. 
It has been recognised for a long time that poverty, poor nutrition, child abuse, 
trauma, and other adverse exposures were bad for health. What epigenetic 
research offers is the shedding of light on the biological pathways through which 
such exposures are translated into concrete, measurable increased risks of various 
diseases. The linkages amongst social context and epigenetics that influence 
the risk of cardiovascular disease, for example, have potential to support health 
policies aimed at the social roots of disparity in this and other disease processes. 
Recognition of aspects of the family and community that increase the risk of 
epigenetic modification may reveal aspects of the early environment that can be 
modified as part of community level efforts to improve well-being in those at risk 
(Saban et al., 2014). To the extent too that epigenetics offers a view to understand 
the pathways through which a mother’s social disadvantage could be translated 
to her child’s vulnerability to disease, knowledge of epigenetic mechanisms may 
galvanise support for public health interventions and generate new ideas for 
effective interventions (Shields, 2017).
The elimination of many of the health problems caused by racism does not 
necessarily require the eradication of racism itself, as desirable as this is, nor does it 
require enormous amounts of money. In this regard, Cuba stands as an example of 
a society in which the risk of adverse epigenetic modifications to humans has been 
reduced through vigilant preventive health care, conscientious antenatal care and 
monitoring of childhood nutrition, and reduction of the effects of acute and chronic 
stressors through a medical system focused on intensive personalised care provided 
by networks of local care givers. In Cuba, the government is also highly vigilant 
of any resurgence of racism because of its many recognised and ramifying adverse 
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effects. Epigenetic research suggests that health promotion beginning from the 
prenatal period and taking an intergenerational perspective, as the Cuban system 
does, creates a highly propitious environment for human thriving. It also provides 
a useful tool for refocusing policy makers’ attention back to the communities in 
which people live and work, and the daily quality of their lives that shape their 
health and those of their offspring (Shields, 2017). This novel and comprehensive 
approach may be the best way to help prevent health disparities from occurring and 
may be one of the most effective ways of reducing the multifarious negative effects 
of racism. 
As knowledge of epigenetic processes grows, so should the capacity to develop early-
life interventions to prevent or mitigate child health disparities. Understanding how 
genes are differentially regulated by experience will affect how we conceptualise 
social inequalities and health disparities. Rather than engaging in nature versus 
nurture debates concerning race as a genetic or social construct, considering race as 
an epigenomic construct (Rubin, 2016) maybe the most accurate and appropriate 
perspective yet. The view in which genotype and the socially experienced world 
are perpetually entwined (Rubin, 2016) is the real world in which people live.
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KNOWING AND BEING




This short reflection works with the question of knowing and the implications of 
knowing for how we live our lives. Its particular concern is with the ways in which 
we come to know about “race” and the implications of this for how we manage 
living with what we think of as racial difference. 
A stimulus for the reflection comes, at one level, from the timeless problematique 
of bystanding seen, of course, most poignantly, in the post-apocalyptic, and as 
yet-incompletely explained puzzle of our behaviour as educated human beings in 
the holocaust of World War II. We were complicit in different ways, astonishingly 
at a stage of our civilisational trajectory when we were supposedly at an advanced 
stage of human development, in that intense moment of modern barbarism in the 
deliberate killing of more than six million human beings. They were Jews, people 
we called Gypsies, communists, gays – people whom we deemed to be other. 
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We  looked on as they were systematically murdered. We knew, but, it seems, we 
also did not know.1 
The more specific stimulus, at another level, is about knowing, knowing as deep 
comprehension – comprehending a matter conceptually and analytically in order 
to be able to deconstruct it and present it in its constituent causative elements. It 
is distinguished from the kind of knowing seen in bystanding, raised classically by 
Latané and Darley (1970) in their study of people’s reactions to alarming incidents. 
That knowing is essentially noticing, of being a witness to an event. Knowing as it is 
approached here builds on the work of Miranda Fricker (2007) and the approach 
she uses of “thinking in moral colour”, of the ability to explain a phenomenon 
beyond its surface features so as to understand it in its historical and contextual 
distinctiveness. 
In this reflection, using Fricker, I consider the implications of knowing about “race” 
in the deep sense. Where Fricker concentrates on how bad knowing works – what 
she calls epistemic injustice and the effects it has on subjected people, that is, the 
“wrong done to someone” based on our personal beliefs about them or on what 
our environment has taught us – I am more interested in the ethical implications 
that arise for the knower (Fricker, 2007:1) who knows more than superficially. 
I am interested in that stage of our cognitive development where we can see and 
understand the workings of prejudice but cede our moral decision-making to the 
baseline of the normative order in which we find ourselves. How is it, I ask, that we 
are able to claim for ourselves that special feat of self-consciousness of being able to 
explain how prejudice operates in and around us, but, and this is our contemporary 
puzzle, as knowers, function according to the normative order around us (see 
Fricker, 2007:38).
Knowing, I argue, raises two issues. The first is about consciousness and its 
obligations. The second, flowing from the first, is about consciousness in situ – 
what might be described as the politics of positionality, how one is placed and how 
one comes to deal with the existential paradoxes and contradictions which flow 
1 The work of Cohen on bystanding is valuable here. He identifies three kinds of bystanding: 
the first where there is acknowledgement of something that may have happened but a 
genuine ignorance, for whatever reason, of the facts; the second where there is deliberate 
and intentional denial that is clearly meant to deceive; and a third where a ‘switching-off ’ or 
a ‘blocking-out’ takes place (see Cohen, 2001:4). It is the third that holds most significance 
for this discussion here. It is about “knowing” and yet not “knowing.” As Cohen (2001:5) 
says, there seem to be ‘states of mind, or even whole cultures, in which we know and don’t 
know at the same time.’ The implicit and unarticulated cultural compacts within this kind of 
knowing in which experiences of oppression, discrimination and exclusion can be ‘known’ 
but disavowed or not fully acknowledged are important to understand. 
Knowing and being |      129
from the ways in which dominant thinking positions one. The chapter concentrates 
on the first. It uses this first reflection to find a way into the second challenge of 
managing one’s positionality.
The first is that of how we make the science around “race” socially consequential. 
How do we take what we know scientifically about “race”, as opposed to our 
popular conceptions – our “street talk”, our handed-down understandings, our 
observations of “reality”, our intergenerational conceptions, our “common sense”, 
our politically-generated explanations, our social beliefs and desires and aesthetics, 
our social justifications for why it must be preserved, our prejudices and half-truths 
about “race” – into everyday behaviour, on the one hand, and public policy, on the 
other? The question I work with is that of whether the real doubt and caution that 
most of the world’s leading scientists are bringing to the discussion about “race” – 
that it does not exist in objective terms – has any significance for us? The syllogistic 
counterpoints I work with, as I pose the question, are Copernicus’ discovery of 
the orbital relationship of the Sun and our planet Earth and the evidence we have 
for evolution. I concede that there are people who reject what science and reason 
tell us, who took, and in some cases still take, position against Copernicus and, 
more pertinently in the contemporary moment, who are now actively defending 
a creationist view of the world against what we know about evolution in relatively 
objective terms. In line with this, I accept that there are people who choose to reject 
what we know scientifically about “race”. These people, I argue, are not knowers 
of “race”. They may know other things relating to “race”, such as the ostensive 
experience of racism – its pains and traumas – and may have important things to say 
about how racism works and its effects, but, for whatever reason, they do not know 
the concept of “race”. They are not the people I am concerned about. The reflection 
is focused on those who accept the science around “race” and who generally begin 
their engagements with the enunciation that “race” is a social construction. 
I pose the question here of what they – we – do with that science. With that 
clarification, the purpose of this reflection is to pause for a moment over the 
ontological implications of knowing in a deep way. I ask the question of what the 
personal and social implications are of understanding the racial question. Does it 
demand anything of us at all? Does it, to be provocative, have any call on our moral 
decisions in terms of our sense of responsibility to each other? Does it require of 
us, as we stand before each other as strangers or even as people who claim to know 
each other, to be managing ourselves in any particular kind of way? What does the 
fact of the physical presence of another human being in my consciousness, apart 
from being able to acknowledge his or her ineffability, require of me? 
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So what do we know about “race”?
In terms of the science around “race”, most, not all, scientists are now of the view 
that “race” cannot be “proved” biologically. Leaders of two major scientific groups 
have expressed themselves on the question of whether “race” exists or not. In 1997, 
the American Anthropological Association gathered to consider the question and 
in 1998 issued the AAA Statement on ‘race’, “[w]ith the vast expansion of scientific 
knowledge in this century … it has become clear that human populations are not 
unambiguous, clearly demarcated biologically distinct groups. Evidence from the 
analysis of genetics (for example, DNA) indicates that most physical variation, 
about 94% lies within so‑called racial groups … There is greater variation within 
‘racial’ groups than between them …” (American Anthropological Association, 
1998). The second panel, made up of a group of Stanford University scientists, 
issued an open letter in the journal Genome Biology on “the ethics of characterizing 
difference: guiding principles on using racial categories in human genetics” (Lee 
et al., 2008). The questions underpinning their approach included the following: 
“Can we find areas of common ground? Do we agree about the implications and the 
interpretation of emerging genetic data? Under what conditions might genetic data 
transform social understandings of racial and ethnic categories, possibly enhancing 
racist ideologies?” (Lee et al., 2008:par. 2). Pertinent amongst their ten statements 
were principles for the use of racial and ethnic categories in looking at group 
differences. The first statement was: “[w]e believe that there is no scientific basis 
for any claim that the pattern of human genetic variation supports hierarchically 
organized categories of race and ethnicity” (Lee et al., 2008:par. 3). Their second 
statement elaborated this position: “We recognize that individuals of two different 
geographically defined human populations are more likely to differ at any given 
site in the genome than are two individuals of the same geographically defined 
population” (Lee et  al., 2008:par. 5). A seventh statement went as follows: “We 
discourage the use of race as a proxy for biological similarity and support efforts to 
minimize the use of the categories of race in clinical medicine, maintaining focus 
on the individual rather than the group” (Lee et al., 2008:par. 16).2 
2 Interestingly, in an attempt to disseminate this open letter more widely, Devin Powell 
(2008:par. 4), writing in the New Scientist, demonstrates the captured nature of the discourse 
around difference and its taxonomies. He presents this capture in his styling of the letter 
as “The Ten Commandments of Race and Genetics”. He fails to assimilate the fact that the 
authors of the Open Letter deliberately and consciously refrain from using the term “race”. 
They refer, instead, to the term ‘population groups’. Powell, in paraphrasing the statement, 
makes the first statement of the scientists exactly the opposite of what they had sought to 
problematise, writing it as “All races are created equal” (Powell, 2008).
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Not all geneticists, predictably, go along with this. Most notably, Richard Dawkins 
and Yan Wong have argued that “however small the racial partition of the total 
(genetic) variation may be, if such racial characteristics as there are highly correlate 
with other racial characteristics, they are by definition informative, and therefore, 
of taxonomic significance” (Dawkins & Wong, 2005:406-407). Recently the 
geneticist Richard Reich contributed to the debate in a profoundly provocative way. 
In a reflection on the significance of new understandings in genetics for thinking 
about “race”, he suggested that the “consensus” that “race” was a social construct 
was being made into an “orthodoxy”: 
[…] over the years this consensus has morphed, seemingly without 
questioning, into an orthodoxy. The orthodoxy maintains that the average 
genetic differences among people grouped according to today’s racial terms 
are so trivial when it comes to any meaningful biological traits that those 
differences can be ignored. 
The orthodoxy goes further, holding that we should be anxious about any 
research into genetic differences among populations …
I have deep sympathy for the concern that genetic discoveries could be 
misused to justify racism. But as a geneticist I also know that it is simply no 
longer possible to ignore average genetic differences among ‘races’.  
 (Reich, 2018:par. 3-6)
It is this that brings us to the position which says that we now have almost 
unanimous agreement about what “race” means – almost because doubters such as 
Dawkins and Reich are important to pay attention to. Doubters notwithstanding, 
it is reasonably correct to say that we have come to a point where the evidence is 
largely that we as a human population, all around the world, have common origins. 
The study of genomics has shown us that our genetic history can be traced back to 
a single group of Homo sapiens which originated in Africa more than 200 000 years 
ago and began to disperse around 60 000 years ago to the rest of the world.
The interesting issue which comes out of our inability to say categorically that “race” 
does NOT exist, as Dawkins suggests, is that there are groups of people amongst 
us who have with respect to particular characteristics similar genetic profiles, 
beyond the problematic 0,1% visible differences which have been used in eugenicist 
explanations of race. These people can be identified by the recurrence or frequency 
of distinct genetic markers, such as disease susceptibilities. These realities exist. It 
is important that they are discussed and worked with between biological scientists 
and social scientists because they involve social and political assessments which are 
unavoidable. They involve, and this is a key point in this argument, categorisation 
and classification. This as a methodological and processual reality is about sense-
making. We are not going to stop trying to make sense of complex things. We need, 
in this sense-making process, to classify and order. 
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But, and here is the essential quarrel with people such as Dawkins and Reich, 
how do we classify and name those distinctive groups of people? “Races”, 
“communities”, “tribes” – all the synonyms we have for biologically/what-one-
looks-like definitions of difference – or terms which reflect the specificity of their 
gene markers? Or do they even need to be marked out at all socially? We need to 
find ways of thinking about and defining categories and classifications which can be 
shown to be of value and use. So, in relation to this, is “race” the most appropriate 
way to account for, label and then ultimately classify differences such as those to 
which Dawkins refers? My own discomfort is that “race” as a category for working 
with, describing and making sense of these “natural” realities, as Dawkins suggests, 
is deeply problematic. It fails to acknowledge the ascriptive processes which 
accompany the idea of “race” and the ways in which the eugenics movement, past 
and current, uses biology and all its surrogate characteristics to allocate worth and 
value. Its presumptive first move is that the idea of “race” can be rendered in neutral 
ways. In this argument, it is not their neutrality that is at issue. At issue, is how they 
name and describe the groups of people with which they are working. Why does 
Reich speak of the west-African groups of people who present – to use a medical 
term – with distinct genetic characteristics as a racial group? Why does he feel the 
need to “race” them? I prefer, as the Stanford scholars do, the term “population 
groups”. It is here that Reich falls short. He is able to show differences in the average 
incidence of particular disease profiles (even in the differences in height between 
“northern Europeans” and “southern Europeans” but which, interestingly, he does 
NOT racialise). He calls, however, these groups of people “races”. Why he prefers 
this naming and attribution he, very interestingly, does not talk about. In what 
follows below, I try to make an argument for my position.
Classification: The power of normative orders versus  
the consequences of knowing
If “knowing” has moral consequences, is our knowing that “race” does not exist 
enough? What action does this “knowing” demand? I pose these questions in an 
attempt to situate what I would like to argue is a real challenge for science and how 
it is mediated and taught beyond the confines of the classroom. 
The action called for, as is intimated in the discussion above with respect to 
Dawkins’ apparent neutral use of the idea of “race”, is being aware of the politics 
surrounding the knowing of “race.” Central in that politics of racial knowledge is 
what we can call norming. It is important to understand norming and the normative 
order and how they work.
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What is a normative order? A normative order is the system of rules and shared 
expectations which a social system, and it can be big or small, uses to govern and 
manage itself. It is the rules and expectations that people have of each other when 
they are in each other’s company – how individuals will treat each other, men will 
treat women, older people will treat younger people, people who are physically well 
will treat those they understand to be unwell, how rich people will behave towards 
poor people, how people who perceive themselves to be of different racial, cultural, 
national, linguistic backgrounds will relate to others who are supposedly different 
from themselves, the responsibilities that individuals and groups feel that they have 
towards each other. A norm becomes an order – order in the sense of how one does 
things – when it is both institutionalised as a rule and as a habit. You habitually, for 
example, relate to a person who you perceive as a woman in particular kinds of ways. 
Why is the idea of a normative order important? It helps us distinguish right from 
wrong. It helps us to do what would be considered the right thing in a particular 
social environment. It is a socially stabilising device. Problematic as normative 
orders can be, we cannot do without them. Without them we descend into 
worlds of absolute arbitrariness. In that arbitrariness, we could justify through the 
invocation of all forms of unacceptable kinds of power any kind of behaviour. We 
would do things based on any kind of explanation. All that would matter in contexts 
such as those is the assertion that I know better than you. This is not acceptable on 
any terms. It is for this reason that we deliberate and engage with each other and 
amongst each other to decide what is minimally acceptable in how we behave with 
respect to both ourselves and to each other. In this way, we manage ourselves as 
human beings. We establish baselines which we hold on to and reproduce. 
But what if a normative order is problematic? What if that normative order has 
so conditioned reality, conditioned consciousness, conditioned knowing to the 
point of Cohen’s (2001:5) disavowal that it is foundationally socially perverse? If 
that is the case, and we are, as with the question of “race”, now moving to the point 
where we can say that patriarchal societies are an example of such institutionalised 
perversity, then we are in some trouble. That trouble, I would like to suggest, lies in 
the ways in which we as people come to make choices in our lives. Those choices, 
to compress complex lines of argument, come through the construction of what 
we believe to be the idea of the Ideal Society. The Ideal Society, as Jonathan Wolff 
(2015:22-23) argues, “is (often) based on principles of justice which are abstracted 
from particular conditions. The principles form a model to which all societies … 
should aspire”.  As he says: “Much work in political philosophy, from Plato to Rawls, 
has taken this form, and the philosopher is a kind of legislator for an ideal society, 
with the hope that actual societies can be brought to resemble the ideal” (ibid.). 
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Critical about this ideal is the way in which it comes to ontologise citizenship, 
the way in which it comes to give substance to subjectivity. It moves on from the 
ideal society to constructions of what the ideal subject is. It puts on personhood a 
particular normative obligation. This is how, as a human being, you should be.
The idea of the Ideal, to recover the point above of the necessity for having normative 
orders, is not something we should shy away from. Given the connectedness of the 
world, it should not be abandoned. The prospect of living in a world of arbitrary 
decisions could be catastrophic. But the idea of the ideal needs constant rethinking, 
theoretically and practically. There are deep theoretical issues about the ways in 
which its conceptual moorings overlook problems comes to build practices based 
on these blind spots. Both the conceptual and the practical are crucial to hold in 
constant critical perspective.
With respect to the conceptual, Charles Mills draws our attention to the very 
fundaments of the ideals that have governed our lives. The point he makes is 
that the supposedly “all-encompassing egalitarianism” of modernity’s famous 
revolutions are profoundly flawed:
If modernity is supposed to eliminate the hierarchies of the pre-modern 
Western world, the reality is that it only does so (to the extent that it does) 
for white males … white women’s inequality is not eliminated but put on 
a different foundation … in the case of people of color, a new structure of 
ascriptive hierarchy is created. As Frederickson underlines, the very fact that 
equality is supposed to prevail universally sharpens the contrast with those 
who are deprived of that status.  (Mills, 2015:51)
Mills goes on to say that part of the problem of mainstream ethical and political 
philosophy is its failure to recognise and explore the social and ontological category 
of sub-personhood – those forms of subjectivity which refuse to accord to people 
full person status. Racialised societies, he says, are not slightly but radically 
different from the normative ideal. They are so far from the ideal that they are 
what he describes as “ill-ordered” societies. Something went wrong with them. 
They went wrong in the dramatic sense that they institutionalised a scientific 
falsehood into everyday life. They took the scientific falsehood that human beings 
could be classified into distinct “races” and that these distinct “races” were fixed 
into a hierarchy of biological, cognitive and spiritual worth into their “knowing”. 
This “knowing” was solidified and legitimised discursively – through the law and 
practice. In places such as South Africa, this “knowing”, as was, indeed, the case in 
many parts of the world, was embroidered into the deep recesses of the physical 
and the mental. A falsehood was painfully stitched into the narrative ways through 
which human beings came to see and think of themselves. 
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As Mills says, what do you do, how do you think about and how do you deal with 
societies which claim a particular normative philosophy but are so remote from 
what actually is happening inside of them? (Mills, 2015:58). Examples of such 
societies are societies such as the United States, South Africa and Brazil where 
the law represents the ideal of how inclusion should be defined and managed, 
but where everyday experience is what is actually determinative. Racelessness is 
the ideal. Whiteness and racism is the practice. In places such as these, there is a 
putative normative order and an actual one. The actual is what governs the society. 
How do we create “well-ordered” societies which will recognise their deviance from 
that which they rhetorically hold aloft? His response to these questions is that you 
need more than ideal principles. You need to institute into this normative approach 
principles of corrective justice. You need to think about, he suggests, “whiteness” 
and about its reconstruction. He says, and this is crucial for us here in South Africa, 
and particularly if we don’t want to give up the possibility of formulating an ideal 
for ourselves, you need to think of what transitional principles you would need to 
be putting in place. Consequently, he makes an argument for the correctness of 
some form of corrective action as a principle – compensatory justice. How this 
compensatory justice is actually given substance to is a matter for debate. It requires 
coming to an empirical understanding of the actual causal mechanisms that are at 
work in creating the injustice in the first place and the development of processes to 
both undo the injustice and to replace it with alternatives which take one closer to 
the formal ideal.
Understanding the “causal mechanisms” in the making of normative orders is 
important. It is here that Daniel Putnam (2015) and Miranda Fricker (2015) 
are useful, and providing a way of putting Angier’s comment about “what it is 
for people to relate to and treat one another as equals” (Angier, 2015:165), in its 
fuller perspective. The approach they take is broadly encapsulated in the term 
“methodological negativism”. The focus of this shift around hermeneutic injustice 
is not material equality. They go beyond material equality. They want to get to 
Angier’s question of what it takes for people to treat each other as equals. 
What is, in our consideration of reconstituting the normative order, methodological 
negativism? Mills presents it as holding the keys to theoretical development to 
“guide us in the transition from our actual societies to” the ideal (Hull, 2015:3). 
There are many ways of doing methodological negativism. That which Putnam and 
Fricker focus on is the question of “knowing the other”. Their advice is to move 
beyond sympathy and empathy. It is about coming to a better understanding of 
what went wrong in the ways people involved in unequal relationships came to 
the relationship come to an understanding of each other. Putnam’s position is that 
dominant understandings of equality, especially those which describe equality as 
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that relationship people from different and unequal positions enter into where 
they are joint deliberators and can give equal weight to those things which they 
deem to be important, do not sufficiently resolve the problem of what he describes 
as the understanding between people. The contribution Fricker makes is that 
of understanding what went wrong – or what Mills calls the non-ideal history – 
the illicitly expanded rights and opportunities held by privileged people. What 
Fricker is asking is that we first should come to a sense of the causal factors in Mill’s 
non-ideal history. She says, “if one is interested in justice, then it is helpful to look 
first at forms of injustice; if one is interested in equality … look first at forms of 
inequality” (Fricker, 2015:73). 
The inequality that Putnam and Fricker are interested in is that of what unequal 
people or individuals bring to their interrelationship. Fricker, working with Martha 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, documents all the human functioning capabilities 
that are at issue in realising equality between people. As she says on that list of 
capacities is the capacity for “practical reasoning”. Valuable as this is, she says, it 
does not accord any weight to what she calls “rational functioning in what is surely 
the most basic and truly human mode of theoretical reason: our functioning 
as contributors to shared information and understanding. One of our most 
basic needs is to use our reason in order to discern the everyday facts and social 
meanings that condition, constrain, and make sense of our shared lives. Indeed, 
many other functionings depend upon it” (Fricker, 2015:75). Raised here is not 
abstract reasoning, or simply the reasoning of the knower. It is the reasoning that has 
informed the relationship. This is essentially what Putnam was talking about when 
he was talking about intelligibility – understanding between people. Inequality will 
continue to be fundamental when this mutual intelligibility is absent. It is absent, as 
Fricker says, in big and small ways. Fricker’s interest is in making better sense of the 
process through which one creates the conditions for marginalised people to make 
their interests intelligible. My own is in shifting the onus of responsibility in the 
ethical economy of the moment to the knower.
The politics of positionality
Critical here then, and this constitutes the second issue to which I drew attention 
above, is having a sense, in Fricker and Mill’s terms, of “what went wrong”. 
Understanding “what went wrong” is necessary for helping each of us come to a 
sense of our place and our positionality in society and the politics underpinning 
that positionality. But acutely pertinent and to the point here in coming to some 
clarity about our positionality is recognising who the “we” are in Mill’s injunction 
that “we” should think. Who is he referring to when he asks that “we need to think?” 
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The approach underpinning the argument worked with in this chapter is that 
hegemonic discourse, such as racism, in their totalising fantasies, and apartheid 
is an example (see Norval, 1996:109), seek to obtain our consent. The “who” in 
Mills’ appeal, recognising how discourse seeks to work, is all of us. All of us are 
positioned by hegemony. All of us are, in these terms, required to think about 
the politics of our emplacement and what hegemony, in its tendentiousness, has 
in mind for us. We need to be mindful, as Wendy Brown (2018) remarked to 
students at a commencement ceremony at the University of California, Berkeley 
about “historical advantage” and how to work with it: “How can we burden you 
with this question, you who are just beginning your adult life. You who did not 
make this world filled with so many troubles and terrors?” Fairness, she argued, was 
not the issue: 
If you stay with the question of fairness, you will stay with a child’s view of 
what can be asked of you or what you can ask of yourself – the view from 
powerlessness and where the only expectation is that you play by common 
rules, set by others. The question of what kind of world you want to live in is 
an adult question; it has bearing when your life is in your own hands, when 
you have a little or a lot of power or latitude …
The point is not to shift the question from one about yourself to one about the 
world – it is not to replace selfishness with selflessness or become creatures 
of bottomless sacrifice. Rather the point is to mix the questions of what you 
want to be and do with what you want this world to be, and let that mixture 
pave your way in the adult world.  (Brown, 2018)
Her point is that each of is, as emplaced subjects, have choices to make about how 
to proceed into the world. Her appeal was for the students to “frame” their thinking. 
In this, she was asking them to have a considered and deliberative perspective of 
the time and place in which they found themselves.
Significant about this address is its recognition, in response to the system’s totalising 
hubris, of the need for all people to be thinking about their emplacement – both the 
powerful and the powerless and to take responsibility for a world “that you didn’t 
build” (Brown, 2018). Central in this is looking forward to the kind of world, she 
says, “you want to live in” (ibid.). 
The politics of Brown’s argument, it may be argued, is its focus on a future, a world 
to come. It leaves, it could be suggested, the question of how one thinks of the 
past. It is here that we are required to locate our positionality and to look critically 
how each of us, as individuals and as members of groups, fit into the calculation 
of “unfair” and “unequal”. The question is demanding. It requires a recognition of 
the big and provocative theories of intersectionality and the even more provocative 
analysis that none of us is ever outside of relationships of power. None of us is a pure 
victim or pure perpetrator. The politics of inequality, to put it bluntly, demands an 
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awareness from each of us of how each of us has arrived at the places and positions 
we occupy in our present circumstances. This awareness requires an understanding 
of the many systems at work in our lives – the systems of racism, sexism, classism 
and all their multiple incarnations. It asks us, in the spirit of Wendy Brown, to 
acknowledge that each of us is implicated in the bearing of power in ways that are 
not of our own making. The point about this approach, and it is put here in an 
extremely condensed way, is that none of us is ever outside of these systems. They 
involve us in complex ways. None of us stands in a position of pristine innocence in 
relation to these systems. Almost every single one of has something to declare. We 
find ourselves, most of us, implicated in one way or another. The message Mills and 
Brown seek to bring holds for all of us.
But in each of these systems we are positioned in very particular kinds of ways. It 
is our awareness of these distinct kinds of positioning that matters. Racial systems, 
as Leathem and Bechus (2018) recently explained (they used the term “race”), 
allowed certain groups of human beings to derive privilege from their simple 
classification. Leathem, in a powerful address to his high school students at a 
Johannesburg school, explained that his parents grew up as white working-class 
people of Johannesburg, they were “dirt poor”: “(My mother) was one of eight 
children; her father lost his leg fighting in the Second World War and the family 
had to get by on a meagre government disability pension”. Despite this, they were 
able to work themselves out of poverty “because they were white” (Leathem & 
Bechus, 2018:11). Now, it is true, of course, that there are people whose white 
classification has not been sufficient to rescue them from poverty – people like this 
exist. They might be disempowered in some ways but are empowered in others. 
But the majority have had what Leathem and Bechus (2018) call the privilege of 
their whiteness: “Their whiteness meant their hard work was allowed to amount 
to something”. There is in this, of course, a kind of totting up of this disadvantage 
being greater than another. Racial disadvantage carries more weight than class 
disadvantage. What should people classified “white” do with this, ask Leathem and 
Bechus? Leathem suggests that the intention is not to have people “feel bad” about 
themselves, but for them to “Stop denying (their white privilege). Stop pretending 
it isn’t real. Just acknowledge it. You have been given an unfair advantage” (Leathem 
& Bechus, 2018).
What follows, argue Leathem and Bechus, and this is the conclusion to which 
I would come too, is that those of us who have been so positioned to advantage 
in terms of racism, and exactly the same applies to all forms of positioning by 
structures of dominance, have to do something meaningful with our knowledge 
– self-knowledge – of our advantage. How one uses it will, of course, in the mode 
of Brown above, depend on the kind of society which we wish to see coming into 
being, and in this, we will have a wide range of choices that we as individuals 
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could make. These choices will themselves always be controversial. As long, as they 
can, however, be substantiated based on grounds that are wider and deeper than 
just our own, they provide us with the legitimacy to engage in a wider discussion 
about the public interest.
Concluding thoughts: How would ethical thinking  
be brought about?
What, following the discussion above, is the responsibility of the knower of “race”? 
This responsibility is multiple. It demands, in the first instance, the development 
in oneself of a hermeneutic of unconditionality in one’s respect and regard for the 
other. The injunction is simple – the deliberate cultivation of a consciousness of 
regard for all human beings and the conscious commitment to understanding the 
other and his or her own coming to-consciousness strategies.3 The issue here is that 
of Fricker and Putnam’s “mutual intelligibility”, not the intelligibility practices of 
the knower alone. The knower, and this is the ethical task for the knower, has to be 
able to account for how he or she came to know the other. He or she must be able to 
deconstruct the cognitive pathway through which his or her comprehension of the 
other unfolded – what empirical or evidentiary sources were used, why were those 
chosen rather than others? Critically, on top of this, what were the criteria against 
which the evidence was collected? What founding principles of human difference 
were brought into play? The practice of this injunction is, of course, never without 
immense difficulty. It begins, however, with the fundamental presupposition of 
difference as that which needs to be understood rather than that which is to be 
presumed and it demands a critical engagement with the normative order and its 
classificatory instincts. Resisting these instincts is the difficulty.
How one takes this point of departure – what we know about “race” – into both 
popular discussion and into official policy-making is what, I would like to suggest, 
is at stake here – a caution and hesitancy in the invocation of these categories as 
opposed to their easy and natural use. This would have, I would argue, immediate 
knock-on effects in the ways we deal with racialisation and its follow-on processes 
of racism. This hesitancy and caution would have implications for both personal 
behaviour and policy formation. It may not change either, but it would require 
of everybody considerable more reflection of the consequences of the decisions 
they are making. Racialisation depends on the acceptance of the classification 
3 Of course, as animal rights and other activists who are thinking of the wider planet would 
argue, and the new work of Achille Mbembe (2017) is crucial here, the Anthropocene in 
which we find ourselves has produced a profound disregard for other species and other 
forms of existence, including the physical landscape. It has privileged the human in deeply 
disrespectful ways (see also Latour, 2013).
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involved in the idea of “race”. Racism depends on it too. If we can make everyone 
much more circumspect about what they understand, we may move towards more 
considered behaviour.
How we institutionalise this hesitancy is an immensely difficult task. Repeated 
explanation is necessary, but so is the deliberate insertion into the public and 
scientific imagination the counter-“factual”, the repeated disruption of the 
normative regular – the use of wholesome, non-stereotypical and positively 
intriguing representations of those considered to be “other”.
I focus here on the “explanation” part of trying to bring this change about. 
The difficulty can come to be understood by understanding, in turn, the way 
current and dominant ideas of “race” were introduced and embedded in people’s 
consciousnesses. The “race” idea was an explanation for why people looked 
different to each other. But it simultaneously, and this is the difficulty, gave them 
in the context of the rapid economic development of the world in the nineteenth 
century, the moral, aesthetic, and affective arguments for their differences – their 
“superiority” (and, conversely, for the other, to make sense of their inferiority). 
It made it possible to produce and explain/justify regimes of oppression and 
exploitation from which particular people drew interest and received benefits. 
One has here the emergence and development of a sensibility, a kind of zeitgeist. 
How do you change zeitgeists? How do you change something which becomes the 
spirit of the age? Here is the challenge. Because this zeitgeist is not just about reason, 
counter-reason alone or the provision of information about otherness, and its most 
naïve forms, as we see in dominant multicultural discourses are a good example, 
impacts very little on consciousness. The difficulty is how to extend knowing about 
the “stuff ” of “race” from the realm of “pure reason” into the affective, the aesthetic 
and emotional parts of one’s thinking. The question is how one comes to make 
another explanation about “race”, an explanation which is cautious and questioning, 
one which gives people a sense that their interests are being served by it. How in 
a context in which the zeitgeist provides both material and psychological comfort 
does one make anti-racist thinking work in people’s interest and from which they 
can see the derivation of benefit? 
One is in this situation confronted here with the shortcomings of theories of 
change. A great deal of work is necessary here. But against this, the best that is 
currently possible, is to persist with a commitment to the provision of good 
education. Good education is when one’s knowing has consequences, when people 
think about their knowing in moral terms. Good knowing could provide people the 
opportunity to be deliberate then about the full gamut of the social, political, and 
moral dimensions of what they know and to extend that into the implications of 
this good knowing for their personal choices. 
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SEMANTICS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RACE
George Chaplin and Nina G. Jablonski
8
The three questions: The problem of racial thinking
The three questions that framed the discussions of the Effects of Race Project in 
2017 were, “What do you not like about race and racial thinking? “Why?” And “How 
would you fix it?” What we dislike most about race is its enduring and tenacious 
nature. This is despite the fact that it has been discredited by many scholars and 
constituencies and shown to be not useful. Race is an historical contingency, not 
a state of nature. Anthropologists see the commonality of humankind and a legacy 
of widely shared cultural and physical traits that outweigh any differences that may 
exist. The tenacity of race has made it possible for racism, its handmaiden, to grow 
and endure. Race has so co‑opted our consciousness and language that it has made 
any attempt to deal with the effects of racism very difficult. 
The addictiveness of racial thinking thwarts all attempts to unite humanity into a 
common cause. Philosophers are divided in their attitudes, with some preferring 
to split and others preferring to unite, but logically both attitudes can be defended. 
144      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
New attempts to erect race constantly arise based on economic, educational, 
biological, and most recently genetic grounds (El‑Haj, 2007; Long, Li & Healy, 
2009b). This is despite the overwhelming commonalities of biology, culture (such 
as the universal love of music, dance, and ritual), social organisation, kinship 
structures, language, and spirituality which render minor differences and any 
subdivisions based on them meaningless (Relethford, 2009; Soudien, 2012).
What can be done about this enduring race ideology? We need to change the 
discourse by changing the lexicon. Language space is constantly changing, 
however, and semantic meanings reinforce past preconceptions and prejudices. 
This is because the innate structure of the brain and its pathways ensures that there 
is no negation in the subconscious. Reusing past pejoratives in new contexts will 
not remove their meanings, but only add to them. The name‑space of race is so 
crowded that even neologisms with no past connections or meanings are hard to 
derive, but a new vocabulary is what is needed. 
Introduction
The Western idea of real races, in a biological sense, was questioned at its start 
as being anti‑biblical because it required there to have been separate creations 
(Sussman, 2014). Racialism and racism rose in the service of slavery and economic 
exploitation ( Jablonski, 2012a; Samson, 2005). Generally, since the United 
Nations’ (UN) Statement on Race (UNESCO, 1952) the acceptance of biological 
race has been in a very slow decline and had become almost universally moribund in 
scientific circles. Fairly recently, however, some philosophers, geneticists, and those 
in the medical professions have repeatedly tried to resurrect biological definitions 
of race (Bamshad, Wooding, Salisbury & Stephens, 2004; Lee, Mountain & 
Koenig,  2001; Wade, 2002). On the other hand, sociologists and the general 
public recognise that the idea of race, and its concomitant racism, is still a real 
phenomenon (Graves, 2015). If for no reason other than to recognise the reality 
of race in the social realm, we need to speak about it. The idea that racialism and 
racism will go away with non‑discussion is nonsensical and wishful. Some favour 
the preservation of named races because they make it easier to preserve unity and 
a positive social identity amongst people who are or were oppressed. Those with 
an attachment to the idea of biological races see it as having some utility, perhaps 
as a shorthand for nested biological facts (Chaplin, 2018). Others seem to believe 
that if biological race is shown to be real, people will accept it and move on, or use 
supposed biological race to justify racial separatism as practiced by neo‑Nazis. 
Racial thinking is not just a metaphysical problem, it is a semantic one too. The 
language around race has been fully occupied and is nearly universally derogatory 
and hurtful. Neologisms like “people of colour” arose in the 1930s after “coloured 
Semantics in the philosophy of race |      145
people” became restricted to mean African American people in the United States, 
and again at the end of the twentieth century in an attempt to be inclusive of groups 
of people identified as non‑European light skin. Basically, people of colour who 
designated the set included all non‑white people who were subjected by the white 
dominant culture. Race is not always imposed on people, but is often willingly 
embraced. The economically powerful see race as a shorthand for class, intelligence 
and ability, and biology. The economically disadvantaged see it as a cause of their 
suffering and as a uniting principle. To both sides, it is a factor used to justify an 
Us–Them dichotomy. A similar phenomenon is observed in the use of regional 
dialects and accents in homogenous peoples where the upper class impose their 
perceived pronunciation on the lower classes and the lower classes cling to their 
accents. Therefore, the subjugated are not free from the support of racialised 
thinking, any more than Cockney speakers or people with Brooklyn accents are 
free from class discrimination. Thus, the Us–Them divide is often a two‑way street, 
and the less advantaged of the two sides often don’t help themselves by supporting 
the discriminatory status quo.
Race labels and hate speech
One effort has been to usurp hateful speech by the subjugated people themselves. 
A  non‑racial example would be “queer”, a once very derogatory term for people 
who  prefer partners of the same gender as themselves. Redeployment of the 
word as a positive identifier has been somewhat successful at lessening its broader 
impact as a slur. Within the queer community, the adoption of the “queer” has 
repurposed the term to be inclusive and accepting. The name is still used as marker 
of  Us–Them, as in queer studies departments, and so still harkens back to the days 
of an Us–Them sexuality divide. In defeating homophobia, the neologism “gay” 
has been much more effective at heading‑off discrimination. Within a few decades, 
“gay” has entered the lexicon of normative life. The acceptance of non‑binary 
sexuality was greatly facilitated by the appropriation of a simple upbeat word. It 
has been remarkable that the once widespread public acceptance of homophobic 
speech within the United States is now seen as harmful and anachronistic 
(Watson, 2017), and is restricted to certain pseudo‑religious political movements. 
In private, homophobic speech is still found within the more isolated, poorly 
educated, and economically depressed parts of society. It seems that today the 
acceptance of gay people is the norm and their rejection is the exception. This is a 
dramatic difference since the Stonewall riots of 1969, which can be seen as the start 
of the gay rights movement. Before then, non‑homophobic people would routinely 
use the slurs popular with the bigoted. In places like San Francisco, even the label of 
“gay” is losing its power as the different sexual persuasions are now so normalised 
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that there is no need to label people by their orientation. The mere absence of 
derogation, however, does not mean things are moving forward; it marks the 
beginning of that process.
There has been a similar attempt to appropriate racial hate‑speech to lessen its 
power and unite its victims. In race speak, the hate‑term, “nigger”, which had 
previously only derogatory and disparaging connotations, has been co‑opted by 
the very people it was applied to as their own neologism (Croom, 2011, 2013). It 
has been redefined in modern usage and sometimes modified slightly, for example, 
“nigga” of hip‑hop and rap, as an empowering collective noun, usable only by 
the people to whom the term applies. This has created a lexicon of limited unity, 
centred on negativity, exclusivity, and division. The use of this term by those not 
in the inner circle of the term’s reference – and probably not of the same race – is 
still seen as carrying its original meaning to those in the inner circle and by a large 
percentage of those outside too. Today, use of the word in its original context, with 
vehemence, is socially unacceptable and, for a public figure, career‑ending. Use 
it in its neologistic sense, in the context of rap, requires mitigation by extensive 
apologies unless it is used by someone in the inner circle as an inclusive term about 
a shared experience. Peter Vecsay, a white sportscaster, was told not to use racial 
epithets applied to LeBron James when reporting a basketball game, even if he 
was only quoting a popular rap song (Watson, 2017). An even greater controversy 
arose over American late‑night talk show host and comedian, Bill Maher, telling a 
racially charged joke using the “N‑word”. To quote rapper Ice Cube talking about 
the term as used by Bill Maher, “That word is like a knife”, he said. “You can use it 
as a weapon or you can use it as a tool. It’s been used as a weapon by white people, 
and we’re not gonna let it happen again. That’s our word now”, Ice Cube continued. 
“And you can’t have it back” (Thompson, 2017). To Ice Cube, it is a tool, but as he 
further pointed out, Bill Maher was not sounding funny, “Sometimes you sound 
like a redneck trucker”. Here, Ice Cube seems to be acknowledging that many users 
of the term today have not given the semantic meaning originally associated with 
the word and continue to endorse its derogatory meaning. Even official race labels 
like the apartheid‑era “black” and “coloured,” as used in South Africa, have both 
descriptive and derogatory meanings, because, repurposing the terms of racism 
has not seen the power of the words diminish that much. Rather, repeating terms 
of racial discrimination has just added a layer of further confusion. Any reuse of 
a semantic term in race‑thinking and racialism is not only laden with meaning, it 
reifies all its previous meanings. This is because, and this cannot be emphasised 
enough, there is no negation in the subconscious, only re‑affirmation.
Besides the terms of race‑hatred, even official race labels like “black” and “coloured” 
still used in South Africa have both descriptive and derogatory meanings, because, 
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repurposing the terms has not seen their power diminish significantly (Maré, 2000, 
2011). Any reuse of a race term in the service of race‑thinking and racialism 
is not only laden with meaning, but it reinforces all its previous meanings and 
connotations. This greatly complicates race studies and the discussion of race‑
thinking. Almost every effort to use race neutral terms has failed because the 
depauperate lexicon has already been exhausted.
It is difficult to find or create neologisms which are defined and widely understood 
without being descriptive or pejorative. “Gay” has served successfully for 
homosexual communities, and it would be ideal if a comparably upbeat and 
unifying term could be created or co‑opted to describe former races. If one can 
be found that would be as successful as “gay” has been, it would be very helpful at 
defeating racism. Just like gay does not harp on the past discrimination, but rather 
promotes the group of people in uplifting terms, then any racial neologism should 
not be restrictive or hark back to previous slights, discrimination, and subjugation. 
Any effective neologism must arise from, and be acceptable to, the community 
to which it applies. A neologism is unlikely to be a panacea, but for it to be useful 
its usage cannot be restricted, limited in meaning, or confined to an inner circle 
supporting the Us–Them divide. Therefore, any successful neologism for defeating 
racism must be widely acceptable to, and universally applied within, the community 
that it applies to, and it must arise from within that community.
The deconstruction of race has been mostly successful in scientific circles, to 
the extent that it is widely accepted that the biological basis of race is without 
foundation, with the result that most basic biological and social scientists have 
rejected the concept (Graves, 2003, 2015; Soudien, 2020). This has not resulted 
in the abandonment of race labels in society, however. The deconstruction of 
race by scientists has not been accepted outside of scientific and some academic 
circles. Feelings and opinions about race exist in countries with past histories of 
legislated segregation like the United States and South Africa, even though race 
labels have lost all formal legitimacy (Maré, 2000). In these places, animus towards 
people belonging to races other than “one’s own” remains and is often manifested 
at home or amongst others with shared attitudes, a process Maré refers to as the 
“privatization of race” (2000). The use of pejorative labels and epithets is illegal, but 
the racism persists, albeit cloaked and only privately revealed ( Jablonski, 2012b). 
At present in the United States, the removal of some of the opprobrium towards 
openly racist attitudes has seen a resurgence of publicly displayed race hatred and 
neo‑Nazi activity. This has shocked the deconstructionists of race and has shown 
that the imposition of science‑based ideas about the biological un‑reality of race 
is unlikely on its own to prevent racialisation, race‑based derogatory discourse, 
and flat‑out hate speech. Biological conceptions of race that linger in the popular 
148      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
imagination provide justification for a racially inequitable status quo and for 
continued social marginalisation of historically disadvantaged groups (Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008). The resurgence of publicly displayed race hatred is also occurring 
because it is seen to be tacitly authorised or condoned. Deeply held beliefs about 
the biological reality of race along with blatant racism previously suppressed out 
of fear of disapproval or legal action are now made public. This is because most 
people believe that race is a real biological fact.
The ontological status of race as a biological fact
The deconstruction of race has been mostly successful in science circles, to the extent 
that the biological basis of race is without foundation and most basic biological 
and social scientists have rejected the concept (Eberhardt, 2005; Eberhardt & 
Randall, 1997; Relethford, 2009). The deconstruction of race by scientists has not 
been accepted widely outside of specific academic circles, however. The removal 
of some of the opprobrium towards racism in the United States under the current 
administration, has witnessed a resurgence of openly displayed race hatred and 
neo‑Nazi activity. This has shocked race deconstructionists and has shown that 
science imposed from outside is unlikely on its own to prevent racialisation, 
race‑based derogatory discourse, and flat‑out hate speech. This is because most 
people believe that race is a real biological fact, and deeply held beliefs previously 
maintained completely in private are being aired publicly because they have been 
tacitly authorised. In other words, the deeply held beliefs about the biological 
reality of race were only suppressed out of fear of disapproval or legal action. This 
trend is also indicative of a deep distrust of science amongst the general public 
in the United States borne of the belief that science is not about the discovery of 
facts, but is a politicised belief system. However, the semantic intent of race as a 
metaphysical biological reality has been overridden by better understanding of 
biology and genetics (Graves, 2015; Long & Kittles, 2009a).
If race is to stand as a biological fact, and for it to have an ontological standing 
as such, it should only be defined by a biological meaning. This does not stop 
people from adding contemporary ideas such as biogeography to make new 
racial terms, or to redefining and reinscribing old terms (Spencer, 2015). This 
has been done in reaffirming the reality of the United States Census categories 
according to or as coincident with reconceptions of  Blumenbach’s continental race 
groupings (Spencer,  2009).1 These reconceptions rely on ideas of within‑species 
1 The United States Census website states: “What is race? The Census Bureau defines race 
as a person’s self-identification with one or more social groups. An individual can report 
as White, Black or African American, Asian, American Indian and Alaska Native, Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, or some other race. Survey respondents may report 
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variation being developed as geographic isolates. In biological speciation theory, 
geographically restricted populations evolving in isolation is a major cause of 
subspecies arising and new species developing. That is, given some long period 
of isolation and further differentiation there would arise subspecies and rising 
eventually to the level of a separate species. Is this what is of expected of humans? 
Geography is not biology though. Humans have always been mobile, and few 
instances of true population isolation without migration or gene flow have ever 
been identified. Differences in skin colour are adaptions to different ecological 
(solar) circumstances, but these differences do not describe trophic‑level 
sub‑speciation as in ecological speciation models. Therefore, at no time has Homo 
sapiens been a species with separate subspecies on the way to becoming multiple 
new species. Despite this, the concept of population isolation is the central tenet of 
race purity laws. The concept fuels the propagation of beliefs about miscegenation, 
and of race mixing leading to genetic degradation, that are favoured by far‑right 
and neo‑Nazi groups. This is the belief that selection on human variation is 
eliding deleterious genes to promote a Nietzschean übermensch within one single 
ecological or geographic isolate. Originally, there was one pair of humans, who had 
evolved from other near‑humans in the ancestral line. Races are never ancestral but 
always develop later from within‑species variation working through other factors. 
Humans are, and have always been, a single species and they must remain so as 
people become ever more admixed and gene flow over long distances continues. 
Species as a metaphysical reality are individuals (Ghiselin, 1997). They can 
be described but not defined. They are not a class or a set or a kind. Species are 
real individual things, but subspecies are never that. Races or biological isolates, 
genetic groupings, natural geographic populations, a group, a defined class, a set, 
are biologically subspecific entities and have no metaphysical individual reality 
(Ghiselin,  1997). These can be defined and are always specific to a temporally 
and semantically contingent usage. The United States Census categories are 
defined by the Bureau of the Census and their definitions changes with time and 
are only understood clearly by the people of the time and place where the usage is 
understood, even if the majority think they clearly understand the terms. Everyone 
who thinks of race applies a biological definition to it and, in addition, applies 
geographic/social/ethnic definitions used to further refine the term. Biology is 
always present in such conceptions because race is a quasi‑taxonomic idea.
multiple races. What is ethnicity? Ethnicity determines whether a person is of Hispanic 
origin or not. For this reason, ethnicity is broken out in two categories, Hispanic or Latino 
and Not Hispanic or Latino. Hispanics may report as any race.” These definitions are not 
exclusive and do not map easily to continents (Blumenbach, 2000; Spencer, 2009).
150      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
No matter how we define species, as a cladistics species of common descent (Kluge 
& Wolf, 1993), a biologically isolated non‑interbreeding individual thing, or an 
idealised abstract individual thing, they all have the commonality of individuality 
(Ghiselin, 1997). Mere lists of characters are the phenotype, and the idea of a 
phenetic species definition was long abandoned as unstable and non‑exclusive and 
not an individual. The species must be unique and is never defined by membership 
in a class or a set (Ghiselin, 1997). This is never true of variation within a species. 
A  local geographic grouping of members of a species (or a deme) is always 
temporally contingent. Given enough time, the variant population will either merge 
back with the greater population it emerged from, or will become specialised or 
drift away from the mean so as to be no longer a variant but something definite and 
individual of itself. Races will disappear or become further differentiated with time. 
There is no realism or antirealism with respect to races, they are defined unstably 
to suit an end and have no enduring metaphysical standing. Any essentialism 
or typologies have stasis as their underlying emphasis and privilege stasis over 
change. Essentialism shows something to be real and immutable like a real number 
or pi which has essence even if not fully innumerable. In discussions of species, 
essentialism is often thought of as an archetype. So, if a race was an immutable 
Aristotelian thing, it could not be changing by definition, neither geographically or 
historically. We should not be able to confuse the properties and the parts of a race 
if they are describing a real thing. Populations are always interdependent on their 
members, whereas, an individual is not interdependent with another individual or 
with a group. The concept of a population in genetics is not as an Individual but as 
a class or a group and as such a population; therefore, population is never stable and 
is always changing the frequencies of its various genetic components. If we were 
to take complete genomes instead of arbitrary chosen genes, then each individual 
would be just an individual. If we take the complete genomes of all the variants 
within a species, it too would be an Individual thing encompassing all the variation 
but not identical to any other species. This is again not true with subspecies.
The null hypothesis for race definition, race‑thinking, or racialism must be that 
humans are one species, not that races are real in any metaphysical sense. Before 
there can be race deniers, there have to be race affirmers. The affirmers of race have 
not yet shown race to be biologically real. The human species is an Individual and 
does exhibit variation and other properties, but these are temporarily contingent 
and open to various almost infinite definitions. These definitions are chosen for 
a purpose. They are said to have utility for that purpose. It is beyond metaphysics 
to say that the purpose is valid only whether it is not real or not. Race not being an 
individual thing like a species is only ontologically sound if the definition is spelled 
out on for each occurrence the term is invoked. This never happens. Therefore, 
people say they know race when they see it: race is so flexible and inclusive that 
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everyone can see it how they want. When they try to put that into words, the 
semantic meaning of race becomes so great as to have no utility across society.
Talking about race and race talk
Should we stop talking about race? In a word, no. Denial of race will not bring about 
the demise of race, rather the cloaking of race will only perpetuate the power of the 
idea and increase its potential for harm. What we need to do is unpack the term 
“race” from other confusions about it. Race is not biology, linguistics, nor is it an 
ethnic grouping. It is not class. Race is not shorthand biology or any other grouping 
definition. The continued use of race serves no useful purpose. Race is not racism 
and the end of race classification is not the end of racism. We must recognise, 
though, that continued belief in real races and the biological or social reality of 
the race concept provide justification for a racially inequitable status quo and for 
continued social marginalisation of historically disadvantaged groups (Williams 
& Eberhardt, 2008). We can be fairly sure that minor genetic differences that are 
not correlated to each other, are masked by varying amounts of admixture. Some 
of these are adaptive with respect to different climates and other environmental 
circumstances, but they cannot make people act in any particular group‑correlated 
way. Outside of an Us–Them dichotomy, a “group‑think” would never be applied. 
No one invokes the sinister left‑handed group as a cause of crime, or that the 
possession of red hair has any meaning at all, even if we can define such groups with 
good ontological standing. Race is an historical anachronism, just like the idea of 
left‑handedness or red‑headedness being evil.
We cannot stop race talk, and in fact, it is vital we do not stop race talk. When we use 
it, however, we need to be very specific by what we mean by it. A neologism would 
help prevent racism but is fraught with difficulties of definition and acceptance. 
Changing language was successful in the case of gay. A more widespread and 
accepted redefinition of gendered speech has been a result of a change in attitude to 
gender equality and anti‑sexism drives. A similar effort at de‑gendering discourse 
has had less scientific study than those of biological race studies but has been 
widely accepted in society. The routine abandonment of the use of gendered 
diminutives is now widely accepted and previous usage is falling by the wayside as 
a result of generational change, such as female actor for actress or flight attendant 
for air hostess. This kind of change has yet to be seen in race discourse even though 
the rejection of race has a history equal in duration to the equal rights movement. 
Feminism as a movement, along with the rejection of homophobia and systematic 
discrimination in either case, is unacceptable today. This can be seen as a result of 
changes initiated in the social new order growing in the 1960s. These lexical success 
stories in sexuality and gender are not mirrored in the sphere of race, even though 
the civil rights movement has a slightly longer history than feminism. 
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Conclusion
In speaking of race today, racial typologies should never be invoked. Race should 
be spoken about only in an historical context or in terms of current racism. All 
attempts at othering need to be resisted and any Us–Them divide removed. While 
many may see such changes as unrealistic or even undesirable, the abandonment 
of race labels freighted with historical baggage is essential. We cannot just keep the 
“good parts” of race, because othering has no good side. The unity of humanity is 
paramount. There should not be further attempts to resurrect racial thinking as 
a shorthand for something else. If we can unpack all confounding terms, we can 
show that racial thinking and, certainly, racism are never right. We can stop racism 
and discrimination, but not by post‑racialism. Today still, racism is real even if 
races are not.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Theresa (Tess) Wilson for help with obtaining and maintaining 
bibliographic materials. We thank our colleague, Gerhard Maré, for valuable 
discussions as we developed early drafts of this chapter. We are grateful to many 
colleagues over the years for discussions of philosophy of taxonomy foremost 
amongst these being Arnold Kluge, and the California Academy of Sciences “Pizza 
Munch” philosophy of science forum led by Mike Ghiselin. We extend a special 
thank you to Mike, a man of supreme erudition, and acknowledge with gratitude 
his wonderful book, Metaphysics and the Origin of Species (Ghiselin, 1997). He 
generously donated time to explain principles of taxonomy and their implications 
to us. The ideas conveyed in this chapter are our responsibility alone.
Semantics in the philosophy of race  |      153
References
Bamshad, M.J.; Wooding, S.; Salisbury, B.A. 
& Stephens, J.C. 2004. Deconstructing 
the relationship between genetics and race. 
Nature Reviews Genetics, 5. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nrg1401
Blumenbach, J.F. 2000. On the natural variety 
of mankind. In: R. Bernasconi & T.L. Lott 
(eds.). The Idea of Race. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company Inc.
Chaplin, G. 2018. An informational taxonomy 
of race-ideation. In: N.G. Jablonski 
& G. Maré (eds.). The Effects of Race. 
Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
Croom, A.M. 2011. Slurs. Language Sciences, 
33(3). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
langsci.2010.11.005 
Croom, A.M. 2013. How to do things with 
slurs: Studies in the way of derogatory 
words. Language & Communication, 
33(3). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
langcom.2013.03.008
Eberhardt, J.L. 2005. Imaging race. American 
Psychologist, 60(2). https://doi.
org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.181
Eberhardt, J.L. & Randall, J.L. 1997. 
The essential notion of race. 
Psychological Science, 8(3). https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00412.x
El-Haj, N.A. 2007. The genetic reinscription 
of race. Annual Review Of Anthropology, 
36(1). https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
anthro.34.081804.120522
Ghiselin, M.T. 1997. Metaphysics and the 
Origin of Species. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press.
Graves Jr., J.L. 2003. The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the 
Millennium. New Brusnwick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press.
Graves Jr., J.L. 2015. Why the nonexistence 
of biological races does not mean the 
nonexistence of racism. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 59(11). https://doi.
org/10.1177/0002764215588810
Jablonski, N.G. 2012a. Living Color: The 
Biological and Social Meaning of Skin 
Color. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press.
Jablonski, N.G. 2012b. The struggle to 
overcome racism. Opinion – The Big Idea. 
New Scientist. 1 September. https://bit.
ly/2thDcoj
Kluge, A.G. & Wolf, A.J. 1993. Cladistics: 
What’s in a word? Cladistics, 9(2).  
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1096-0031. 
1993.tb00217.x
Lee, S.S-J.; Mountain, J.L. & Koenig, B.A. 
2001. The meanings of “race” in the 
new genomics: Implications for health 
disparities research. Yale Journal of Health 
Policy, Law, and Ethics, 1. https://bit.
ly/374Uof5
Long, J.C. & Kittles, R.A. 2009a. Human 
genetic diversity and the nonexistence of 
biological races. Human Biology, 81(5-6). 
https://doi.org/10.3378/027.081.0621
Long, J.C.; Li, J. & Healy, M.E. 2009b. Human 
DNA sequences: More variation and 
less race. American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology, 139(1). https://doi.
org/10.1002/ajpa.21011
Maré, G. 2000. Race thinking and thinking 
about race: Suggestions for terminology. 
Research Review, 15. 
Maré, G. 2011. ‘Broken down by race…’: 
Questioning social categories in redress 
politics. Transformation: Critical 
Perspectives on Southern Africa, 77. https://
doi.org/10.1353/trn.2011.0037
Relethford, J.H. 2009. Race and global patterns 
of phenotypic variation. American Journal 
of Physical Anthropology, 139(1). https://
doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.20900
Samson, J. 2005. Race and Empire. Harlow, UK: 
Pearson Education Limited.
Soudien, C. 2012. The modern seduction of 
race: Whither social constructionism? 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives 
on Southern Africa, 79. https://doi.
org/10.1353/trn.2012.0022
154      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
Soudien, C. 2020. Knowing and being: Living 
our learning about ‘race’. In: N.G. Jablonski 
(ed.). Persistence of Race. Stellenbosch: 
African Sun Media.
Spencer, Q. 2009. Is cladistic race a genuine 
kind? PhD thesis. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University.
Spencer, Q. 2015. Philosophy of race meets 
population genetics. Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 52(Supplement  C). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.04.003
Sussman, R.W. 2014. The Myth of Race: The 
Troubling Persistence of an Unscientific 
Idea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/
harvard.9780674736160
Thompson, D. 2017. Ice Cube did everyone a 
favor and schooled Bill Maher on his use 
of the N-word. Vibe. 10 June. https://bit.
ly/2Rtz0JR 
UNESCO. 1952. The Race Concept: Results of 
an Inquiry (The Race Question in Modern 
Science). Paris: UNESCO.
Wade, N. 2002. Race is seen as real guide to 
track roots of disease. New York Times 
[Online]. https://nyti.ms/2uTtU20
Watson, E.C. 2017. Sportswriter uses 
Notorious B.I.G. lyric containing N-word 
to comment on LeBron James-Knicks 
scuffle. Okayplayer. https://bit.ly/36445t8 
Williams, M.J. & Eberhardt, J.L. 2008. 
Biological conceptions of race and the 
motivation to cross racial boundaries. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
94(6). https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.94.6.1033
 |      155
“WHO WAS HERE FIRST?”, 
OR “WHO LIVES HERE NOW?”
Indigeneity, a difference like no other
Zimitri Erasmus
9
On 6  February  2019, the South African parliament approved the Traditional 
Leadership and Khoi‑San Bill B 23 D‑2015 (hereinafter, “the Bill”) (RSA, 2015). 
This comes after close to a decade of struggles, on the part of communities who self‑
identify as “Khoi‑San”, for constitutional recognition as “traditional communities” 
and “indigenous people”, alongside communities already recognised as such 
since 2003. Section 1.2 of the memorandum on the Bill states that: “While certain 
traditional structures and leadership positions have … been recognised by law in 
compliance with the Constitutional prescripts, there has never before been statutory 
recognition of the Khoi‑San” (emphasis added). 
Approval of this Bill also comes in the wake of two reports: the first, by the 
United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, on the “human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people” (hereinafter, “the 
Stavenhagen Report”) (UNCHR,  2005), and the second, by the South African 
Human Rights Commission on the national hearing on the human rights of the 
Khoi‑San (hereinafter, “the SAHRC Report”) (SAHRC,  2018). I argue, first, 
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that these documents produce “indigeneity” as a special kind of difference and 
present this difference as one that exceeds the banality of “race”; second, that 
these claims of culture encourage a politics of minorities premised on conservative 
multiculturalism; and third, that this politics has the potential to hinder broad‑
based solidarity and struggles for social justice.
The Bill in brief
Historically, the Bill must be seen against the backdrop of the Bantu Authorities 
Act of 1951 which initiated the apartheid state’s policy of “separate development” 
under Prime Minister Daniel Malan, and the Promotion of Bantu Self‑Government 
Act of 1959 passed under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. These Acts divided 
the majority of South Africans – classified under apartheid first as “native”, then 
as “Bantu” and later as “black” – into separate ethnic groups “self‑governed” 
by chiefs who were co‑opted by the apartheid regime. Premised on apartheid’s 
colonial and ethnological reasoning, these Acts racialised, ethnicised and 
differentiated citizenship, bound culture to custom, and fixed each to a demarcated 
geographical territory which it called a “homeland” or “Bantustan”. These were 
amongst a battery of apartheid laws that wove together ideas of “race”, culture, 
custom, nation, citizenship, territory and rights. Not all South Africans with lived 
experiences of blackness – the political concept that refers to people oppressed and 
disenfranchised under white supremacist rule – were racially classified “black” and 
allocated to a “homeland”. Instead, those with diasporic histories of indenture and 
of slavery were and continue to be classified as “Indian” and “coloured” respectively. 
South Africans who claim “Khoi‑San” identities today are historically classified 
as “coloured”. 
Contemporaneously, the Bill must be situated in relation to the South African 
Constitution (1996) which, considering the legacy of the 1913 Natives Land Act, 
provides for land restitution to individuals and communities dispossessed of land 
and property as a consequence of this Act. With reference to legislation passed 
by the post‑1994 democratic government, the Bill serves to repeal three laws that 
recognised, provided for and regulated “traditional communities” since  2003. 
These include the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 
of 2003, Act No. 23 of 2009, and the National House of Traditional Leaders Act 
No.  22 of 2009. Furthermore, the Bill must be situated in the context of failed 
local government, increasing inequality, contestations about the implementation 
of policies for redress, and the material and symbolic question of land restitution. 
This statutory frame mirrors the apartheid state’s Bantu administration and casts 
social struggles into its mould.
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The Bill provides for the recognition of communities who self‑identify as 
“traditional” and “indigenous” Khoi‑San. It provides for the establishment of 
national, provincial, and local institutions to administer these communities and 
for the salaries of “traditional” and elected leaders. Chapter 4 Section 51 of the 
Bill makes provision for a Commission on Khoi‑San Matters. Akin to bodies that 
produced “knowledge of the natives” to enable colonial rule, members of this 
Commission are required to
[…] have a qualification or experience in or knowledge appropriate to
(i) anthropology;
(ii) history relating to the Khoi‑San;
(iii) customary law and customs and the institutions of Khoi‑San leadership; 
or law (Section 52.1 (b) and …
… must collectively represent a pool of knowledge concerning issues relevant 
to the Khoi‑San groupings (Section 52.1 (c) [to fulfil its function which is] … 
to investigate and make recommendations to the [relevant] Minister on the 
recognition of [these communities and their hereditary and elected leaders]. 
 (RSA, 2015:Section 57.1)
The memorandum on the Bill summarises its key objectives to
– transform the traditional and Khoi‑San institutions in line with 
constitutional imperatives such as the Bill of Rights;
– restore the integrity and legitimacy of the institutions of traditional and 
Khoi‑San leadership in line with customary law and practices; and
– protect and promote the institutions of traditional and Khoi‑San leadership. 
 (RSA, 2015:Memorandum, Section 1.5)
It further notes that these objectives are based on principles that “derive their 
mandate and primary authority from applicable customary law and customs”; 
promote freedom, human dignity, nation building, peace and cooperative and 
democratic governance with organs of state; “strive to enhance tradition and 
culture”; and that “advance gender equality within the institutions of the traditional 
and Khoi‑San leadership” (RSA, 2015: Memorandum, Section 1.6).
Significantly, activists and scholars have criticised the role and relevance of a House 
for Traditional Leaders and of the Bill in a democratic government (see Ainslie & 
Kepe, 2016; Jara & Macingwana, 2017; Ntsebeza, 2005). They provide evidence 
that the jurisdictions of today’s “traditional” leaders mirror apartheid’s demarcation 
of “homelands”. Drawing on the work of social scientist Mahmood Mamdani, 
Mazibuko Jara and Vukile Macingwana (2017) argue that the Bill entrenches a 
bifurcated neo‑apartheid arrangement which reduces rural South Africans to “tribal 
subjects” and undermines struggles for the democratisation of rural governance and 
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for substantive economic equality. These include struggles against the exploitation 
and ecological destruction of resources by global mining conglomerates; against 
commercial bioprospecting and for related rights to intellectual property derived 
from indigenous knowledge; against the tourist use‑for‑profit of heritage and 
sacred sites and artefacts; struggles for the return of human remains; and struggles 
against elites who benefit from business relationships between government, private 
companies and “traditional” leaders who enjoy locally centralised political power. 
It is important to note that irrespective of their cultural affiliations and of the ways 
in which they were classified historically, the post‑1994 government has not served 
poor people, most of whom migrate between rural and urban areas, in ways that it 
could and should have. 
The unintended consequence of efforts to protect the rights of “Khoi‑San” 
communities as minorities has the potential to divide and weaken the struggles of 
poor people as a whole. This is evident from reported findings of a panel led by 
former president Kgalema Motlanthe which advocated that parliament scrap the 
Bill. Despite its argument that the Bill undermines the property and citizenship 
rights of one‑third or close to 19 million of South Africa’s population, parliament 
ignored this panel’s recommendations (Kiewit, 2019). 
The Reports: Producing a difference like no other
The Stavenhagen (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2005) and the 
SAHRC (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018) Reports draw on a range 
of reports on “indigenous peoples” produced by the UN, the International Labour 
Organisation and various African Commissions amongst other organisations, 
commissions and working groups. Of significance to this chapter are two definitions 
of the concept “indigenous”. The Report of the African Commission’s Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities defines “indigenous 
peoples” as (a) collectives of people each with an historical attachment to land, 
territory and a specific way of life; (b) who self‑identify by specific cultural and 
legal practices that are discrete and distinct from dominant or mainstream social 
practice; and (c) whose histories and social practices render them invisible and 
vulnerable to discrimination (UNCHR, 2005:60‑103). The Stavenhagen Report 
(UNCHR,  2005) draws from the International Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations for its operative definition of “indigenous”: “non‑dominant groups 
of aboriginal or prior descent with distinct territorial and cultural identities” 
(UNCHR,  2005:9, emphasis added). In South and southern Africa, the term 
“indigenous” has generally referred to Bantu‑language‑speaking communities and 
the legal and cultural practices associated with these. This designation was used to 
differentiate linguistic communities who constitute the majority in the region from 
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smaller European settler communities on the one hand, and on the other hand from 
smaller diasporic communities considered to be “Asian”, “Indian” and “coloured” 
(misguidedly understood to be “of mixed race”).
Each of these definitions map indigenous‑ness onto continuity with pre‑invasion 
and precolonial societies to produce “indigeneity” as a static and idealised 
difference that is older than all other difference, uncontaminated by the politics 
of power, and violated historically by patterns of migration, slavery, colonialism 
and apartheid. The SAHRC Report mobilises the popularised notion – derived 
mainly from archaeology, physical anthropology and human population genetics 
– that the Khoi‑San represent an older difference. It notes that these communities 
are “widely recognised as the descendants of the original Homo sapiens or ‘modern 
day man’, whose ancestry can be traced back 150,000 years” (SAHRC, 2018:19). 
Furthermore, it points out that the San are estimated to have lived in the region 
for at least 120 000 years and that the Khoi arrived in what we know today as the 
Western Cape some 2 000 to 2 500  years ago. The Report contrasts these long 
historical connections with later migrations to southern Africa from its central 
regions and from Europe (SAHRC, 2018:19). This Report specifically notes 
allegations by the Gauteng Provincial Khoi and San Council of violence against 
indigenous communities since the arrival of these African migrants and European 
settlers (SAHRC, 2018:25).
The Stavenhagen Report acknowledges that “all indigenous peoples of South 
Africa were oppressed and discriminated against” (UNCHR, 2005:2, emphasis 
added) under apartheid and that post‑1994, “Blacks [continue to] constitute the 
poorest segment of the population, making up over 90 per cent of the 22 million 
poor” (2005:6). As with all black South Africans, the Report admits that what 
it refers to as Khoi‑San “ethnic groups” – which it estimates to include 315 000 
to 325 000 people (ibid.:7) – are internally differentiated (ibid.:9, 10) when it 
comes to substantive access to social services. Nevertheless, the Report maintains 
that these indigenous people “tend to be more marginalised” (ibid.:2) than other 
South Africans. It makes three significant recommendations. First, “that the 
legal institutions maintaining the stigma of their [the Khoi‑San] classification as 
‘Coloureds’ by the apartheid regime be removed” (ibid.:3). Second, that the South 
African government keeps a “national register of officially recognised indigenous 
communities” (ibid.:3, 19). And third, that “the restitution of land claims by 
indigenous communities not be limited to the cut‑off date of 1913” (ibid.:3). This 
third recommendation is not novel. It follows on a 2003 ruling of the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal that communities of the Richtersveld in the Northern 
Cape are eligible for restitution because they were dispossessed of their land 
through racial discrimination prior to 1913 (Trahan, 2004).
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The first and second recommendations of the Stavenhagen Report (UNCHR, 
2005) effectively amount to the reclassification of some historically classified 
“coloured” South Africans who self‑identify as “indigenous Khoi‑San”. It does not 
contest the practice of classification per se. This is evident from the emphasis in 
the related SAHRC Report “that an agreed national standard for identification, 
verification and classification of indigenous communities in South Africa is 
needed” (SAHRC, 2018:54). The SAHRC Report suggests twelve groups so far. 
It further notes that such recognition will enable communities to “manage their 
own affairs” (ibid.:88). This discourse is frighteningly reminiscent of apartheid’s 
Population Registration Act of 1950, its race classification practices, and its battery 
of legislation for Bantu Administration. It points to a post‑1994 ethnographic 
state and post‑1994 divide and rule. Like the Stavenhagen Report, the SAHRC 
Report acknowledges that “other African communities [in South Africa] may be 
considered to be indigenous” (ibid.:8).
Nevertheless, both Reports draw on a global discourse of “indigeneity” in an 
effort to construct “the Khoi‑San” as especially “indigenous”. The discourse of 
the SAHRC Report positions the Khoi‑San as a “population with special needs 
and views” (SAHRC, 2018:10) that requires what President Jacob Zuma called 
a “Special Moment” for land restitution (ibid.:48) and other “special measures” 
(ibid.:87) for its recognition. It argues for the recognition of the Khoi‑San as “the 
first peoples to inhabit South Africa” (ibid.:38). Moreover, the SAHRC Report 
positions contemporary claims to be indigenous and Khoi‑San in opposition to 
the racial classification “coloured” during and after apartheid suggesting that today, 
the former confers more dignity than the banal race category. This discursive move 
conceives of the Khoi‑San as a community distinct from “coloured” communities, 
as well as from what we have come to refer to as “black African” communities. In 
sum, both the Stavenhagen and the SAHRC Reports are premised on a discourse of 
conservative multiculturalism that is unlikely to contribute to cultivating a culture 
of social justice in this place at this time. What would it mean to see all communities 
with histories of conquest, slavery, indenture, and displacement as part of black 
experiences in South Africa?
Culture and custom
Culture has never the translucidity of custom; it abhors all simplification. In 
its essence it is opposed to custom, for custom is always the deterioration 
of culture.  (Fanon, 1990:180)
Frantz Fanon counter‑poses culture with custom. Culture is understood here to be 
the living practices of everyday life in the present and towards possible futures. 
It refers to the complex ways in which we continuously forge our existence within 
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historically located and always contested fields of meaning and relations. As sites 
of power, these fields lend themselves as much to assertions of power as to the 
improvisations that emerge from complex negotiations and contestations of power. 
Custom refers to the revival of an imagined way of life from a time long gone in 
an attempt to claim authenticity and belonging, and to justify rights. Custom 
turns culture into an unchanging set of practices that not only distinguishes but 
separates one group of people from another across time and space despite their 
historical interconnections. According to custom, culture is transmitted in almost 
hereditary fashion from one generation to another or ascribed according to lineage 
and, culture is executed repetitively according to a set of rules preserved by its 
custodians, usually traditional leaders. Improvisation is to culture as rigidity is 
to custom. 
Section 5.1 (a) of South Africa’s Traditional Leadership and Khoi‑San Bill recognises 
and provides for custom in the terms outlined above. 
A community may … apply to the Premier [of the province] concerned to be 
recognised as a Khoi‑San community if it
(i)  has a history of self‑identification by members of the community 
concerned, as belonging to a unique community distinct from all other 
communities;
(ii)  observes distinctive established Khoi‑San customary law and customs;
(iii)  is subject to a system of hereditary or elected Khoi‑San leadership with 
structures exercising authority in terms of customary law and customs of that 
community;
(iv)  has an existence of distinctive cultural heritage manifestations;
(v)  has a proven history of existence of the community from a particular point in 
time up to the present; and
(vi)  occupies a specific geographical area or various geographical areas together 
with other non‑community members (all emphasis added).  (RSA, 2015)
Legal scholar Yvette Trahan notes that South African jurisprudence draws this 
conception of custom from its adaptation and synthesis of British and Dutch 
colonial law. She writes that for English law “custom” has four attributes: “(1) it 
must be immemorial (must have been in existence from a time preceding the 
memory of man, a date fixed at 1189 AD); (2) it must be reasonable; (3) it must be 
certain; and (4) it must have continued as a right and without interruption since its 
immemorial origin” (Trahan, 2004:569). And, the same criteria apply for Roman‑
Dutch law except that the latter “only requires the custom to be an old one” (ibid.).
In contrast to this conception of culture, anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argues 
that, as cultural beings, humans are more than simply “bearers of history, custom, 
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and habit” (Appadurai, 2013:267). People live with pasts that matter and dream of 
futures – though unknown and uncertain – that matter, too. What happened shapes 
what is possible. We should not forget to pay attention to the future. In this vein, 
Fanon (1986:229) writes:
There are in every part of the world men who search.
I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my 
destiny.
I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing 
invention into existence.
In the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself. 
Here, Fanon distinguishes between history as prison and invention as a route out 
of this prison. History refers in part to Europe’s creation of race/culture/tribe as 
the destiny of the colonised: outside of, without, or forever trapped in history. In 
contrast, invention is a route out of the pre‑ and over‑determining workings of race/
culture/tribe. This infinite and iterative process unsettles colonial conceptions of 
culture as static, “tribal” and racialised. Invention is both disruptive and generative. 
It breaks and makes. Invention undoes the existing social order. It cultivates new 
institutions, new practices and new ways of being for a new social order. It turns 
politics into a living practice for the future and accounts for the ways in which 
human life involves improvisation. David Marriott interprets Fanon’s distinction 
between history and invention to suggest that “the meaning of the future cannot 
by definition be a simple matter of what happened in the past” (Marriot, 2012:64). 
Instead, this meaning is always open‑ended.
Recognition and social justice
Both the Stavenhagen (UNCHR, 2005) and the SAHRC (2018) Reports construe 
claims in a discourse of human rights which encourages striving for the recognition 
of claims of culture. Such a politics of recognition produces a proliferation of 
difference premised on stories about the past that frame and valorise difference 
in terms of degrees of belonging, which translate into degrees of entitlement and 
legitimacy. The questions that drive these stories include: Who was here first? Who 
came here first? How did you come here: by foot or by boat? Rights bound to ethnology 
make difference absolute, endow it with intrinsic value and turn it into a currency 
used to bargain about belonging and entitlement. This severs difference from 
shared (even if differentially) institutionalised violence and inequality produced 
by slavery, colonialism, apartheid and their attendant forms of domination, 
dispossession and exploitation that continue in different ways today. Such a narrow 
conception of difference undermines broader struggles for social justice.
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Anthony Bogues’ distinction between “political association” on the one hand 
and “common association” on the other hand, is valuable here. The former refers 
to “but one human practice among others” (Bogues, 2012:40). The latter refers 
to ways of life that encompass an “expanded notion of rights to include social 
rights” such as access to housing, health care, a living wage, and education; that 
practice substantive or radical equality; and that cultivate participatory forms of 
democracy (ibid.:40‑42). On this view, “political association” can be understood as 
identification and “common association”, as solidarity.
This returns me to Fanon who writes:
My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. (1986:135).
It was not the black world that laid down my course of conduct. My black skin 
is not the wrapping of specific values (1986:227).
In the first quotation above, Fanon tells us that his black consciousness is valid and 
has meaning because of the particular circumstances of his life: his lived experience 
of being black in the world. In the second, he reminds that his solidarity with the 
Vietnamese during the Vietnamese war was not determined by “the black world” 
nor was his “black skin … the wrapping” of the political values that shaped this 
solidarity. This highlights the way in which the political associations we make are 
shaped by the ways in which we learn to make sense of ourselves and our placement 
in the world. At the same time, these particular political associations do not 
preclude broader associations. 
In this vein, Kenan Malik’s critique of identity politics in the United Kingdom 
and the United States as of the 1990s is poignant. He notes that in the 1960s 
identity politics was a means of challenging oppression within a broader social 
movement for transformation and in the face of a left politics which was blind to 
such oppression. As part of broader struggles against oppression, this politics of 
recognition did not become an end in itself. In contrast, he argues, identity politics 
of the late twentieth and twenty‑first century has become an end in itself, deepening 
social divisions rather than reaching across them, and rendering collective action 
possible only when rooted in identity. He writes: “… the debate is not whether we 
should challenge oppression. It is about how we should do so” (Malik, 2017). 
Closure
Similarly, I do not question the importance of re‑writing the history of Southern 
Africa in ways that account for the presence and contributions of Khoi and San 
communities. Nor do I question efforts on the part of communities who identify 
with this history to fight against poverty and oppression. I do question the ways 
in which local and global legal discourse presses these social struggles into a frame 
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of cultural minorities who effectively become “tribal subjects”. I do question the 
requirement of this discourse that these so‑called “minorities” be officially named 
and statistically counted by these names as separate collectives for their struggles to 
have any significance. This practice is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, it 
implies that you do not count as a citizen or, better still, as a resident with limited access 
to basic resources, unless you are classified as a member of an officially recognised 
cultural, ethnic or racial group. On the other hand, recognition as a member of a 
“traditional community”, which is legally required to be represented statistically in 
this case, strips you of your rights as a citizen or resident. I am concerned about the 
implications for struggles against inequality when ethnological reasoning is used 
to fight for “minority rights” in South Africa today where the majority of South 
Africans are poor and landless. I am concerned about a politics of minorities that 
is framed by the questions “Who was here first?” and “Who came here first?” What 
would it take for South Africa to focus on who lives here now?
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367 years ago, on 6 April 1652, a flotilla of three ships under the command of Jan 
van Riebeeck, landed at what would one day become the city of Cape Town. It 
was Van Riebeeck’s second landing in Cape Town (Richards, 2018; Thom, 1952). 
South Africans today may not easily register the full sense of historic consequence of 
that landing. Over three centuries of incursion, invasion, conquest and occupation, 
layers of experiencing, remembering, and forgetting may have resulted in a kind of 
penumbra of history in which knowledge and ignorance coexisted in the half-dark 
and the half-light as a condition of living through imperial and colonial time. In this 
situation, life for the conquered nationalities of Southern Africa could be textured 
by anxiety, ignorance, half-knowledge, guesswork, speculation, desperate hope, and 
vengeful despair. Such is a state of living that conquerors impose on their subjects, 
and, unwittingly, on themselves! For either, though, the horizon of possibility is 
determined by what measure of control, or the lack of it, each has had over the 
course of their lives.
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There would sometimes be more darkness than light, sometimes more light, in a 
fraught penumbra in which both conqueror and conquered lived, more prone to 
be in conflict than in peace. Ultimately, over time victorious European powers 
succeeded in imposing a tense, ordered stability – the result of an accumulative 
and steadfast imposition of their power and control over Africans in Southern 
Africa and other parts of the Africa. The nature and state of rule that ultimately 
emerged in Southern Africa drew from European experience and lessons learned 
in South America, North America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle-East where 
non-European people were invaded, conquered, and deprived of their lands (Falola 
& Roberts, 2008). 
Technologically driven and therefore far more advanced than other parts of the 
world, the march of mercantile, and later capitalist European enterprise led to an 
unprecedented systemic, predatory hunger for human labour across the world, 
far in organisational scope than the Roman Empire and the world created by 
Genghis Khan (Weatherford, 2012). Europeans, increasingly under the spell of a 
conquering, technologically advanced culture, found it convenient to distinguish 
themselves from peoples they conquered on the basis skin colour, amongst other 
factors. That way, they could distance themselves from the common humanity they 
shared with those they sought to enslave. To establish themselves as a category of 
human above and beyond other humans, Europeans developed and fine-tuned 
categories of human differentiation according to what came to be known as “races.” 
Declaratively or through implicit forms of self-legitimation, they set themselves 
apart at the apex of humanity as the “superior race.” 
In the resulting classification and hierarchical ordering of human beings and 
human value, the people of Africa and the Aboriginals of Australia, came to occupy 
the bottom rung. Other “races” in various gradations of colour and culture in 
Asia, North and South America got to be variously stacked up below Europeans 
but above Africans. Thus are Europeans to this day able to carry their imagined 
high “white” value wherever they are in the world; while Africans continue to be 
associated with low “black” value. 
Those “races” located in the range between “high” and “low” could suffer various 
forms of affirmation or de-affirmation according to which they could feel more or 
less human according to the dominant European norm of “the human”, depending 
on where they were located in the hierarchy of classification. Each could conceivably 
crave recognition from those “above” them; or, according to the contempt they 
received from “above”, dispense contempt towards those “below” them. Thus did 
the “races” in-between implicate themselves in the formal and informal regulation 
of global racial hierarchy. In this manner, this classification of humans, ironically 
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a part of the triumph of European modernism, and which took some five centuries 
to develop, became a norm in the modulation of human relationships across the 
globe to this day.
Over that five hundred-year time frame, in a global order supported by a mode 
of economic production which evolved governance and cultural institutions that 
justified it, the residual low “black” value of the peoples of Africa in contrast to the 
high “white” value of Europeans has had a resilient influence on economic and social 
order in countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and the United States of America 
where “blacks” are a statistically significant part of the national population. Perhaps 
South Africa is the proof of such resilience where the hegemony of racial thinking 
and conduct may be seen to retain currency even where “black” Africans are the 
overwhelming majority in a country in which they are indigenous inhabitants. 
It may seem not to matter significantly that South African “blacks” have won the 
freedom to change their status fundamentally, both in their own country and in 
how they are viewed by the world beyond. Habits of discriminatory interracial 
behaviour cultivated and lived over five centuries of currency may prove difficult 
to discard even where the political conditions for changing them have been won 
and even established. An attitude of reflex reaction to hurt may be discerned in 
the very manner of self-assertion where the extent of activist anti-racist outrage 
may appear disproportionate to its actual cause by a white individual of ordinary 
pursuits, whose own “superiority” is elevated beyond its actual value and status. 
Such “resistance” may reinforce the sense of powerlessness even as the new sense 
of power is invoked. The resilience of systemic oppression tends to overwhelm 
resistance to it for as long its systemic authority, despite its being decried, is still 
embedded in the social and economic realm (Gumede, 2018).
At first emulating invader experience in other parts of the world, and then later 
creating a state designed purposefully around a hierarchical ordering of people 
according to race, the government of South Africa under Prime Minister Malan 
in 1948 consolidated “white” rule in the country into what came to be known as 
“apartheid.” Later, one of the system’s most renowned proponents Hendrik Verwoerd 
who became Prime Minster in 1958, described the system euphemistically as 
“separate development” (Venter & Koers, 1999). Systematic apartheid can be seen 
to be the logical outcome of the British government’s decision to grant dominion 
status to South Africa while leaving “black” South Africans to the fate of successive 
Afrikaner governments. In this way, Britain would maintain sovereignty over South 
Africa, reap attendant economic benefits while being distant from the ongoing 
brutal effects on Africans of its decisions (Ngcukaitobi, 2018). After the institution 
of slavery in the United States, the apartheid system in South Africa became the 
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most driven pursuit and achievement of institutionalised racial order in the world. 
The system pervaded the entire country, affecting every aspect of individual and 
group life. It was a manner of state design and ordering that needed to be imposed 
by its “white” initiators and beneficiaries as much as it would be resisted by its 
“black” victims. Seen against this, Verwoerd’s dream of a political architecture of 
“separate development” nursed a built-in fault line that would crack open along the 
path of the apartheid state’s determined attempts to enforce it.
The Euro-American dominance of the world, partly through “racial” ordering, was 
never a one-sided drama. It was always and continues to be resisted by its “black” 
victims. It is ironically in this resistance that something began to happen which 
called into question both the colonial and imperial Euro-American ordering of the 
world into their racialised exploitation of it. There emerged significant moments 
of intercession and intersection in which solidarities of resistance between some 
sectors of the populations in both the colonising metropolis and its distant 
colonised possessions found confluence in challenging and resisting racial ordering 
and its deleterious effects on relations between people at both the local and global 
levels. The abolitionist movements in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America are cases in point (Duberman, 1935). They show that there 
was no unanimity in the metropolitan centres on the necessity for the institution 
of slavery. The abolitionist movements may have been small, but they were led by 
remarkable people who over time exerted considerable influence against it. 
Local movements of resistance in the colonies, often gaining traction across 
generations of anti-colonial struggles found common cause with traditions 
of enlightened thinking and resistance in other parts of the world, even more 
particularly in the metropolitan colonial centres themselves. Such common 
cause was based on more than moral and ethical grounds. They also recognised 
connections between racial ordering in the colonies and class ordering in the 
European metropolis. The colonised “races” in the colonies and exploited workers 
in capitalist colonising Europe shared an historic interest in collaborating to counter 
the rising impact of capitalism in its local and global manifestations. Communist 
and socialist movements around the world provided organised solidarities of 
collaboration. The enslaved, the colonised, and workers in a global order growing 
in its encompassing nature, increasingly saw themselves as important cogs in the 
ever-intensifying global competition for material resources and human labour. 
They saw in this realisation points of leverage in their common struggle for human 
dignity (Cox, 2014). 
As a consequence of its rigorous, incisive, and strong moral resonance, the Marxist 
critique of capitalism resonated well with colonised and working people the 
world over. Marxism challenged the notion of “race” by highlighting its complex 
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interactions with “economic class”. From the Marxist perspective, capitalism was 
an economic system driven by an inherently antagonistic class interests between 
propertied “owners of the means of production” on the one hand, and on the other, 
workers who sold their labour for a wage. The “owners of the means of production” 
and various groups of the propertied class would grow and wield enormous 
power over both slave and worker. Thus, a common interest between workers 
in the metropolitan centres of colonialism and slaves in the colonies was easy to 
discern, even though slaves were owned and compelled to give their labour with no 
monetary reward, while workers were free to sell for a wage or withhold it. 
Over time, colonial capitalism built and accumulated considerable wealth 
and assets as it also set up global institutions governed by laws that gave formal 
legitimacy to its collective interests and secured its historic advantage. It was able to 
achieve this feat despite the statistically small number of countries that benefitted 
from it relative the number of countries they subjected to their control. Equally so 
the populations of colonised countries far outnumbered the combined populations 
of colonising countries. Europe, and later the United States, compensated for their 
small demographic size with an enormous capacity to enforce their dominance over 
their “possessions” with both economic and military power behind government 
systems they imposed with a range of legislative compulsions on colonised peoples. 
The fundamentals of that relationship whose evolution Vladimir Lenin pondered 
are still in place in much of the world today (Lenin, 1963). 
Over time, economic, technological and cultural dominance created conditions 
in which its benefits, both individual and social, were absorbed into patterns of 
daily lives of people in both the dominant metropolitan countries and in their 
colonial “possessions”. The compulsive effects of such overwhelming economic, 
technological dominance tend to be softer and potentially more lasting than 
naked projections of military power. This is despite the fact that since the 1960s 
and 1970s when many colonised countries won their freedom, the ability of the 
hegemony of dominant nations to universalise rationalisations of their dominance 
was considerably diminished when the power of the colonial order largely lost the 
appearance of permanence. The enormous inequalities in wealth running across 
generations both between and within countries became increasingly unsustainable 
on both economic and moral terms (Piketty, 2017). Climate movements around 
the world have come to underscore the perils that this situation poses for all peoples 
(Nixon, 2011).
These changes in global patterns of hegemony have important implications for 
what it means to be human today. Against the background of global disparities in 
wealth and standards of living, the voices and needs of billions of the world’s once 
repressed people seem poised to shift more and more towards the centre of the 
172      |  PERSISTENCE OF RACE
world’s consciousness. To be human today will be different from what it meant five 
hundred years ago. Invasions and conquests of old have given way to new forms of 
human mobility and a new global sense of right in which belonging to a country 
once colonised, includes an awareness of vital connection with wealthy countries 
in Europe implicated in the backward conditions of struggling countries. The 
concomitant moral rights to claim connection with Europe necessitate the search 
a joint search for balance between unsustainable extremes of wealth and poverty in 
the world. Modern human migrations, some of which have resulted in much stress 
in Europe, in some cases prompting new forms of nationalism and recidivist racism 
to reappear may be an adjustive evolutionary mechanism to achieve balance in 
ways that require new thinking about how people of the world should live together. 
The 1960s in particular saw an historic shift in the evolution of relationships 
between colonising Western countries and their colonies. European countries 
which possessed colonies eventually yielded to irrepressible pressures from the 
colonies to be granted independence. The United Nations (UN) and its various 
agencies bound member states to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
context against which the rights of countries and their peoples to self-determination 
were universally acknowledged. European countries could not be signatories to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and at the same time keep colonies and 
the inherent conditions of injustice by which those colonies were maintained. 
Indeed, the demand by colonised peoples engaged in various struggles for freedom 
had grown to irrepressible levels with mounting costs to their colonisers, making 
colonisation unsustainable. 
In addition to economic costs, there were also profound moral costs. Against the 
background of two world wars in which they engaged in mutual slaughter, European 
countries and the United States profoundly shifted their moral sensibilities and 
in their different ways confronted the weight of the brutal history of their own 
colonisation of other countries. The reconstruction of Europe was accompanied 
by a greater trend towards democracy. Even in its various articulations in both 
capitalist and socialist governments the democratic ethos was recognised as a basis 
for universal participation in the governance of countries as well as in the resolution 
of global conflicts. 
In retrospect, the era of independence for the new countries in Africa was the 
beginning of self-rule in which the first decade of freedom is perhaps best seen 
to be the first of many future transitions in the contemporary evolution of the 
African continent towards self-determination in whatever character that self-
determination may take. For European countries the loss of direct control over 
their colonial possession would certainly have been accompanied by anxieties over 
their future access to mineral resources and trading markets they had access to by 
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rights of dominion. Continued access would now be negotiated. But the context 
of such negotiation was itself fraught with contradictions. Would it be possible to 
achieve fair balance in mutual benefit between negotiators unevenly balanced in 
a global economic and geopolitical climate in which tactical and strategic benefits 
would highly likely accrue heavily towards stronger European and North American 
negotiating partners, who had established over a long period of time the rules and 
cultures of trade and the governance systems to manage and maintain them? 
In addition to global economic and geopolitical contradictions, the character 
of postcolonial independence was shaped by other imponderables. There were 
bonds between the post-colony and departed colonisers that could not be severed 
overnight. Colonial languages, now the official medium of communication, together 
with political, economic, military, educational, judicial, religious, and cultural 
institutions created during colonial times had all established for newly independent 
countries a practical necessity for continuous engagements with former rulers. In 
this context, structures of postcolonial influence for Britain and France would be 
respectively the British Commonwealth and the French Community as structured 
mechanisms of influence to manage changing degrees of sovereignty and calibrate 
continuities and discontinuities of practice with their former colonies.
Nine years after Ghana became the first country in Africa in 1957 to gain indepen-
dence from Britain Kwame Nkrumah, its first Head of State, was overthrown in a 
military coup. Hardly a month earlier, Nigeria’s first post-independent government 
was overthrown in a military coup. Such dramatic seizures of state power ushered in 
the era of military governments in Africa. Many newly elected civilian governments 
were overthrown in military coups ( Japhet,  2012). The causes behind this 
historical development are many and complex, but it could be surmised that the 
first wave of democratically elected governments in Africa were unable to survive 
internal or external pressures to deliver prosperity faster through some measure of 
achieved internal autonomy, or to maintain exploitative relationships with departed 
colonist countries. 
A chief characteristic of the era of military governments was how they reproduced 
repressive, centralised government reminiscent of the way European colonial 
powers had ruled their colonies. In this way, the model of repressive colonial 
government was re-imposed on nominally independent states by their own elites, 
military or civilian. This state of affairs also allowed departed colonial countries the 
convenience following their departure to claim to have no formal responsibility for 
the emergence of totalitarian regimes in their former possessions. Britain in 1910 
achieved this kind of distancing effect in South Africa through an agreement with 
Afrikaners to establish the Union of South Africa. Thus, Britain handed over the 
fate of “black” people to Afrikaners. While military governments in other African 
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countries could exemplify the inability of newly freed nations to take care of 
themselves after having given up the saving graces of “white” colonial protection, 
Britain allowed racial capitalism to continue from a safe formal distance in South 
Africa to Britain’s economic advantage. Ultimately, it will not be easy for former 
colonising countries to distance themselves from the full economic and moral 
implications of their material successes. 
In many newly independent African countries, citizens found it difficult to recognise 
and experience the expected benefits of independence. Their independence did 
not lead to capable states that could ensure security of well-being for citizens in 
their social, economic, and political lives. Visions of freedom that once energised 
struggles for independence seemed to be aborted by the experience of how things 
seem to remain the same even as they change. Many African countries entered 
the competitive global arena as nominally independent countries without the 
wherewithal to compete meaningfully. They remained dependent in their economic 
and political strivings even as freedom was proclaimed by their leaders. How could 
colonial history be transcended by a new and equitable relations between countries 
worldwide? In pondering the unresolved issue of global equity, Frantz Fanon 
opined that the “colonised, underdeveloped man is a political creature in the most 
global sense of the term” (Fanon, 1963).
II 
What implications would such a situation have for countries such as Brazil, South 
Africa and the United States (Hamilton, Huntley, Alexander, Guimarães & James, 
2001)? These countries are of some special interest for the theme of race and being 
human in the world. They have been the furnace in which the full impact of race 
in shaping global attitudes towards the experience and meaning of being human 
has burned furiously in the last 500 years of world history. In these three countries, 
the top and bottom rungs in the global hierarchy of racial order have coexisted and 
interacted in significant population numbers, locked to varying degrees in a fatal 
embrace. What lessons could they offer for the prospect of new human relations in 
the world? 
Václav Havel speculates about the possibilities of a new world. “Above all”, he 
writes “any existential revolution should provide hope of a moral reconstitution 
of society, which means a radical renewal of the relationship of human beings to 
what I have called the “human order” which no political order can replace. A new 
experience of being, a renewed rootedness in the universe, a newly grasped sense of 
“higher responsibility”, a new-found inner relationship to other people and to the 
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human community – these factors clearly indicate the direction in which we must 
go” (Havel, Lukes & Keane, 1990). What would it take to achieve a world such as 
Havel envisaged? 
The New York Times Magazine of 18 August 2019 published “The 1619 Project” 
(2019). It is a rigorously researched and incisive look at the legacy of slavery and 
how on this institution was founded the phenomenal economic prosperity of the 
United States. In its mechanisms, American slavery was as brutal on the slaves 
as it was inventive and hugely profitable for slave owners. From slave narratives 
and factual conditions described in “The 1691 Project”, we can discern how 
slaves in the cotton and sugar plantations of the United States were treated as 
non-human objects. In their non-human state, slaves could be bought, relentlessly 
driven to work in cotton fields from dawn to dusk, and then sold like any other 
commodity. American slavery exemplifies the dehumanisation of people in which 
they were subjected to a system of production that became so pervasive that it 
shaped how “a  category of persons” ( Jones & Dlamini, 2013) can be universally 
devalued. Against the American and global contexts of slavery, it is clear how the 
entire continent of Africa and its peoples became devalued in the eyes of much of 
the world. 
Viewed gainst this historical context, a striking feature of the “The 1619 Project” 
is the assertion by Nicole Hannah-Jones in her essay that the American “founding 
ideals of liberty and equality were false when they were written. Black Americans 
fought to make them true. Without this struggle, America would have no 
democracy at all”. She concludes her essay: “We were told once, by virtue of our 
bondage, that we could never be American. But it was by virtue of our bondage that 
we became the most American of all” (The 1691 Project, 2019). I understand this 
to mean that oppressed people in the world, by their relentless struggles to throw 
off the yoke of oppression in their quest for freedom and human dignity, show up 
to their oppressors impurities in the proclaimed civilising philosophies of goodness 
on the basis of which oppressors displayed their “superiority”. Most of the time, 
from the point of view of oppressed “blacks”, their “white” oppressors even as they 
induced fear in their victims did not appear so superior at those very moments that 
they displayed brutality, whether in the cotton plantations of the United States, 
the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919 in British India, the killing fields that King 
Leopold of Belgium created out of the Congo (Hochchild, 2002), or in the carnage 
of European “world wars”.
The full force of the profound change in the moral sensibilities of Europeans after 
the second World War emerges from their collective realisation of what two “world 
wars” had revealed of the state of Western civilisation. What Europeans saw of 
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themselves in the mirror of history was not a pleasant reflection. This may have 
contributed to a leap of moral imagination to recognise the humanity of those who 
until then had been lowly in the European estimation of what it meant to be human 
in the world. Europeans became more morally mindful of how the enormous 
wealth they created for themselves over the centuries was implicated in their 
degradation of other peoples in the world. Equally so, what white Americans may 
see of themselves in the twenty-first century against the mirror of history reflected 
by “The 1691 Project” will not be pleasant to them. Instead of facing squarely the 
moral dilemmas posed by an economic system whose mechanisms for generating 
profit at the expense of African Americans were founded on the practices of slavery, 
white Americans evolved ingenious ways of maintaining slavery by other subtle 
means (Blackmon, 2008; Duvernay & Moran, 2016). Over time, such resilient 
systems got embedded in political, economic, and social cultures that provide an 
important perspective against which to understand why white American police 
officers are likely to suspect unarmed “black” men as legitimate targets for what 
gets to be justified as legal shootings. It is as if the colour black worn by African 
American men, was itself a gun against which white police officers have felt by 
reflex a necessity to defend themselves despite the absence of an actual weapons 
threat against them (Tillman Jr., 2018). 
From the foregoing, I seek to extrapolate the prospects for working towards 
Havel’s world in which freedom for South African “blacks” who have liberated 
themselves from racial oppression do not have to bear the burden of racism in their 
very understanding of the nature of their freedom. Casting off this burden may be 
harder for African Americans in the United States where they are not the majority 
population. The horizons of possibility will not be the same when the oppressed 
are the majority population as opposed to when they are the minority. 
III 
Section 1 of the South African constitution sets out the values undergirding the 
Republic of South Africa as “one, sovereign, democratic state”. The values are 
spelled out in subsections (a) “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms; (b) non-racialism and non-sexism; 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; (d) Universal adult suffrage, 
a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multiparty system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”. 
I  understand the order to be significant and, in all likelihood, intentional. 
Sections 1(c) and 1(b) are means to achieve the values in (a) and (b). There is in 
this resonant, unifying statement of national values an omission that is central to 
the thesis of this chapter. 
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What is missing in the values of the constitution is one of the most far-reaching 
social legacies of colonial incursion and settlement in South Africa. The discovery 
of diamonds and gold in the 1880s in South Africa led to one of the largest and 
probably the most significant subcontinental migrations in Africa. Hundreds 
of thousands of men across the Southern African subcontinent were forced by 
colonial legal compulsions to abandon their traditional agricultural economy to 
enter the nascent cash economy in which they had to labour for a wage and then 
pay tax. They were also compelled, mostly temporarily but sometimes permanently, 
to abandon their families. They walked or boarded trains from across South Africa, 
Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and 
Zambia, destined to become Africa’s first working-class population in a nascent 
full-blown capitalist economy in Africa, centred in Johannesburg, the city of gold. 
If the cotton plantations established the base of American capitalism, the mines 
were the base of the growth and enormous profitability of South African colonial 
capitalism. If, over time, millions of slaves laboured in the cotton fields of the United 
States and the sugar plantations in the Caribbean Islands, in South Africa millions 
of men across the subcontinent travelled to supply labour for the mines of South 
Africa under the most appalling conditions (Van Onselen, 2019). But something 
close to a miracle happened there in the mines and industries of Johannesburg 
that would to be significant enough to be considered a formative element in the 
quest for social cohesion in nation-building in the distant future of a South African 
constitutional democracy over a century later. 
The value that is missing in the South African constitution was first proclaimed by 
several hundred of representatives of conquered peoples in Southern Africa who 
convened in Bloemfontein in 1912 to establish the South African Native National 
Convention. The educated, nascent African elites (some of them educated in the 
United State in the first decade of the twentieth century) and traditional leaders 
who included those from neighbouring countries such as Swaziland, Botswana 
and Lesotho, congregated in Bloemfontein after the establishment of the Union 
of South Africa to ponder the future of Africans in the new country from whose 
governance they were excluded. They founded the South African Native Congress 
and called for the unity of conquered and oppressed people of the South Africa to 
unite across tribal identities. What they envisioned was to develop on its own over 
nine decades of organised resistance to South African state racism. In the mines 
and industries of Johannesburg, tribal identities became increasingly porous as 
people exchanged languages, traditions, cultures, and intermarried massively over 
the decades. Inter-ethnic conflict in South Africa diminished significantly in scale 
since the 1960s in the same way that war between European countries has not 
occurred since the second world war. Apart from Zulu nationalism, which has been 
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mobilised from time to time since the establishment of the Inkatha Freedom Party, 
there is has been no significant tribal mobilisation for political ends in South Africa.
Against this background, it is significant that the legacy of an historical trend 
towards cross-tribal cohesion has not been affirmed in Section 1(b) of the South 
African constitution. “Non-ethnicism” ought to have stood in the constitution 
along with “non-sexism” and “non-racialism” as a national value. It is significant that 
“white” South Africans as a group are the missing “tribe” in this Southern African 
evolution of non-ethnic solidarity.
This is because “whiteness” from the colonial to the apartheid state was an 
imposed political, economic and geographic norm, but never a demographic one 
(Harris, 1993). To maintain the illusion of South Africa as a “white country”, the 
apartheid state worked hard to construct a majoritarian “whiteness” through land 
acquisitions that resulted in only 13% of the land declared as belonging to “black” 
people, and the rest of the 87% to “white” people. But it was impossible, except by 
genocide, to keep “black” people away from 87% “white” land. Indeed, genocide 
would have made no sense whatsoever because the vast sea of “black” labour was 
necessary to sustain South Africa’s growing capitalist economy for “white” profit. 
Thus, through a deft political psychology, “white” South Africans sort to separate 
themselves from people whose predominant presence they required in other ways. 
To combat racism in South Africa based on how the demographic “white” minority 
has “minoritised” the “black” majority, is to focus on a fundamentally false reality. 
This false reality diverts attention from the real objective of the “black” South 
African struggle for freedom. Combating “racism” only made sense as a tactic for 
political mobilisation. The declared primary objective has been to create a new 
human order in the post-1994 South African nation-state. This latter objective 
became difficult to discern when the tactical means to achieve it assumed 
the apparent status of principal cause. Minorities with power, in this case the 
technological dominance of Western societies, are likely to maintain dominance 
over numerical majorities by violent means. But the fact of such dominance being 
unsustainable was recognised by all the negotiating parties in South Africa who 
agreed on a peaceful transition to democracy in 1994. Following that the “white 
tribe” of South Africa was presented with an historic opportunity find a space, from 
which it has not been excluded, within the predominant, horizontal non-ethnic 
human space that has evolved for over a century of cross-ethnic interactions 
across the industrial landscape of South Africa. Seen against this thinking, the 
constitutional value of “non-racialism” is not sufficient on its own to carry the full 
historic significance of the non-ethnic demographic legacy. Its main weakness is to 
suggest that the relationship between “black” and “white”, is the fulcrum around 
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which hinge future human relationships in South Africa. In reality, “non-racialism” 
accentuates “race” even as it strives to combat it. 
This situation confronts “white” South Africans with a deep existential question: 
where do they really belong in the world? Are they fatally attached to global 
whiteness in its 500-year manifestation across the world such that they would 
prefer to continue to be subject to the burdensome moral problematics of its 
history in a setting where the relevance of that history is destined to be eroded? 
Or, are they capable of ditching global whiteness for a new identity in community 
with a horizontal non-ethnic South African human reality that continues to evolve? 
If South Africa in 1994 significantly challenged global notions of reconciliation, 
would they equally challenge global notions of identity? 
I would argue that the prospect of white South Africans becoming part of the 
demographic legacy of a horizontal community of ethnicities is far more possible in 
South Africa than in the United States. In the United States, the population that has 
historically carried the moral conscience of their country, the African Americans, 
may ultimately only be able to project moral idealism and legitimacy but not be 
able to exercise a decisive influence on the psychic and moral transformation of the 
Euro-American community that may have coalesced into some form of cohesion 
similar to South Africa’s trans-ethnic cohesion but overwhelmingly dominant in 
projecting and maintaining the power of its collective benefits. It is precisely there 
that a significant difference between the South African and American trans-ethnic 
cohesions may be discerned. In the one case, the ethos of cohesion was based on a 
broad political, economic and moral consensus to tolerate the systemic oppression 
and exploitation of fellow citizens who were not seen as such despite being in the 
same country. In the case of South Africa, on the contrary, there was a “black” broad 
inter-ethnic consensus and commitment to combat racial oppression. The birth of 
the South African constitutional democracy in 1994 was an historic achievement of 
this consensus based on the moral idealism and political legitimacy of the majority 
population’s commitment to achieve freedom for all South Africans in an activist 
constitutional democracy. 
At the international level, Europe and its transatlantic component in “white” 
America, as well as in Australia and New Zealand face the challenge of how to live 
in a world shared with billions of non-Europeans who have evolved considerably 
over 500 years of global history and can no longer be colonised and oppressed as 
they used to be. They have become far more aware of their potential to reshape the 
world in ways that push the global environment to became more democratic and 
just. In 2006, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa formed an association 
(BRICS) as major emerging economies. Between them, they account for billions of 
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people who can no longer easily belong to a vertical hierarchy of human value. This 
development strongly suggests that the biggest global challenge of the twenty-first 
century will very well be the quest for a horizontal human space across the world 
that effectively eliminates the terrible legacy of a hierarchy of races that has 
bedeviled human relationships across the world for so long. 
IV
The European Union (EU) has pondered for some time the notion of “a supra-
national democratic system” (Lamy, 2005). The idea has great merit in light of 
profound demographic changes in the global order. But it is an idea that can really 
make sense within a genuine space of equality in global discussion. A voice from 
the Caribbean speaks with great resonance about the global issues at stake. “The 
macro-reality of an ethnically non-white numerical majority being called upon to 
function as a cultural minority in a Eurocentric ethos laced with what has been 
described “the white bias” is part of the repertoire of concerns, apprehensions, 
resentments and frustrations of millions of Caribbean souls, from Haiti to Brazil” 
(Nettleford,  1993). Inward Stretch Outward Reach, the title of Nettleford’s book, 
speaks to a necessary condition for non-Western societies to enter into new and 
meaningful global conversations with Western powers. Non-Western societies 
face the imperative of the “inward stretch” by deepening their internal economic, 
technological, political, and cultural capacity to negotiate “outward reach” from a 
position of greater strength. In this connection, the outward reach of China and 
India might be seen to illustrate the full potential of a visionary, resourceful, and 
concerted “inward stretch”. 
The African Union (AU), established as the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, 
agreed to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area after seventeen years of 
“difficult negotiations” (Krippahl & Welle, 2019). It aspires towards an ambitious 
“Agenda 2063 for a continental market with the free movement of persons, 
capital, goods and services, which are crucial for deepening economic integration, 
and promoting agricultural development, food security, industrialisation and 
structural economic transformation”. The success of such a continental initiative 
will ultimately depend on each member state of the AU “stretching inwardly”. 
Similar regional collaborations in South America, the Middle-East, the Caribbean, 
and Asia express a desire for the emergence of a global order to better manage 
seismic changes in human global relations such as have been occurring since the 
end of the Second World War, in reality a European War. In light of these trends, 
the UN organisation in its current form seems unsuited to respond creatively to 
the fullest implications of unfolding global demographic shifts towards a global 
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order where values of human equality, economic prosperity, and democracy are 
shared. In  particular, the Security Council which has a strong representation of 
veto wielding colonial powers, is a cold war instrument that still connotes imperial 
hierarchies unsuited to the imperatives of horizontal interactions in the global 
community. It is unsuited to the evolving global times.
The appeal of democratic global institutions is that they offer the best chance 
for replacing legacies of race with the human pursuit of universal well-being. 
The challenge for bottom rung Africa will be in how the continent creates and 
leverages multistate capabilities founded on viable bases of internal trade within 
regional economic zones, as envisaged in the African continental free trade area, 
that cooperate with one another to harness a continental economy that can 
compete and collaborate with other global economies for shared benefits. Full 
human dignity will be better achieved and shared through collaborative human 
achievements based on new shared values as a foundation for a different and more 
human global order. 
South Africans might well imagine a flotilla of three ships made in South Africa 
setting sail on their way to The Netherlands with a plan to dock at the port of 
Amsterdam meaningfully on 6  April  2022. The ships will be operated by a crew 
of young South African sailors under a South African commander who with his 
or her crew represent the country’s constitutional demographic profile. Their 
mission will be significantly different from that of Van Reebieck who landed in 
Cape Town 370 years ago on that day to establish a refreshment post for the Dutch 
East India Company for the convenience of company ships on their way to India. 
Young South African passengers will disembark in Amsterdam to meet their young 
Dutch peers and together to explore and negotiate new relationships between The 
Netherlands and South Africa that will contribute towards the evolution of new 
moral, intellectual, political and economic global order across the entire range of 
human endeavour. Havel’s world might suddenly look real. 
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